Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Railroad Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270; Murray v. Patrie, 5 Blatchf. 343; Fisk v. N. P. R. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 362; Clark v. Dick, 1 Dill. 8; Johnson v. Monell, Woolw. 390; McCormick v. Humphrey, 27 Ind. 144; Tod v. Fairfield, 15 Ohio St. 377; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412; Kulp v. Ricketts, 3 Grant, 420; Greely v. Townsend, 25 Cal. 604.) This power is only given by implication; it is the indirect means by which Federal courts acquire jurisdiction. (Railroad Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304.) A case may be removed from a State to a Federal court where it arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, as well as where it arises between citizens of the different States. (Kulp v. Ricketts, 3 Grant, 420.) Congress may determine at what time its power may be invoked, and at what stage of the proceedings a trial may be removed to the Federal courts. (Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10.) No State can take away the privilege conferred upon citizens of other States to sue in the Federal courts, by providing a special remedy in its own courts. (Mason v. Boom Comp., 3 Wall. Jr. 252.) Parties cannot by agreement oust jurisdiction in the federal judiciary. (Davis v. Packard, 6 Peters, 41, 7 Peters, 276; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 415; Cobb v. N. E. Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 192; Hobbs v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 56 Me. 421.) A statute requiring an agreement from a foreign corporation not to remove a cause is void (Morse v. Ins. Co., 20 Wall. 496; Railroad Co. v. Pierce, 27 Ohio St. 155; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 6 Biss. 463; but see Cont. Ins. Co. v. Kasey, 13 Alb. L. J. 311; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Best, 23 Ohio St. 505); but if a license to transact business in a State is made to depend on the condition that the corporation shall not remove any case from a State to a Federal court, the State may revoke it if such removal is made. (State v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 175; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 Alb. L. J. 267; but see Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 6 Biss. 461. See as to transfer into the Federal courts of all suits in the United States Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, Edwards v. Tanneret, 12 Wall. 446.)

§ 2. Extent of judicial power.—The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and

equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;-to all cases affecting embassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;-to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;-to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State;-between citizens of different States;-between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. (U. S. Const. art. 3, sec. 2, cl. 1.)

Jurisdiction.-"Shall extend" is used in an imperative sense, and imports an absolute grant ofpower. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304.) There are three classes of cases enumerated. In the latter class as to controversies, Congress may qualify the jurisdiction, either original or appelJate. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411.) How jurisdiction shall be acquired, whether original or appellate, and the mode of procedure, are left to the wisdom of the legislature (Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247;) so Congress may give the Federal courts original jurisdiction in any case to which appellate jurisdiction extends (Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 9 Wheat. 738;) and may lawfully provide for suits, at the option of the parties, on all controversies between citizens of the different States. (Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10.) When a question within the judicial power becomes an ingredient of the cause, Congress may give the Federal courts jurisdiction. (Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 9 Wheat. 738.) The questions which the case involves must determine its character. (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738.) Congress may provide that a national bank may sue and be sued in the national courts. (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; Bank of U. S. v. Northumberland Bank, 4 Wash. C. C. 108, 4 Conn. 333; Magill v. Parsons, 4 Conn. 317; Bk. of U. S. v. Roberts, 4

Conn. 323.) The judicial power is the instrument provided in administering security to an officer acting in discharge of his duty. (Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412.) It covers every legislative act of Congress. (Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 3 Wis. 1; Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 217.) It is the final arbiter of constitutional construction (Vandorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 3 Wis. 1), and may receive from the legislature the power to construe every constitutional law. (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 735; Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412.) For the judicial power to extend to a violation of the Constitution, it must be “a case in law or in equity" in which a right under such law is asserted in a court of justice. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.) Seeking protection under a law is a case ar sig under that law. (Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412; Kulp v. Ricketts, 3 Grant, 420). The judicial power is unavoidably in some cases exclusive of all State authority, and in others may be made so at the election of the legislative body. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411.) The jurisdiction of the Federal courts in the first three classes of cases in this section is exclusive (State v. McBride, Rice, 4(0); so as to questions arising on treaties, when not political questions. (Wilson v. Wall, 6 Wall. 83; Ex parte Leon, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 301; U. S. v. Lathrop, 17 Jolins. 9; U. S. v. Camp.. bell, 6 Hall L. J. 113; Haney v. Sharp, 1 Dana, 442). Congress may grant exclusive jurisdiction in the United States courts over suits arising under the laws of the United States. (Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Voorhees v. Frisbie, 8 Bank. Reg. 154. So far as the provisions of a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, they are subject to such acts as Congress may pass for their enforcement modification, or repeal. (Edye v. Robertson, 112 U. S. 580.)

Extent of judicial power.-A case in law or equity consists of the right of one party as well as of the other, and it arises when its correct decision depends on the con

FED. PROC.-2.

struction of the Constitution or laws of the United States, Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 379; U. S. v. Williams, 4 Cranch C. C. 392; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 733; Jones v. Seward, 41 Barb. 272; Ex parte Mulligan, 4 Wall. 114.) It is a suit instituted according to the regular course of judicial procedure (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 138; Ŏwings v. Norwood, 5 Cranch, 137; Martin v. Hunter, Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264;) it is limited to such as are between parties or are of a judicial nature (Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; U. S. v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40), and does not include political questions. (Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.) When the subject-matter of a controversy is political, it is beyond the domain of the judiciary, as where it involves the existence de jure of the government, or the legality of some at or proceeding purely governmental. (Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50.) Cases at law include suits in which legal rights are to be ascertained and determined as distinguished from those where equitable rights are administerel (Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 447; Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. 486; and see Strother v. Lucas, 6 Peters, 768; Parish v. Ellis, 16 Peters, 453: Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 669; Sherbourne v. De Cordova, 24 How. 423); or where the proceeding is in admiralty (Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 447; Robinson v. Campbell 3 Wheat. 212); but a case can only be considered when the subject-matter is submitted in the form prescribed by law (Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 433), and the record must show that the Constitution or some law or treaty is drawn in question. (Lawler v. Walker, 14 How. 149; Mills v. Brown, 16 Peters, 525; Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 180; Ryan v. Thomas, 4 Wall. 603.) The United States courts have no jurisdiction of offenses at common law. (Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75; Turner v. Bank of N. A., 4 Dall. 10; U. S. v. Lancaster, 3 McLean, 431; Kitchen v. Strawbridge, 1 Wash. C. C. 84; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, Wood. & M. 401.) Suits in which relief is sought according to the principles and practice of equity jurisdiction are cases in equity. (Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212; U. S. v. Howland, 4 Wheat.

V.

108; Lorman Clark, 2 McLean, 568; Gordon v. Hobart, 2 Sum. 401; Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95; Cropper v. Coburn, 2 Curt. 465.) The true test is whether there is a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law in the same court. (U. S. v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 108; Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 215; Gaines v. Chew, 2 How. 619; Williams v. Benedict, 8 How. 107.) It extends over cases in State courts and over statutes whether passed by a State legislature or by Congress, and which are claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States. (Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 399; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 625), but not to statutes claimed to be void under a State constitution. (Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 392.) To bring an act within the control of the judiciary, it must be clearly subversive of the Constitution. (Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54.) The objection_must not be doubtful (U. S. v. Jackson, 3 Sawy. 62; People v. Brinkerhoff, 68 N. Y. 259), but a clear violation of the Constitution. (C. C. R. R. Co. v. Twenty-third St. R. R. Co., 54 How. Pr. 168; Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178.) The question as to the title to property conferred by treaty is a political question, and its decision by the political department is conclusive on the judiciary (Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 309; U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 711; Garcia v. Lec, 12 Peters, 520; Williamson v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Peters, 441; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 56); so the protection of Indians in their possessions (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 20), and as to State boundaries (Rhode island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 736; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Peters, 520), and as to political treaties (Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 56), and as to the recognition of foreign gov ernments, are political questions. (Williamson v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Peters, 419; Cherokee Na. v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 20; Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 241; U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246; The Divina Pastora, 4 Wheat. 64). The recognition of the existence of a government is conclusive of its public character. (Du Pont v. Pichou, 4 Dall. 321; U. S. v. Ortega, 4 Wash. C. C. 531.) The jurisdiction extends to all cases affecting embassadors, etc., although they are not parties to the record. (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; U. S. v.