Opinion of the Court. 229 U. S. the duties incident to setting apart to the bankrupt what, after a hearing, may be found to be exempt. Custody and possession may be necessary to carry out these duties and all levies, seizures, and liens, obtained by legal proceedings within the four months, that may or do interfere with that possession are annulled, not only for the purpose of preventing the property passing to the trustee as a part of the estate, but for all purposes, including that of preventing their subsequent use against property that may ultimately be set aside to the bankrupt. This property is withdrawn from the possession of the Trustee not for the purpose of being subjected to such liens, but on the supposition that it needed no protection inasmuch as they had been nullified. The liens rendered void by § 67f are those obtained by legal proceedings within four months. The section does not, however, defeat rights in the exempt property acquired by contract or by waiver of the exemption. These may be enforced or foreclosed by judgments obtained even after the petition in bankruptcy was filed, under the principle declared in Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U. S. 294. But Hall did not waive his exemption in favor of the Iowa plaintiffs and they had no right against his wages, except that which was obtained by a legal proceeding within four months of the bankruptcy. Those liens having been annulled by § 67f of the Bankruptcy Act, furnished no defense to the Railroad when sued by Hall for his wages, earned in Nebraska, exempt by the laws of that State, and duly set apart to him by the Referee in Bankruptcy. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska is Affirmed. 229 U. S Argument for Plaintiff in Error. AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK OF NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, v. MILLER, AGENT OF THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MACON, GEORGIA. ERROR TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 325. Argued May 9, 1913.-Decided June 9, 1913. When a bank has performed the dual function of collecting and crediting a check the transaction is closed; and, in the absence of fraud or mutual mistake, the transaction is equivalent to payment in usual course as though presented to another bank and paid over the counter. National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U. S. 686. While knowledge of an officer of a bank of a fact which it is his duty to declare, and not his interest to conceal, is to be treated as that of the bank; where it is his interest to conceal such knowledge the law does not, by a fiction, charge the bank with such knowledge. There is a presumption that an officer of a bank will disclose his knowledge of matters which affect the bank and which it is not to his personal interest to conceal; and there is also presumption that he will not disclose those matters of which he has knowledge and which it is his interest to conceal, including his own bankruptcy and indebtedness to other banks. A bank, on which the president of another bank just before his own bankruptcy drew a check in favor of the latter, cannot, after having paid the check by crediting it to the payee bank, cancel the credit and retain the money on the ground that the payee bank is to be imputed with constructive knowledge of its president's bankruptcy. 185 Fed. Rep. 338, affirmed. THE facts, which involve the right of a bank to cancel payments made on a bankrupt's check on the ground of constructive knowledge of the bankruptcy on the part of the payee, are stated in the opinion. Mr. John M. Gaut, with whom Mr. J. S. Pilcher was on the brief, for plaintiff in error: Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 229 U.S. The Nashville Bank, at the time when it made the book entries and mailed the letter of advice, was in total ignorance of the bankrupt's insolvency, suspension and bankruptcy. Having acted under mistake of fact, that bank had the right, as between itself and the bankrupt or any one standing in his shoes, to revoke the book entries and make the set-off. Re Farmers' Bank, 13 Fed. Rep. 361; Re Dickinson, 5 Fed. B. R. 483; Union Bank v. McKay, 102 Fed. Rep. 662; Kelley v. Solare, 9 Meeson & Welsby, 54; Bell v. Gardner, 4 Man. & Gran. 10; French v. DeBow, 38 Michigan, 708; Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kansas, 336. The Nashville Bank also had the right, as between itself and the First National, to revoke the book entries on the ground of mistake. The latter bank, having given no value for the check, and suffered no injury by its reception, the equities of the former were superior. Guild v. Baldridge, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 295; Bank of Repub. v. Baxter, 31 Vermont, 101; 5 Cyc. of Law & Pro. 542b. The check was not payment, but only means of payment. It was a wrong upon the Nashville Bank for the bankrupt, in his condition of insolvency, to have drawn and delivered the check, and especially wrong, after his act of notorious insolvency, not to have notified that bank of the fact. Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 109; Mitchell v. Warden, 20 Barb. 253; Pegulus v. Taylor, 38 Barb. 375; Choffer v. Fort, 2 Lansing, 81; Sharkey v. Mansfield, 90 N. Y. 227. If the First National knew of his state of insolvency, it was particeps criminis in not informing the Nashville Bank. Peterson v. Union Bank, 52 Pa. St. 206. The First National, independent of any imputation to it of the bankrupt's knowledge, did have knowledge of the insolvency before the contract of deposit was consummated. The First National, at the time it received the check, 229 U.S. Opinion of the Court. knew of this indebtedness by the imputation of Plant's knowledge. St. Louis R. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566. The doctrine of imputation exists in all cases where the agent is acting within the scope of his authority. The doctrine does not rest on a presumption that the agent will communicate his information to his principal. Whether the act of payment itself is considered or the results of the payment, his interests certainly were not adverse to, but were concurrent with, those of the First National. Even if the doctrine of imputation did rest on the probability of the agent communicating his knowledge to his principal, there was no improbability that the bankrupt would have communicated to the other officers of the bank, had there been any occasion to do so, the fact that he owed another bank. Mr. Sloss D. Baxter for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the court. R. H. Plant, of Macon, Georgia, kept a deposit account with the American National Bank of Nashville, and, on May 16, 1904, was indebted to it in the sum of $50,000 on paper which matured two or three weeks later. He was generally regarded as a wealthy man, but was in fact insolvent. While so insolvent he, on May 13, 1904, gave to the First National Bank of Macon, of which he was President, a check for $3,000 on account of an indebtedness due by him to it. The Macon Bank at once mailed the check to the Nashville Bank with instructions to place it to the credit of the Macon Bank. The check was received by the Nashville Bank at 8 o'clock Monday morning, May 16. The letter was opened shortly after nine o'clock, and was credited to the Macon Bank's account about 11 o'clock A. M.,-an hour or so after a petition in bankruptcy had been filed against Plant in Macon. His failure precipitated a run on the Macon Bank, and, the same day, by direction of the Comptroller of the Treasury, a Receiver was appointed for it under § 5234, Rev. Stat. The Nashville Bank was not advised of either of these failures, and about 2 o'clock it charged the $3,000 check to Plant's account and the same day mailed to the Macon Bank a letter stating that its account had been credited with $3,000. Four or five days later, having learned of Plant's bankruptcy, it charged off the $3,000, claiming that Plant's insolvency, on May 16, gave to the Nashville Bank the right of set-off even as against the unmatured drafts. Carr v. Hamilton, 129 U. S. 252, 256. The plaintiff was subsequently appointed agent of the Macon Bank under Rev. Stat., § 5234, and brought suit against the Nashville Bank for the recovery of the $3,000. Most of the facts were agreed upon, but much evidence was taken for the purpose of showing that the Macon Bank had notice of Plant's insolvency, and at the conclusion of the testimony each party moved that a verdict be directed in its favor. Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154. The court instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed (185 Fed. Rep. 338) by the Circuit Court of Appeals. There are some disadvantages of sending a check for collection directly to the bank on which it is drawn, but when such bank performs the dual function of collecting and crediting the transaction is closed and, in the absence of fraud or mutual mistake, is equivalent to payment in usual course. National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U. S. 686, 689. In the present case it was as though an officer of the Macon Bank had presented the check to the Teller of the Nashville Bank and on receiving the money had paid it back over the counter for deposit to the credit of the Macon Bank. The Nashville Bank, however, claims that there was |