229 U.S. Argument for Appellant. against Spain, took possession of the Island, formed a so-called republic and administered the affairs of the Island until possession was surrendered to the United States on February 22, 1899, prior to which time no authorities of the United States had been in the Island and the United States had not been in possession or occupation of the Island, it having been up to that time in the actual physical possession of the Spanish and the people of the Island. Mr. Barry Mohun and Mr. L. T. Michener, with whom Mr. J. N. Wolfson and Mr. P. G. Michener were on the brief, for appellant: The court has jurisdiction. Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 230; Armstrong v. United States, 182 U. S. 243. The title of the United States to the Island of Cebu did not vest so far as the rights of individuals were concerned until the proclamation of the treaty of April 11, 1899. Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 230; Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32. The payment of duties by appellant to the de facto government in Cebu was lawful. United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246, 253; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 536; DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 184; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 303; Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U. S. 257, 272; 1 Moore's Digest Int. Law, pp. 41 et seq. The doctrine of the case of United States v. Rice, supra, has been uniformly recognized and enforced by the United States through its Department of State. In Re Duties Collected at Mazatlan, Mexico, 1 Wharton's Int. Law Dig., § 7, p. 29; The Bluefields Case, 1 Moore's Dig. Int. Law, pp. 49, 51. The order of the President of July 12, 1898, could only be enforced at ports and places actually occupied by the military forces of the United States and was only ap Argument for the United States. 229 U.S. plicable to imports made at such ports and places. Lincoln v. United States, 197 U. S. 419, 428; DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 199; Hall's Int. Law, 5th Ed., p. 448. If there should be doubt as to the meaning of the Executive Order of July 12, 1898, it should be resolved in favor of appellant. Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 616; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 474. The temporary allegiance owed by appellant to the United States as conqueror in possession of Manila did not justify the exaction of these moneys from him as duties upon an importation into Cebu. The military commander at Manila while above the laws of the Philippine Islands was not above the laws of his own country, Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 234, and was further restricted by the order of the President dated July 12, 1898, which was in accordance with the rules of International Law. United States v. Rice, supra; Hall's Int. Law, 5th Ed., supra. The ratification act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 636, is not applicable to this case. United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U. S. 370; Dooley v. United States, supra; Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U. S. 176; Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., v. United States, 197 U. S. 419; on re-hearing 202 U. S. 484; The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 64, 118, The Hague Convention, 32 Stat. 18031826. See Article 42. The legislative history of the ratification act negatives an intention on the part of Congress to have ratified this collection. Senate Bill, 6362, 59th Cong. 1st Sess. Mr. Frederick De C. Faust, Acting Assistant Attorney General, for the United States: The collection of the duties in question at Manila was a valid and lawful exercise of the war power vested in the 229 U.S. Argument for the United States. military commander of the United States forces in the Philippine Islands. The general right of a military commander, under the war power, to govern territory of the enemy after its conquest and prior to the ratification of a treaty of peace is not open to question. Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1; Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 U. S. 176. The conquering power has the right to displace the preëxisting authority and to assume to such extent as it may deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers and functions of government. There is no limit to the powers that may be exerted in such cases save those which are found in the laws and usages of war. These principles have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject. New Orleans v. Steamship Company, 20 Wall. 387, 394. See also Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 9 Cr. 191; Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603; American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511. It is conceded that the military forces of the United States did not take actual possession of the island of Cebu until after the first payment of the duties had been made to the native insurgents, but that fact does not affect the point at issue in this case. The question here is as to the right of the military commander, under the war power, to prescribe rules and regulations governing importations of merchandise, not by inhabitants of Cebu, but by residents of Manila, claiming the protection of the United States, into the enemy's territory. While it is true that the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain was signed December 10, 1898, the war did not cease nor title to the Island of Cebu vest in the United States, in so far as the rights of third parties were affected, until the exchange of ratifications on the eleventh of April, 1899. Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32; Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222. Until such ratification the Island of Cebu continued to be hostile territory, and all commercial intercourse between its inhabitants and the inhabitants of Manila, then under military occupation of the United States, was prohibited by the rules of international law. Wheaton's Int. Law, 422; Montgomery v. United States, 15 Wall. 395. The only recognized belligerents in the Philippine Islands, prior to the ratification of the treaty, were the United States and Spain. Appellants landed their cargo and paid the alleged duties demanded by the native inhabitants of Cebu at their peril, well knowing that duties in the same amount would be exacted thereon by the military authorities at Manila. United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246, 255, upon which appellants rely, directly supports the Government's contention in this case. The importers were residents, not of the island of Cebu, but of the city of Manila, conducting their business under the protection of the United States military authorities. Their obligation to comply with the law was due, therefore, not to the Kingdom of Spain nor to the rebellious natives of Cebu, but to the United States. As to the executive order of July 12, 1898, see Lincoln v. United States, 202 U. S. 499. Any doubt that might possibly exist as to the authority of the military collector at Manila to collect the duties. here in question is completely removed by the terms of the ratification act of June 30, 1906. See United States v. Heinszen, 206 U. S. 381. MR. JUSTICE DAY, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. When the Spanish fleet was destroyed at Manila, May 1, 1898, it became apparent that the Government of the United States might be required to take the necessary steps to make provision for the government and control of such part of the Philippines as might come into the military occupation of the forces of the United States. The right to thus occupy an enemy's country and temporarily provide for its government has been recognized by previous action of the executive authority and sanctioned by frequent decisions of this court. The local government being destroyed, the conqueror may set up its own authority and make rules and regulations for the conduct of temporary government, and to that end may collect taxes and duties to support the military authority and carry on operations incident to the occupation. Such was the course of the Government with respect to the territory acquired by conquest and afterwards ceded by the Mexican Government to the United States. Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164. See also in this connection Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603; New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 387; Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222; 7 Moore's International Law Digest, §§ 1143 et seq., in which the history of this Government's action following the Mexican War and during and after the SpanishAmerican War is fully set forth: and also Taylor on International Public Law, chapter IX, Military Occupation and Administration, §§ 568 et seq., and 2 Oppenheim on International Law, §§ 166 et seq. There has been considerable discussion in the cases and in works of authoritative writers upon the subject of what constitutes an occupation which will give the right to exercise governmental authority. Such occupation is not merely invasion, but is invasion plus possession of the enemy's country for the purpose of holding it temporarily at least. 2 Oppenheim, § 167. What should constitute military occupation was one of the matters before The Hague Convention in 1899 respecting laws and customs of war on land, and the following articles were adopted |