its interest, but the appellants also have interest; but mere unity of interest or difference in its degrees is not enough, there must be an illegal purpose. If the interest was real and the peril which threatened was real or thought to be real, unity of interest or contribution of expenses cannot be regarded as necessarily proof of collusion. Chicago v. Mills, 204 U. S. 321. And the cases are numerous in which it has been decided that the motives of litigants in seeking Federal jurisdiction are immaterial. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, and cases cited.

Cashman v. Amador &c. Canal Co., 118 U. S. 58, is relied on. The case is distinguishable from the case at bar. Cashman was an alien and brought suit against the Canal Company claiming that his land was injured by the debris thrown on it by the working of certain mines by hydraulic process. The suit was instituted at the instance of the County of Sacramento, the County not being able to bring suit in the Federal court. There was a cause of action in Cashman; there was a disability on the part of the county to sue in the Federal court in its own name. So far there is resemblance to the case at bar, but there are material differences between the agreement in that case and the agreement between the parties in this. The County was to pay the expenses, engage counsel and indemnify Cashman against all charges and expenses, and he stipulated "not to compromise, dismiss, or settle the said suit without the consent of the County of Sacramento, and to allow said County and the attorneys aforesaid in its behalf to manage and conduct the said suit to the same extent and in the same manner as if such suit had been commenced by and was prosecuted in the name of the said County of Sacramento." It is manifest, as this court said, from the very beginning the suit was in reality the suit of the County, with a party plaintiff "collusively made" for the purpose of creating a case cognizable "by the Circuit Court of the United

States." In other words, as was said, the "dispute and controversy" which was "involved" was nominally between Cashman, an alien, and the defendants, citizens of California, but was "really and substantially" between one of the counties of California and citizens of that State, and thus not "properly within the jurisdiction" of the Circuit Court.

The case at bar has no such features. It is not under the control of the water company. It was brought by appellants, they having a justiciable controversy, well or ill-founded, and which it was desired to be determined in a Federal court, they being non-residents of Colorado and citizens of other States.

It is true by the decision of this court in The City and County of Denver et al. v. The New York Trust Company et al., and Same v. The Denver Union Water Company et al., ante, p. 123, the merits of the controversy have been decided against them, but they must be judged as of the time their suit was begun, and, so judged, we think the suit was not collusively brought and should not have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The decree dismissing it is, therefore,

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE DAY dissents.

229 U.S.

Opinion of the Court.

ADAMS v. RUSSELL, WARDEN.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.

No. 1048. Submitted May 12, 1913.-Decided June 10, 1913.

This court will not review the judgment of the state court when it rests not only on Federal, but also on non-Federal grounds, and the latter are sufficient to sustain it and were necessarily decided.

Whether state officers have power to grant a parole under a state indeterminate sentence act, and under what conditions, are for the state court to finally determine.

The state court having held that, under the applicable statutes, the parole granted to a prisoner was absolutely void and was therefore properly vacated, such ground is sufficient to sustain the judgment, and this court cannot review it on the asserted Federal question that the state officers had vacated the parole in such manner as to violate the prisoner's constitutional rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Whether a state statute allowing prisoners a reduction for "good time" is part of an indeterminate sentence act is for the state court to determine, and in this case it is a substantial local question on which to rest the judgment of the state court.

Writ of error to review 169 Michigan, 606, dismissed.

THE facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review a judgment of the state court which rests upon non-Federal as well as Federal grounds, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Fred A. Baker for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Grant Fellows, Attorney General of the State of Michigan, and Mr. Thomas A. Lawler, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.

Error to review the action of the Supreme Court of Michigan, denying plaintiff in error a writ of habeas corpus. VOL. CCXXIX-23

The facts, as alleged in the petition, are these: Plaintiff in error was convicted in the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit of the crime of seduction and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two and one-half years and for not more than five years. The case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State on a bill of exceptions and a writ of error and the sentence and judgment of the court below affirmed. Pending the writ of error he was released from imprisonment, but after his sentence was affirmed he was recommitted to prison and ever since has remained there. He duly made application to the Advisory Board of Pardons for a parole under Act No. 184 of the Public Acts of 1905 (June 7, 1905, Pub. Acts, 1905, p. 268), as amended. On December 5, 1911, the board granted and delivered to the warden of the prison a certificate or warrant of parole by which he was paroled "for two months from and after January 29, 1912."

On December 11, 1911, the action of the board paroling plaintiff in error was vacated, for the reason, as the records show, that it was at that date "in possession of facts not known at the time of such action." The warden was notified of the action of the board.

This action of the board was without notice to plaintiff in error and gave him no opportunity to be heard or to disprove the charge or facts alleged against him.

Having served his minimum sentence and having been granted a parole he is not now imprisoned on any process, judgment, decree or execution specified in § 8 of the Habeas Corpus Act of the State.

On March 5, 1912, he presented a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court of the State in which he set up the facts of his case as above stated and alleged the illegality of his imprisonment as follows: (1) The Advisory Board has no jurisdiction or authority to vacate the parole granted to him, the power and authority to retake and return any paroled convict to the prison being

within the exclusive jurisdiction and discretion of the warden or superintendent of the prison. (2) If the Indeterminate Sentence Act is construed to confer such power upon the board without notice to the convict, then said act is in conflict with the provision of the constitution of the State which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment or the taking of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and against the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. (3) If so construed, the convict would be twice punished for the same offense. (4) The Indeterminate Sentence Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder contemplate that a convict's parole will not be annulled except when he violates the terms and conditions of his parole or the rules and regulations. (5) His term of imprisonment has expired.

The Supreme Court instead of granting a writ of habeas corpus as prayed, granted a writ of certiorari to inquire into the cause of detention, under the authority of § 9889 of the Michigan Compiled Laws of 1897. The court also granted a common law writ of certiorari to bring the record of the Advisory Board before it, and both writs were made returnable April 2, 1912.

Returns were made to the writs, which plaintiff in error traversed so far as they set forth facts which were alleged in a communication to the board, attached to the returns.

The case so made up was argued and submitted to the court on April 2, 1912.

The Attorney General made no attempt to sustain the power or jurisdiction of the Advisory Board to annul a parole without notice to the convict, but contended that as the Supreme Court in affirming the conviction of plaintiff in error had held that the time he was out on bail should not be included in determining the length of his