deree cannot interfere therewith without invading their posses- sion. Wilson v. Trexler (90 S. E. 180), 106 S. C. 15.
5. Under Carmack amendment to the interstate commerce act, punitive damages are not recov- erable against a carrier for mere wrongful acts. Harman V. Southern Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 1023), 106 S. C. 209.
6. Under the Carmack amend- Iment of the interstate commerce act, punitive damages were not recoverable against a carrier for unauthorized wilful or wanton acts of its servants in delaying transportation of goods shipped, notwithstanding the later enact- ment of the Cummins amend- ment, making carriers liable for "actual loss." De Loach v. Southern Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 701), 106 S. C. 155.
7. As general damages both natu- rally and necessarily flow from the wrongful act, party whose rights are invaded need not al- lege general damages, but is en- titled to recover such damages as follow natural, necessary and proximate result of act of wrong- ful invasion which fixes his right of action. Vann v. Tyler (91 S. E. 301), 106 S. C. 377. 8. As special damages naturally but not necessarily flow from the wrongful act, but are re- coverable, although wrongdoer could not have anticipated par- ticular result, it is necessary to allege and prove special dam- ages. Id.
See, also, Commerce. Harman v. So. Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 1023), 106 S. C. 209. Landlord and Tenant. Saine v. Hertzog (91 S. E. 859), 106 S. C. 501. Logs and Log- ging. Griggs v. Graves (91 8. E. 319), 106 S. C. 431.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.
1. Under the statute giving an ac- tion for wrongful death, where none existed before and limiting the right of recovery to those cases in which the party injured would have been entitled to re- cover if death had not ensued,
the beneficiary of a decedent who had released the defendant could not recover. Rish v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. (90 S. E. 704), 106 S. C. 143.
1. In interpreting trust deeds, Courts are not bound by the rigid rules controlling in the con- struction of law deeds. Duncan v. Clarke (90 S. E. 180), 106 S. C. 17.
2. Where a trust deed read that E. should hold for the life of her husband, "and at his death for the use of such issue as he shall leave living," and he left five children and a grandchild, such granchild was not entitled to a sixth share, his father also being entitled to a sixth, since "issue" means those persons whose names are practically written in the statute of distribution, and when heirs named in the statute come forward, an heir and his or her child may not both take. Dun- can v. Clarke (90 S. E. 180), 106 S. C. 17.
3. In foreclosure suit, living chil- dren of the mortgagor and her husband who had deeded the property to her for life and at her death to their "body issue," and to "her heirs and assigns forever," held to be necessary parties to be brought in under section 171 of Code Civ. Proc. 1912. Bank of Prosperity v. Dominick (90 S. E. 264), 106 S. C. 120.
4. Where deed delivered to the grantee was returned for re- nunciation of dower by the gran- tor's wife, and, before that was done, the grantor died, and his pretended wife renounced dower, and the price was paid, not to the grantor's legal representa- tive, or his heirs at law, but to an attorney at law, the deed was Bunch never legally delivered.
v. Dunning (91 S. E. 331), 106 S. C. 300.
5. Where a man gets valuable tract of land for nothing from one whose condition is such that the borderland between weak-
mindedness and imbecility is a mere shadow, in the absence of a clear and satisfactory explana- tion, he is guilty of fraud. Tuten v. McAlhaney (91 S. E. 328), 106 S. C. 328.
6. The registry of a deed is a matter entirely different from its proof; the principal object being to affect third parties with notice. J. W. Dillon & Son Co. v. Oliver (91 S. E. 304), 106 S. C. 410.
7. While the intention of the grantor should govern, it cannot violate a rule of law, "intention" being a word of art, and signi- fying the meaning of the writing. Sandford v. Sandford (91 S. Ē. 294), 106 S. C. 304.
8. In an action to foreclose a pur- chase-money mortgage on lot al- leged to contain a certain num- ber of acres, evidence held in- sufficient to establish defendant's contention that it did not con- tain such number of acres when plaintiff conveyed. Wright v. Seale (91 S. E. 291), 106 S. C. 261.
9. Deed granting land "to have and to hold unto G. F. S., his heirs and assigns, forever, the condition of said sale being: That said G. F. S. is not to mortgage or in anywise dispose of said land. And after his death it is to go to his wife and his and her children"-grants a fee simple. Sandford v. Sandford (91 S. E. 294), 106 S. C. 304.
10 A condition against alienation following a fee simple grant is void, since a remainder after a fee is void, and an attempt to convey a fee and deprive the grantee of an incident of owner- ship is void. Id.
11. Where the condition of gran- tor is such that borderland be- tween weak-mindness and im- becility is a mere shadow, and he conveys valuable property to stranger in blood without con- sideration, burden is on grantee to remove presumption of undue influence. Tuten v. McAlhaney (91 S. E. 328), 106 S. C. 328.
12. Evidence held to show that deed was secured by undue in- fluence upon grantor of doubt- ful mentality, without consider- ation. Tuten v. McAlhaney (91 S. E. 328), 106 S. C. 328. 13. Where a deed conveyed land in trust for use of grantor's life for life, with remainder over in fee to her children, although the estate conveyed to children could not become vested interest in possession until death of life tenant, when life tenant died the statute executed use in children. Holder V. Melvin (91 S. E. 97), 106 S. C. 245. 14. The legal interest of trustee in an estate given to him in trust is measured, not by words of in- heritance in the deed or will, but by object and extent of trust upon which the estate is given. Holder v. Melvin (91 8. E. 97), 106 S. C. 245.
15. Where a deed provided an estate in trust to wife of gran- tor for life, with remainder over in fee to her children, the trust was active until death of the life tenant, but passive as to re- mainder to children, as no active duty rested upon trustee in con- nection with the remainder. Holder v. Melvin (91 S. E. 97), 106 S. C. 245.
16. A deed, conveying land in trust to grantor's wife for life, with remainder over in fee to children, held to convey a vested remain- der in fee in a child of the life tenant in esse when deed was executed, but who predeceased mother, so that share of such child passed to its issue. Holder v. Melvin (91 S. E. 97), 106 S. C. 245.
18. The construction of a deed is a question of law for the Court. Metz v. Metz, (91 S. E. 864), 106 S. C. 514.
19. Deeds executed by a father to his children of parts of land claimed to have been included in a prior deed by him to them are admissible as bearing on the question whether the prior deed was delivered. Metz v. Metz (91 S. E. 864), 106 S. C. 514.
1. Fraud is recognizable at law as well as in equity. Gordon-Mc- Cabe & Co. v. Colleton Mercan- tile & Mfg. Co. (90 S. E. 161), 106 S. C. 27.
2. Equitable jurisdiction did not attach to an action between deal- ers in cotton, because plaintiffs, also seeking the recovery of a specific sum of money, claimed the right to foreclose their lien on defendant's cotton in their possession, which lien they had already in fact foreclosed, since they had an adequate and com- plete remedy at law. Id.
3. Jurisdiction in actions for ac- counting. See Account. Gordon- McCabe & Co. v. Colleton Mer- cantile & Mfg. Co. (90 S. E. 161), 106 S. C. 27.
4. In an action to recover land, charge in answer that trustee had violated the trust and given plaintiff a deed of trust proper-
ty for his own benefit, against the cestui que trust's rights, was an issue triable by chancel- lor. Middleton v. Levi (90 S. E. 325), 106 S. C. 32.
5. In action to recover land, and in view of admission of answer that defendant did not own land in dispute and that his deed was made to secure money due him from cestui que trust loans to her without notice of plaintiff's claim of title, the issue was for the chancellor. Id.
6. In equity, the Circuit Judge was not bound by the verdict, as he is bound in cases at law. Middleton v. Levi (90 S. E. 325), 106 S. C. 32.
7. The defense of laches applica- ble to a suit for equitable relief need not be set up specifically, and if clearly established by the evidence, relief will be denied by the Court on its own motion. Cook v. Knight (91 S. E. 312), 106 S. C. 310.
8. As the defense of laches need not be formally pleaded and will be applied by the Court on its own motion, a complaint seeking the reformation of a deed on the ground of mistake is not sub- ject to a motion to make more definite and certain, though not averring when the mistake was discovered or that the agreement for the conveyance was in writ- ing. Id.
9. The length of time which will justify a Court of equity in re- fusing relief on the ground of laches depends upon the facts of the particular case; laches connoting not only undue lapse of time, but also negligence and opportunity to have acted soon- er. Id.
See Water and Watercourses. Parish v. Town of Yorkville (90 S. E. 185), 106 S. C. 23.
See Statute of Frauds. Harly v. Wilson (90 S. E. 183), 106 S. C. 7. Witness. Contradiction of.
Turner v. Blue Ridge Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 185), 106 S. C. 11. Com- petency, transactions with de- ceased. Patrick v. English (91 S. E. 295), 106 S. C. 267. Lar- ceny. State v. Scott (91 S. E. 318), 106 S. C. 270.
1. Evidence held insufficient to show that one defendant, in pur- chasing from the other, had notice of fraud by which the other secured a deed, so as to put him on inquiry. Tuten v. McAlhaney (91 S. E. 328), 106 S. C. 328.
2. Under Code Civ. Proc., sec. 438, it was incompetent for plaintiff in an action on a note to testify that an indorser, since deceased, made payments and promises to him, and in what the last payment consisted. Patrick v. English (91 S. E. 295), 106 S. C. 267.
3. In action upon a note indorsed by defendant's intestate, it was competent for plaintiff to testi- fy that when he got possession of the note it had intestate's name on the back of it, and that intestate did not put his name on the back after plaintiff got it. Patrick v. English (91 S. E. 295), 106 S. C. 267.
4. In prosecution for selling liquor, action of Court, in refus- ing to allow a State's witness to be asked on cross-examination "if he had not been indicted for nonsupport of his family," was not abuse of discretion. State v. Grice (91 8. E. 307), 106 S. C. 280.
5. In a prosecution for seduction under promise to marry, testi- mony of mother, in regard to statements by defendant before and after event to the effect, that he would marry girl, held sufficient to corroborate testi- mony of girl under statute; "to corroborate" meaning to strengthen or add weight or credibility to a thing. State v. Griffin (91 S. E. 318), 106 S. C. 283.
6. In a prosecution for seduction under promise to marry, state-
ments of promise made by de- fendant to mother before event held correlated with statements made after event, and, therefore, competent to corroborate testi- mony of girl. Id.
7. Where defendants were con- victed of larceny principally on the testimony of a small negro boy, who claimed to have seen the taking, motion for new trial, based on affidavit of another that the boy, after the trial, had stated he did not see and could not have seen the taking, was properly refused; the offered testimony being merely hearsay. State v. Raysor (91 S. E. 311), 106 S. C. 287.
8. Testimony of one when ex- amined before a coroner's jury cannot be used against him on a subsequent prosecution for the homicide, as this would be to re- quire him to furnish testimony against himself; any admission or confession in such testimony not being free and voluntary. State v. Perry (91 S. E. 300), 106 S. C. 289.
9. Error in admission against de- fendant in homicide of his testi- mony at the coroner's inquest is not harmless because of evidence of a similar declaration by him elsewhere. Id.
10. As to the issue whether a cer- tain tract was within the descrip- tion of the deed, witnesses may not answer yes or no, but only describe the land and point it out on the plat. Metz v. Metz (91 8. E. 864), 106 S. C. 514. 11. In an action for money alleged to have been loaned by plaintiff through her husband to the de- fendant, declarations made in another case by plaintiff's hus- band that plaintiff was owner of defendant's business held inad- missible as not binding on plain- tiff in absence of authority given husband to speak for her. True v. Cudd (91 S. E. 856), 106 S. C. 478.
12. An alleged oral contract by a person since deceased to will property to the plaintiff is void
as within the statute of frauds. Brown v. Golightly (91 S. E. 869), 106 S. C. 519.
13. In action for price of dresses sold, defendants' evidence that goods were defective in material and workmanship was admissi- ble under general denial to dis- prove allegation of value. Skudowitz v. Basha (91 S. E. 868), 106 S. C. 541.
14. In action for goods sold, evi- dence that defendants had at- tempted to rescind contract by returning part of goods and tendering payment for part re- tained was inadmissible under general denial. Id.
15. In an action for the balance due for material and labor, it was proper to exclude answer to the question, "You know that there was a provision in this con- tract for a penalty for failure to finish work in proper time, did you not?" since the contract, being in writing, must speak for itself. Guimarin V. Southern Life & Trust Co. (90 S. E. 319), 106 S. C. 37.
16. A written contract cannot be supplemented by parol testi- mony. Guimarin v. Southern Life & Trust Co. (90 S. E. 319), 106 S. C. 37.
17. That one has undertaken to an- swer for the default of another cannot be proved by parol. Guimarin v. Southern Life & Trust Co. (90 S. E. 319), 106 S. C. 37.
18. In an action for an insurance agent's failure to cancel a policy, it was error to exclude evidence that the agent's attention was never called to the prohibited list. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Bollin (90 S. E. 327), 106 S. C. 4.5.
19. An insurance agent held not entitled to a directed verdict in an action for his failure to can- cel a policy on the ground that plaintiff failed to prove a con- tract requiring the agent to ren- der that service. Id.
20. While custom may be relevant in doubtful cases, a general cus-
tom was irrelevant where there was no doubt at the time of the trial. Bailey v. Savannah Guano Co. (90 S. E. 317), 106 S. C. 50. 21. Evidence of assumption of risk and negligence. See Ballenger v. So. Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 1019), 106 S. C. 200.
22. In murder trial, it was error to admit testimony that the witness, awakened by the shooting, heard men going by in the dark, and a question, "Did you get him,” replied to with the words, "Yes, but God damn it, I got him in the back," and that one of the men said, "What are you going so fast for?" where the witness did not identify any of the voices; the testimony being plain hearsay. State v. Winfield (91 S. E. 327), 106 S. C. 392.
23. An examination of the deceased by a physician chosen by the in- surer is some evidence that a disease, which under the terms of the policy would have avoided it, did not exist when the policy was executed. Baker v. Metro- politan Life Ins. Co. (91 S. E. 324), 106 S. C. 419.
24. An examination of the deceased by a physician chosen by the in- surer is some evidence that the existence of a disease, which by the terms of the policy would have avoided it, was known to and waived by the insurer. Id. EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS- TRATORS.
1. Executors having already em- ployed a large force of legal talent may not, without necessity being shown, employ more at- torneys and make their compen- sation a charge on the estate. In re Coleman (91 S. E. 861), 106 S. C. 534.
2. The criterion for fixing fee of attorneys employed by executors is not the amount of the estate, but the benefits derived and the labor, learning and skill involved. In re Coleman (91 S. E. 861), 106 S. C. 534.
3. Where an administrator with will annexed conveyed stocks,
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