Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

11. Act Congress, March 1, 1913,
known as the Webb-Kenyon act,
divesting intoxicating liquors of
their interstate character when
such liquor is intended to be re-
ceived, possessed, sold, or in any
manner used in violation of State
laws, is not unconstitutional as
attempting to confer upon the
State power to regulate inter-
state commerce, the regulation
being made by Congress itself
in excluding from interstate com-
merce liquor that is intended to
be received, etc., in violation of
State law. Brennan v. So. Ex-
press Co. (90 S. E. 402), 106 S.
C. 103.

12. Act 1915 (27 St. at Large, p.
737), sec. 1, providing that when
a motor vehicle is operated in
violation of the law or negligent-
ly or carelessly, and when any-
one receives personal injuries
thereby, or when any property
is damaged thereby, such dam-
ages shall be a lien on such motor
vehicle, next in priority to the
lien for State and county taxes,
recoverable in any Court of com-
petent jurisdiction, with the right
to attach such vehicle as pro-
vided by law for attachment,
does not violate the due process
of law provisions of Const., art.
I, sec. 5, and U. S. Const.
Amend., 14. Merchants & Plant-
ers Bank v. Brigman (91 S. E.
332), 106 S. C. 362.

CONTINUANCE.

1. An order granting a continu-
ance, provided costs be paid
within 20 days is complied with
where payment is made imme-
diately upon the Court's con-
firmation of the clerk's taxation.
Saine v. Hertzog (91 S. E. 859),
106 S. C. 501.

CONTRACTS.

1. Plaintiff held not entitled to re-
cover for excess shown by a sur-
vey completed subsequently to
the 90-day period provided in a
contract for the partition of
lands, the contract providing
that in event of failure the stated
acreage should stand. Jennings

v. Bowman (91 S. E. 731), 106
S. C. 455.

2. To enforce a contract whereby
a person contracts to dispose of
real estate by will, the same
proof is necessary as when he
contracts to convey title by deed.
Brown v. Golightly (91 S. E.
869), 106 S. C. 519.

3. An alleged oral contract by a
person since deceased to will
property to the plaintiff is void
as within the statute of frauds.
Brown v. Golightly (91 S. E.
869), 106 S. C. 519.

4. In action of claim and delivery
for sawmill, where the issue was
as to amount due, held defend-
ant was entitled to compensation
for boards manufactured and de-
livered, and for cutting and
hacking of lumber for plaintiffs.
Griggs v. Graves (91 S. E. 319),
106 S. C. 431.

5. In an action for specific per-
formance of a contract for the
sale of lands for flowage pur-
poses, decision of Supreme Court
on appeal, that no contract had
been made, and that the parties
he restored to their original
status, did not require defend-
ant to surrender a deed from
plaintiff to lands not in dispute,
and to withdraw the water there-
from, but merely restored the
parties to their status as to mat-
ters litigated and left them to
litigate such matters as if no
contract had been made. Adams
v. Georgia-Carolina Power Co.
(90 S. E. 702), 106 S. C. 162.

6. A contract for sale of machin-
ery, by which the seller agreed
to correct any defects which
might develop within 30 days,
covers latent as well as patent
defects, and the purchaser can-
not recover for breach of war-
ranty as to latent defects dis-
covered at any time within 6
years after original use. West-
inghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v.
Glencoe Cotton Mills (90 S. E.
526), 106 S. C. 133.

7. Under a contract for sale of
machinery, by which the seller
agreed to correct defects dis-

covered within 30 days, he is en-
titled to a reasonable time with-
in which to replace the defective
parts. Westinghouse Electric
& Mfg. Co. v. Glencoe Cotton
Mills (90 S. E. 526), 106 S. C.
133.

8. Where seller agreed to correct
defects of machinery discovered
within 30 days, purchaser was
entitled to prove all defects re-
sulting within 30 days and all
damages proximately resulting
therefrom after a lapse of suffi-
cient time to correct them; the
liability being fixed at such
time. Id.

9. Under a contract for sale of
machinery, by which the seller
agreed to correct defects dis-
covered within 30 days, the pur-
chaser is entitled to recover only
such damages as proximately re-
sult from failure to correct de-
fects within a reasonable time,
and after due notice. Westing-
house Electric & Mfg. Co. v.
Glencoe Cotton Mills (90 S. E.
526), 106 S. C. 133.

10. Where seller agreed to correct
defects of machinery discovered
within 30 days, it was the pur-
chaser's duty to reasonably exert
itself to minimize damages, and
such as might have been averted
are not proximate and cannot be
recovered.

Id.

[blocks in formation]

Life & Trust Co. (90 S. E. 319),
106 S. C. 37.

13. In an action for the balance
due for material and labor, it
was proper to exclude answer to
the question, "You know that
there was a provision in this con-
tract for a penalty for failure to
finish work in proper time, did
you not?" since the contract, be-
ing in writing, must speak for
itself. Guimarin V. Southern
Life & Trust Co. (90 S. E. 319),
106 S. C. 37.

14. A contract reading that it was
agreed that defendant sold to
plaintiff 200 bales of lint cotton
at 11 cents a pound, to be settled
for at the difference ruling in S.
on day of delivery, to be de-
livered between certain dates,
which was not signed by defend-
ant, and a signed letter from de-
fendant to plaintiff stating that
he objected to the wording of the
contract, refused to sign it, and
was returning it, did not consti-
tute such a note or memorandum
of the contract for the sale of

cotton, signed by the party
charged, as satisfied the statute
of frauds. Harby v. Wilson (90
S. E. 183), 106 S. C. 7.
15. It is not competent to prove by
oral testimony any of the essen-
tial elements of a contract which
the statute of frauds requires to
be in writing, such testimony be-
ing only competent to connect
different writings, which must
themselves contain all the essen-
tial elements of the contract, the
party to be charged acknowledg-
ing in writing that they do.
Harby v. Wilson (90 S. E. 183),
106 S. C. 7.

[blocks in formation]

in issue the company's corporate
capacity. Westchester Fire Ins.
Co. v. Bollin (90 S. E. 327), 106
S. C. 45.

2. Where minority stockholders
by cumulating votes secured elec-
tion of a majority of directors
on returns, and chairman de-
clared election void, and minori-
ty withdrew, an election by ma-
jority owners of the stock, after
reconsideration of the first elec-
tion, in the absence of any re-
strictive provisions of constitu-
tion and by-laws, was valid.
State v. Ellison (90 S. E. 699),
106 S. C. 139.

3. Where Court concluded that
three of relators were duly elect-
ed directors of corporation and
were entitled to their offices, and
they were excluded from their
offices, judgment dismissing peti-
tion for possession of corporate
property would be reformed to
declare that they were directors
and entitled to exercise the
duties of their office. State v.
Ellison (90 S. E. 699), 106 S. C.
139.

COSTS.

1. Where a judgment against a
railroad for overcharge of
freight rate and statutory pen-
alty was affirmed on condition
that the plaintiff within 20 days
remit the penalty and plaintiff
complied with the condition, the
judgment was an affirmance, and
plaintiff, as prevailing party,
was entitled to the costs of ap-
peal. Spence v. Southern Ry.
Co. (90 S. E. 750), 106 S. C. 169.
See Continuance. Saine v. Hertzog
(91 S. E. 859), 106 S. C. 501.
See Executors and Administra-
tors. Herndon v. Caine (91 S.
E. 1), 106 S. C. 230.

COUNTIES.

1. In view of Const., art III, sec.
1, provisions of article VII, secs.
1, 2, relating to establishment of
counties, are directory and not
mandatory, so that act Feb.
1912 (27 St. at Large, p. 841),
forbidding establishment of
counties out of territory of cer-

[blocks in formation]

1. State Courts have jurisdiction
of actions to recover overcharges
of freight rates on interstate
shipments, where no question of
the reasonableness of the rate is

involved. Spence V. Southern
Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 750), 106 S. C.
169.

See Magistrates. State v. Mellette
(91 S. E. 4), 106 S. C. 224;
Barnes v. C. & W. C. Ry. Co. (90
S. E. 1017), 106 S. C. 227.
See Criminal Law. State v. Waller
(91 S. E. 311), 106 S. C. 297.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. An instruction held not erro-
neous as failing to charge that
the defendant was entitled to the
benefit of every reasonable doubt
on every material point, or as
failing to charge the meaning of
reasonable doubt. State v. Shu-
man (90 S. E. 596), 106 S. C. 159.
2. A Judge has no right to threat-
en or intimidate a jury or unduly
detain them in order to affect
their deliberations. State v. Shu-
man (90 S. E. 596), 106 S. C.
150.

3. Where the case was submitted
at 5 o'clock and the jury were in
the jury room until 11 o'clock
next morning, when they ren-
dered a verdict of guilty, an in-
struction, intimating that the
Judge would keep the jury three
weeks if they did not agree, held
error prejudicial to accused.
State v. Shuman (90 S. E. 596),
106 S. C. 150.

4. Testimony of jurors in a crimi-
nal case as to whether the charge
of the trial Court coerced them
into finding a verdict is im-
proper. State v. Shuman (90 S.
E. 596), 106 S. C. 150.

5. Exceptions, not argued on a
criminal appeal, will not be con-
sidered by the Supreme Court.
State v. Shuman (90 S. E. 596),
106 S. C. 150.

6. In a prosecution for sale of
liquor in which accused set up an
alibi, instructions held to give fuli
effect to alibi. State v. Grice
(91 S. E. 383), 106 S. C. 279.
7. In a prosecution for murder,
where defendant's testimony
alone contradicted evidence by
the State that deceased was un-
armed and that defendant fol-
lowed him to the scene of the
difficulty, newly discovered evi-
dence corroborating defendant's
testimony is material and would
probably change the result.
State v. Wiley (91 S. E. 382),
106 S. C. 437.

8. Lack of diligence in producing
evidence of witnesses who were
in Court at the original trial held
not shown, where accused did not
know the witnesses were present
at the difficulty or had personal
knowledge thereof. State v.
Wiley (91 S. E. 382), 106 S. C.

437.

9. Newly discovered evidence, in
a prosecution for murder, which
corroborates defendant's testi-
mony on material issues as to
which his testimony alone contra-
dicted that offered by the State,
is not merely cumulative. State
v. Wiley (91 S. E. 382), 106 S. E.
437.

10. Under Const., art. V, sec. 21,
prescribing jurisdiction of magis-
trate's Courts, such Court had
no jurisdiction as to an obstruc-
tion of a highway or neighbor-
hood road, an indictable offense
under common law, where the
penalty therefor has not been so
limited. State v. Mellette (91 S.
E. 4), 106 S. C. 224.

11. Upon trial for illegal sale of
liquor, defendant and his coun-
sel, who were present and knew
that the testimony was not signed
by the witnesses as required by
law and made no objection there-
to, held to have waived such
right. State v. Waller (91 S. E.
311), 106 S. C. 297.

12. In murder trial, it was error
to admit testimony that witness
heard men going by in the dark
and a question, "Did you get
him," replied to with the words,
"Yes, but God damn it, I got
him in the back," witness not
identifying any of the voices.
State v. Winfield (91 S. E. 327),
106 S. C. 392.

13. Testimony of one when ex-
amined before a coroner's jury
cannot be used against him on a
subsequent prosecution for the
homicide, as this would be to re-
quire him to furnish testimony
against himself; any admission
or confession in such testimony
not being free and voluntary.
State v. Perry (91 S. E. 300),
106 S. C. 289.

14. Charge stating law if defend-

ant had renewed the initial diffi-
culty was not erroneous as inti-
mating that defendant did re-
new the difficulty. State v.
Stevens (91 S. E. 302), 106 S. C.
272.

15. Error in charge on self-defense
held cured by following state-
ment, so that if defendant de-
sired clearer statement, he should
have requested it. State V.
Stevens (91 S. E. 302), 106 S. C.
272.

16. Where only part of charge was
contained in case, it will be pre-
sumed that correct law was
charged in omitted portions, and
error cannot be predicated on re-
fusal of request. State v. Roof
(91 S. E. 314), 106 S. C. 279.
17. In a criminal case, the Supreme
Court cannot consider questions
affecting the weight of the evi-
dence, which is a matter for the
trial Judge alone. State
Hampton (91 S. E. 314), 106 S.
C. 275.

V.

18. A defendant accused of selling
intoxicating liquor is not preju-
diced by the refusal of the Court
to reread to the jury on their
request the testimony of a wit-
ness as to sales made by accused
and for which he had been con-
victed. State v. Hampton (91
S. E. 314), 106 S. C. 275.

19. Error in admission against de-
fendant in homicide of his testi-
mony at the coroner's inquest is
not harmless because of evidence
of a similar declaration by him
elsewhere. State v. Perry (91
S. E. 300), 106 S. C. 289.
20. Refusal of requests covered
by charge given is not error.
State v. Roof (91 S. E. 314), 106
S. C. 279.

21. In a prosecution for homicide,
if the jury finds a verdict of
guilty of murder, they have the
right to add, if they see proper,
a recommendation to mercy
which will reduce the punishment
to imprisonment in the State
penitentiary for life. State v.
Stevens (91 8. E. 302), 106 S. C.

272.

23. Where defendants were con-
victed of larceny principally on
the testimony of a small boy,
who claimed to have seen the
taking, motion for new trial, on
affidavit of another that the boy,
after the trial, had stated he did
not see the taking, was properly
refused. State v. Raysor (91 S.
E. 311), 106 S. C. 287.

24. Refusal of the trial Court to
hear the motion for new trial, on
the ground of error in not strik-
ing the testimony of a witness,
does not require a reversal,
where the record does not show
that a motion to strike was
made, or that the Court refused
to hear the motion for new trial.
State v. Hampton (91 S. E. 314),
106 S. C. 275.

25. The rule requiring facts stated
in an exception to be based on
an independent statement of
those facts in the case is not
merely technical, but should be
strictly enforced in a criminal
case. State v. Hampton (91 S.
E. 314), 106 S. C. 275.

CROSS-EXAMINATION.

See Witnesses. State v. Grice (91
S. E. 307), 106 S. C. 280.

CROSSING ACCIDENTS.

See Railroads. White v. A. C. L.
R. R. Co. (91 S. E. 323), 106 S.

C. 337; Callison v. C. & W. C.
Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 260), 106 S. C.

123.

CUSTOMS AND USAGES.
1. While custom may be relevant
in doubtful cases, a general cus-
tom was irrelevant where there
was no doubt at the time of the
trial. Bailey v. Savannah Guano
Co. (90 S. E. 317), 106 S. C. 50.
See Insurance. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co. v. Bollin (90 S. E. 327),
106 S. C. 45.

DAMAGES.

1. Where seller agreed to correct
defects of machinery discovered
within 30 days, purchaser was
entitled to prove all defects re-
sulting within 30 days and all
damages proximately resulting
therefrom after a lapse of suffi-
cient time to correct them; the
liability being fixed at such time.
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg.
Co. v. Glencoe Cotton Mills (90
S. E. 526), 106 S. C. 133.

2. Under a contract for sale of
machinery, by which the seller
agreed to correct defects dis-
covered within 30 days, the pur-
chaser is entitled to recover only
such damages as proximately re-
sult from failure to correct de-
fects within a reasonable time,
and after due notice. Westing--
house Electric & Mfg. Co. v.
Glencoe Cotton Mills (90 S. E.
526), 106 S. C. 133.

3. Where seller agreed to correct
defects of machinery discovered
within 30 days, it was the pur-
chaser's duty to reasonably exert
itself to minimize damages, and
such as might have been averted
are not proximate and cannot be
recovered. Id.

4. The principle that one injured
by the negligence of another
must reasonably exert himself to
minimize his damages is not ap-
plicable to the case of a tender of
goods wrongfully refused, so as
to place any duty on the tenderee
on the tenderers' failing in their
duty of taking care of the goods,
because, the goods being in the
tenderers' possession, the ten-

« AnteriorContinuar »