This conclusively shows that the master is merely a custodian of the securities. It is not his business to collect them, and his institution of the suit is without authority of law. It is not his business to collect for the adult parties. That is their affair, and he cannot institute the suit for the infants, as the decree requires him to hold them for them until they become of age, "or to be turned over by him to a duly appointed guardian on their behalf." The cash portion at the sale was $5,000, which was distributed as provided for by the decree.

In the decree in this case a large amount is allowed for attorney's fees. It is difficult to conceive how the parties can be benefited by allowing the master to foreclose and how they can be benefited by paying attorney's fees and commissions to the officers of Court. The decree in the former case contemplated that the adults manage their own interests, and that of the minors was protected by the order of Court. The evidence in the case fails to show that the plaintiff is in any manner entitled to maintain this suit. He has no authority from any one interested therein and no order from the Court. He is merely a custodian of the securities and a volunteer in the matter without authority of law to bring the action, and I think the judgment should be reversed, and the complaint dismissed.

Judgment reversed.

MESSRS. JUSTICES GAGE and HYDRICK concur in the opinion of the Court.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GARY, dissenting. This is an appeal from an order overruling the objection interposed by the defendants that the plaintiff did not have the right to bring the action, to foreclose the mortgage given to secure payment of the bonds hereinafter mentioned, on the ground that he was not the real party in interest. The plaintiff contended that such an objection could not be entertained, unless it was

made by demurrer or answer; and his Honor, the Circuit Judge, so ruled.

In the present case the question whether the plaintiff is the real party in interest is very important, as it is contended by the defendants that the bringing of this action by the plaintiff is in violation of the previous orders of the Court, in the proceedings out of which this action arose, which provide that the bonds representing the shares of the minors be delivered to the master for Richland county, to be held by him for such minors until they become of age, or to be turned over by him to a duly appointed guardian on their behalf; and that the bonds representing the shares of the adults be delivered to the master for Richland county, and that the same be forthwith assigned to them by said master, according to their respective rights therein. Furthermore, it occurs to the Court that the question may hereafter arise as to the liability of the plaintiff, in his official capacity, for any losses that may be sustained under these proceedings, if he should be allowed to proceed with the action.

In the case of Parker v. Victoria Co., 105 S. C. 375, 89 S. E. 1068, the Court used this language:

"The case of Haygood v. Boney, 43 S. C. 63 (20 S. E. 803), as well as numerous others that might be cited, clearly shows that the Court has the power to order the amendment, or it can remand the case to the Circuit Court for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to make a motion to that effect."

Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we deem it advisable to order that the defendants be allowed to amend their answers, so as to present the question under consideration in proper form.

MR. JUSTICE FRASER concurs in the dissenting opinion.

BRIDGES-COUNTIES-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES.-Case of Sanders v. York County, 106 S. C. 374, 91 S. E. 305, followed.

Before BOWMAN, J., York, February, 1916. Reversed.

Separate actions by Z. V. Bradford, by John Thompson, by F. J. Blankenship and by Earle B. Roach against York County. Orders sustaining demurrers, and defendant appeals.

Messrs. Wilson & Wilson and Oran S. Crawford, for appellant.

J. S. Brice and Dunlap, Dunlap & Hollis, for respond

ents.

March 15, 1917.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by MR. JUSTICE FRASER.

These cases were tried along with the case of Joseph H. Sanders v. York County, 106 S. C. 374, 91 S. E. 305, and are determined by the judgment in that case.

The orders sustaining the demurrers are overruled, and the cases are remanded for trial.

1. CONTINUANCE-Costs-CONSTRUCTION OF ORDER.—An order granting a continuance provided costs be paid within 20 days is complied with where payment is made immediately upon the Court's confirmation of the clerk's taxation.

2. LANDLORD AND TENANT - EVICTION NATURE OF RIGHT. · Under a rental agreement for a period agreeable to the landlord, the tenant must vacate when requested.

An instruction

3. LANDLORD AND TENANT- EVICTION INSTRUCTION. that plaintiff tenant cannot recover for defendant landlord's locking her out of her room if she agreed to vacate is erroneous, because allowing eviction without notice and before removal of the tenant's goods.

4. LANDLORD AND TENANT-EVICTION-LANDLORD'S RIGHT.-The manner and time in which landlord may terminate a lease is not dependent upon his tenant's reputation for chastity.

5. LANDLORD AND TENANT-EVICTION-DAMAGES.-One thousand dollars damages, reduced by the trial Court to $500, held not excessive where plaintiff tenant was wrongfully ejected by her landlord.

Before HON. J. L. GLENN, special Judge, Spartanburg, July, 1915. Affirmed.

Action by Olivia M. Saine against J. P. Hertzog. Judgment for J. P. Hertzog. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Mr. J. C. Otts, for appellant, submits: This appeal raises four questions: 1. Did the presiding Judge err in refusing to hold that the complaint stood dismissed under the order of the former presiding Judge, to wit: "That on the payment of costs within twenty days from the rising of the Court, that said case be continued until the July term; otherwise that it be dismissed with costs." It is contended by the appellant that the order requiring the plaintiff to pay costs within twenty days from the rising of the Court was a penalty, and that when the plaintiff failed to pay the costs within twenty days,

Argument of Counsel.

[ 106 S. C. that the case stood dismissed under the order of Judge Efird. 2. Did the defendant-appellant have the right to act upon the reputation of the plaintiff in taking the action he did, in putting another lock upon the door? It was contended that in a case involving the character and reputation of the plaintiff as being detrimental to the good name of apartment house that the defendant-appellant had the right, and it was his duty to act upon the plaintiff's reputation. Did the presiding Judge err in refusing to charge that defendant had a right to act upon the reputation of the plaintiff and in refusing to charge the defendant's tenth request in full? 3. If the plaintiff agreed with the defendant to vacate the apartment by a certain time and failed to do so, did the relation of landlord and tenant cease and the plaintiff become a trespasser; and, if so, did the defendant-appellant have the right to take charge of the room, if he could do so peacefully and without injury to the plaintiff or any of her property? And, if so, was there not error in not charging all of the defendant's fourth request, to wit: Or if you find that when requested to vacate the room she agreed to do so by a certain time, and did not do so, the plaintiff cannot recover. 4. Was there any competent proof of actual damage to the plaintiff, the jury having found only actual damages; and that the defendant-appellant did not act unlawfully, unwantonly or maliciously in locking the door so as to prevent the plaintiff from occupying the room without his knowledge and consent; and cite: As to conditional continuance: 9 So. 376; 20 So. 339; 30 Pac. 1078. Reputation: Dudley L. 346. No recovery for mental anguish: 52 S. C. 323; 82 S. C. 481; 57 S. C. 325; 84 S. C. 15. No special damages: 9 H. L. Cas. 599; 84 S. C. 15; 57 S. C. 325; 9 Exch. 341. Ejection of tenant: 6 Car. & P. 723; 195 Mass. 392; 42 L. R. A. 830.

Messrs. Gwynn & Hannon, for respondent, cite: As to order requiring payment of costs: 81 S. C. 534 and 566.