INFECTIOUS AND CONTAGIOUS DISEASES OF FARM ANIMALS AND THEIR EFFECT ON AMERICAN AGRICULTURE. By D. E. SALMON, D. V. M., The subject which I have been asked to discuss at this congress is a very large one and includes so many different elements that it can only be treated in the most general manner in the short time at my disposal. The omission of many important details is therefore a matter of necessity rather than choice. What I shall hope to do is to impress upon you the necessity of controlling the contagious diseases of farm animals and the practical value to the farmers and to the country at large of the efforts of the Federal Government which are being put forth to investigate, to understand, and to control these diseases. Animal husbandry is one of the most important branches of agriculture, and it has been developed in the United States to a degree which excites the admiration of the world and which justifies every legitimate effort for its assistance and protection. In no other country can you find such an aggregation of farm animals-animals in such amazing numbers, of such value, so highly bred, and so free from disease. Statisticians tell us that we have more than 19,000,000 horses and mules; over 17,000,000 milch cows; 44,500,000 other cattle; nearly 64,000,000 sheep; 47,000,000 hogs, and 250,000,000 fowls of various kinds. The horses and mules are worth $1,200,000,000; the cattle are worth $1,300,000,000; the sheep are worth $168,000,000; the hogs are worth $365,000,000; the fowls are worth about $86,000,000. In round numbers, the total value of these farm animals is $3,119,000,000. This, then, is the tremendous investment of capital which our farmers are holding in domesticated animals. It is generally regarded as simply representing so much wealth, and as a matter of interest to no one but the owners. But we must take a broader view than that of our animal husbandry. The cattle, sheep, hogs, and poultry are a large and essential part of the food supply of the nation, and the horses are necessary for the production of the other part of our food supply. Any cause which reduces the quantity of our food supply or increases the cost of its production makes the conditions of life, especially in the @ Read at the Farmers' National Congress, Niagara Falls, N. Y., September 23 1903. large cities, more difficult, adds to the distress and misery of that part of the population which at best is merely able to exist, and tends to increase disease and mortality in proportion as its effects are felt. There are also times when through domestic disorder or foreign foes the very life of a nation is at stake, and in such emergencies the food supply has often been an important factor in its preservation. And one of the conditions which undoubtedly adds to the stability of our Government is the abundance and the high quality of our food supply produced by American farmers. These considerations apply, of course, to all the elements of the food supply as well as to the domesticated animals, but they are of especial interest in connection with animals because of the imported plagues, which are generally preventable, but which often sweep a continent as with fire, depleting the supply of animal food, endangering the public health, and ruining many people who are engaged in agricultural pursuits. A calamity of this kind affects nearly the whole population of a country, depresses business, causes restrictions upon traffic, and often leads to the closing of foreign markets for the animals and animal products of the affected country. The losses from communicable animal diseases in the United States, considering the large numbers of animals produced, have been moderate as compared with those of other countries, the distance from the Old World having for the most part protected us from the plagues which are most destructive there. Still we have had troubles of our own, and some of them very serious ones, and it is to the consideration of these that most of my time is devoted. THE CONTAGIOUS PLEURO-PNEUMONIA OF CATTLE. An imported disease known as the contagious pleuro-pneumonia of cattle led to the establishment of the United States Bureau of Animal Industry and to the active interest which the Federal Government has since shown in the protection of our farm animals from the ravages of communicable diseases. This plague was allowed to slumber in the eastern part of the country for forty years before active measures were inaugurated by the General Government for its suppression. Fortunately the current of traffic was from the West to the East, or the contagion would have been spread beyond the possibility of eradication. Nevertheless, diseased cattle were taken to the West, and the `plague appeared in Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, and Kentucky, threatening the entire cattle industry of the country. In this precarious and dangerous situation, when the integrity and the prosperity of the cattle industry for many years in the future, if not for all time, hung in the balance, we had divided counsels. Men who had never seen the disease, for the good reason that they had never looked for it in the places where it prevailed, insisted that it did not exist upon the Ameri can continent; others urged impracticable plans for its eradication, and there were not wanting those who claimed that the effort for the control of the disease was simply a raid on the Treasury, and that the disease would last as long as appropriations were made. Under these apparently discouraging conditions an inadequate appropriation was made, with no direct authority to go into the States where the disease existed and enforce the measures necessary to combat it. However, the best that could be done under the circumstances was done; the contagion was held in check, and evidence of its existence was produced. To be brief, the funds were soon increased, more power was given, and within five years from the beginning of the work the contagion was totally stamped out; and although a dozen years have since gone by the disease has not again been found on this continent. There still remains, however, an unpleasant reminder of the fact that it once existed here. In 1879 the British Government, on the ground of the existence of this disease in the United States, prohibited our exported animals from going inland to market and required them to be killed on the docks where landed. That regulation is still in force, and with the oft-demonstrated disinclination of the British officials to treat our cattle trade with justice (we have never asked for generosity) it would appear that there is little likelihood of its being removed, at least during the lifetime of the present generation. The effect of this regulation is not as injurious to-day as it was a quarter of a century ago, when first instituted. Then it depreciated. our cattle from $5 to $10 a head, but the trade has since adjusted itself to the existing conditions, and now the loss on this account is comparatively light. The results which followed this pleuro-pneumonia work were of incalculable benefit to the agriculture of the United States. In the first place the celerity with which the disease was eradicated here was an object lesson to the whole world. Great Britain, Germany, France, and other European countries had for many years been enforcing measures in a half-hearted manner for its suppression without success, and for a long time they were incredulous that we had succeeded. An abundance of time has now elapsed for a complete demonstration, and this has given our Government a reputation for intelligence and efficiency in the control of animal diseases which has been of considerable assistance in preventing restrictions and prohibitions from being placed upon our animals and animal products in various parts of the world. Great Britain has also followed our example and stamped out the disease, thus relieving us of the menace of its reintroduction with British cattle. The most important result of the pleuro-pneumonia work, however, was probably the establishment of a bureau in the national Department of Agriculture to investigate and furnish information concerning the animal industry of the country and to perform such executive work in relation to animals and animal products as may from time to time be necessary or desirable. The inspection of meats for interstate and foreign commerce was inaugurated immediately after the termination of the pleuro-pneumonia work, and this, together with the scientific investigation of disease, enabled us to collect and maintain a force of trained experts who were available for immediate service in an emergency such as we have had in New England during the past year. The eradication of pleuro-pneumonia has also been an object lesson of the greatest value for our own farmers. It has proved to them that, notwithstanding our peculiar form of government and the rights of the sovereign States, it is possible for the Federal Government to eradicate animal diseases in this country. It has also proved that certain plagues of animals are of exclusively exotic origin, and that if the contagion is once thoroughly stamped out those diseases will not again be seen until fresh contagion is introduced from abroad. This is a lesson which we all need to have forced upon us again and again before we can appreciate the great importance and the permanent value of prompt and efficient work in stamping out such plagues. It is not difficult for anyone to understand that if all the zebras, for example, on the American continent were killed off there would never be any more here until there had been another importation of these animals; but when it concerns the infinitely small forms of life which constitute the contagion of the animal plagues it requires actual experience with them before we can fully realize that the same principle holds good with them as with the larger species of animal and vegetable life. FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE. Late in November of last year the country was astounded to learn that an extensive outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease existed in the New England States. We had for years maintained a rigid quarantine of all susceptible animals coming from countries where the disease existed; we had taken special precautions to insure, so far as possible, the disinfection of hides from infected countries; we had held up, inspected, and in some cases quarantined menagerie animals; we had been particularly careful to prohibit or disinfect halters, feed bags, hay, and bedding that came with animals from infected countries. The entrance of the contagion was therefore a mystery, and one which has not yet been satisfactorily cleared up. What we know is that the disease was first seen near the docks and spread from there toward the interior. There are, of course, many ways in which the contagion might be brought and escape our inspectors, but it does not often come through such channels, as is proved by the fact that this is the first outbreak of the disease that we have had in twenty years, and the only one that we have ever had that could not be traced to the importation of diseased cattle. When I arrived in Boston, December 1, more than one hundred herds of diseased cattle had already been discovered in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The local quarantine was largely disregarded, and people going from one stable to another carried the contagion and extended the infected area. Cattle dealers were gathering up animals in the infected sections and shipping them to market; in some cases they sent them to other States. Cars were thus infected, with imminent danger of their carrying the disease to the interior of the country. Newly diseased herds were reported daily. In this emergency it was necessary to stop the exportation of cattle and sheep from Boston; it was also necessary to quarantine the States in which the disease existed, and to prevent cattle, sheep, hogs, and undisinfected railroad cars from going to other States. After duly considering the practical impossibility of maintaining an efficient quarantine of the diseased herds and the failure of other countries which had endeavored to control such outbreaks by quarantine, it was decided to kill at once all susceptible animals upon the premises where the disease was found. This plan was carried out, and the only exceptions made were in the case of herds which had gone through the disease and entirely recovered before they could be reached. Before the work had progressed very far it was found that the disease also existed in New Hampshire and had been quite extensively disseminated in that State. The same regulations were applied there as in the other infected States. As soon as possible after the herds were killed, the barns, stables, and yards were disinfected by trained men and at Government expense. In some cases the hay, straw, and other fodder were purchased and burned. As a result of this thorough work the disease was stamped out, and no new territory was infected after the Government force was organized and put into the field. The measures adopted to suppress this outbreak were looked upon by some citizens as extremely arbitrary and harsh, and the Department of Agriculture has even been censured for securing the prosecution and conviction of men who deliberately violated the quarantine and drove cattle out of the infected States for the purpose of shipping them to the general markets of the country. But suppose the disease had been spread in this manner and new outbreaks had appeared in other States, would not the Department have been even more severely censured for failing to control the contagion? There appears to be a tendency to look upon laws and regulations as things which are made to be violated, and if this tendency were encouraged it would be impossible to stamp out such plagues as foot-and-mouth disease. Undoubtedly the best policy is to make only such regulations as are absolutely |