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ancholy catastrophes happened during the British squadron, already sufficientthe storm. Among the rest, the In- ly occupied with its own wounded, and domptable was wrecked on the coast, the numerous prizes in its hands. In rehaving on board, besides her own, the turn, the Marquis of Solano, governor of survivors of the Bucentaure's crew, and Cadiz, sent to offer the English the above a thousand persons perished. use of the hospitals for their wounded, Some of the prizes foundered in the pledging the Spanish honour that they gale; others were sunk by the British. should be carefully attended to. When Four only reached Gibraltar in safety. the storm after the action drove some But the British took Admirals Ville- of the prizes upon the coast, they deneuve, Alava, and Cisneros, besides clared that the English who were thus twenty thousand prisoners, including thrown into their hands should not be the land forces on board,* and the com- considered as prisoners of war; and bined fleet was almost totally annihi- the Spanish soldiers gave up their own lated, while their own loss was only beds to their shipwrecked enemies. sixteen hundred and ninety men killed Already was to be seen the commenceand wounded. "Six-and-twenty ships ment of that heartfelt alliance which of the line," says General Mathieu Du- was so soon destined to take place bemas, 'at Trafalgar or Cape Ortegal,+tween these generous enemies; and it were compelled to strike their colours. It may truly be said that there were left only a few remnants of the fleet which two months before had filled England with alarm." +

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was amidst the tempests of Trafalgar that the feelings were produced which brought them to stand side by side at Vittoria and Toulouse.

116. No words can describe the mingled feelings of joy and grief, of exultation and melancholy, which pervaded the British empire upon the news being received of the battle of Trafalgar. The greatest naval victory recorded in the annals of the world had been gained by their arms. The dan

115. An interchange of courteous deeds took place between the British fleet and the Spaniards at Cadiz. The magnitude of the disaster had extinguished all feelings of irritation, and brought the people into that state of sad exaltation which is nearly allied to generous emotion. Admiral Colling-gers of invasion, the menaces of Napowood made an offer to send all the wounded Spaniards ashore; a proposal which excited the deepest gratitude in that high-spirited people, and was at the same time a seasonable relief to

*This number may appear large, and the whole loss, including prisoners, is stated by M. Thiers to have been only 7000 men.THIERS, Vii. 172. This number, however, is exclusive of those who fell into the hands of the victors, but escaped during the storm. The English took nineteen ships of the line, including two first-rates, the Santissima Trinidad and Santa Anna. In three of the seventy-fours taken, the prisoners were 800 each.-Nelson Desp. vii. 226. Applying this to the whole nineteen ships taken, the crews of these ships would be 15,200, and as there were two first-rates taken, and 4000 troops on board, under General Contarnin-[COLLINGWOOD to MOLLARDEN, 24th Oct. 1805; Nelson Desp. vii. 217]-the number of persons on board the prizes could not be less than 20,000. Lord Collingwood accordingly says, "In the captured ships we took 20,000 prisoners, including the troops."-LORD COLLINGWOOD to J. E. BLACKETT, Esq., 2d Nov. 1803; Nelson Desp. vii. 235.

leon, were at an end. Secure in their sea-girt isle, they could now behold without alarm the marshalled forces of Europe_arrayed in hostility against them. In a single moment, from the

The subsequent action with Sir R. Strachan. In the midst of this scene of ruin, Admiral Collingwood did not neglect the duty which he owed to the Supreme Disposer of all events. On the day after the battle, the following general order was issued to the fleet: "The Almighty God, whose arm is strength, having of his great mercy been pleased to crown the exertions of his majesty's fleet with success, in giving them a complete victory over their enemies on the 21st of this month, and that all praise and thanksgiving may be offered up to the throne of grace for the great benefit to our country and to mankind, I have thought proper that a day should be appointed for a general humiliation before God, and thanksgiving for his merciful goodness, imploring forgiveness of sins, a continuation of his divine mercy, and his constant aid to us in defence of our country, liberties, and laws, without which the utmost efforts of man are naught.”—COLLINGWOOD, i. 179.

result of one engagement, they had passed from a state of anxious solicitude to one of independence and security. Inestimable as these blessings were, they yet seemed an inadequate compensation for the life of the hero by whom they had been gained. The feelings of grief were even more powerful than those of gratitude; and England, with the fleets of her antagonist sunk in the deep, seemed less secure than when, in presence of her yet unscathed enemies, she was protected by the hero whose flaming sword turned

every way.

117. Need it be added that all the honours which a grateful country could bestow were heaped upon the memory of Lord Nelson? His brother was made an earl, with a grant of £6000 a year; £10,000 was voted to each of his sisters, and £100,000 for the purchase of an estate. A public funeral was decreed, and a monument by the nation in the place of his interment, St Paul's cathedral. The principal cities of the empire vied with each other in erecting monuments and statues to his memory. Admiral Collingwood was made a baron, and received a pension of £2000 a-year; a grant which first raised that noble officer from the state of comparative dependence which is so often the lot of upright integrity. The remains of Nelson were consigned to the grave amidst all the pomp of funeral obsequies, in St Paul's, followed by a countless multitude of sorrowing spectators. The leaden coffin in which he was brought home was cut in pieces and distributed as relics through the fleet; and when at his interment his flag was about to be lowered into the grave, the sailors who assisted at the ceremony with one accord rent it in pieces, that each might preserve a fragment as long as he lived. Unbounded was the public grief at his untimely end. Yet," in the words of his eloquent biographer, "he cannot be said to have fallen prematurely whose work was done; nor ought he to be lamented who died so full of honours, and at the height of human fame. The most triumphant death is that of the martyr; the most awful,

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that of the martyred patriot; the most splendid, that of the hero in the hour of victory; and if the chariot and horses of fire had been vouchsafed for Nelson's translation, he could scarcely have departed in a brighter blaze of glory."

118. Lord Nelson was the greatest naval officer of this or any other nation whose achievements have been recorded in history. The energies of an ardent and impetuous mind were in him wholly absorbed in patriotic feeling. Duty to his God, his King, and country, constituted the simple objects to which unrivalled powers and consummate genius were directed. Like all other great commanders, he took the utmost pains to make his officers thoroughly acquainted beforehand with his general plan of operations, but intrusted them with full discretionary powers in carrying them into execution. He possessed the eagle eye which at once discerns the fitting movement, and the capacity for skilful combination which brings every power at his disposal simultaneously and decisively into action. Simple in his desires, enthusiastic in his character, he was alike superior to the love of wealth, the bane of inferior, and envy of others, the frailty of ambitious minds. Devotion to his country was in him blended with a constant sense of religious duty; and amidst all the license of arms he was distinguished from the first by an early and manly piety. In later years, when his achievements had marked him out as the great defender of Christianity, he considered himself as an instrument in the hand of Providence to combat the infidel spirit of the Revolution, and commenced his despatch on the battle of the Nile by ascribing the whole to Almighty God. Too great to be fettered by rules, too original to condescend to imitation, he consulted his own inspiration only in all his mighty deeds, and in every instance left the stamp of native genius on the duties, whether elevated or humble, which he performed. whole career, from his first entrance into the navy to the battle of Trafalgar, exhibited a pattern of every manly

His

virtue. Bold in conception, cautious in combination, firm in execution, cool in danger, he was the most successful, because the most profound and intrepid, of leaders. If a veil could be drawn over the deeds perpetrated at Naples, his public character might be deemed without a fault: but no human being was ever yet perfect; and that alloy of frailty which has descended to all from our first parents, long concealed in him by the intensity of patriotic devotion, was at length revealed by the fascination of female wicked

ness.

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enemy, and lasted with great vigour for four hours; when it terminated in the capture of every one of the French ships, but not till they were almost totally dismasted, and had sustained a loss of seven hundred and thirty killed and wounded. Crippled and dispirited as they were, it was not to be expected that the four French ships could have withstood the shock of four fresh English line-of-battle ships, supported by four frigates, who took an important part in the action; and the heavy loss which they sustained proves that they had not surrendered till the last extremity. Sir Richard Strachan brought his four prizes into harbour, which somewhat consoled the English for the absence of so many of those taken at Trafalgar; and their satisfaction was increased by the British loss being only twenty-four killed and a hundred and eleven wounded.

120. It is observed by Mr Hume, that actions at sea are seldom, if ever, so decisive as those at land- -a remark suggested by the repeated indecisive actions between the English and Dutch in the reign of Charles II., but which affords a striking proof of the danger of generalising from too limited a collection of facts. Had he extended his retrospect further, he would have observed that the most decisive and important of all actions recorded in history have been fought at sea. The battle of Salamis rolled back from Greece the tide of Persian invasion; that of Actium gave a master to the Roman world; that of Lepanto arrested for ever the dangers of Mahometan

119. The battle of Trafalgar was soon followed by another victory, which at any other period would have excited the most lively satisfaction, but was hardly noticed in the transports consequent on that stupendous event. Admiral Dumanoir, who had escaped from the disaster at Cadiz, and crossed the Bay of Biscay in hopes of getting either into Rochefort or Brest harbours, fell in, on the 2d November, with the frigates of Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, who immediately made signal that a strange fleet was in sight. The British admiral instantly gave chase, which was continued two days and nights, during which the light of the moon rendered the enemy visible; until at length, at noon on the 4th November, the two squadrons were so near that Dumanoir was obliged to lie to, and receive battle. The English fleet at first consisted of five ships of the line and four frigates; but during the chase one of the former was driven away by stress of weather, and in the action which followed four line-of-invasion in the south of Europe; and battle ships and four frigates alone were engaged. The French had four sail of the line only, and some of their guns were dismounted from the effects of the battle of Trafalgar. The battle began at noon, by each of the British line-of-battle ships engaging one of the

The ultimate fate of the celebrated and

bewitching Lady Hamilton, whose influence led Nelson into the cruel executions at Naples, which forms the only blot on his public character, was a remarkable instance of moral retribution. She died in France, many years afterwards, alone and unbefriended, in want of the common necessaries of life.

that of La Hogue checked for nearly a century the maritime efforts of the house of Bourbon. As important in its consequences as the greatest of these achievements, the battle of Trafalgar not only at once secured the independence of England, and destroyed all Napoleon's hopes of maritime greatness, but annihilated for half a century the navies of France and Spain. The losses of the Moscow campaign were repaired in six months; even the terrible overthrow of Leipsic was almost forgotten in the host which was mar

shalled round the imperial eagles at Waterloo. But from the shock of Trafalgar the French navy never recovered; and during the remainder of the war, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Napoleon, no considerable fleet, with the tricolor flag, was ever seen at sea. Error frequently attends hasty or partial induction; but from a sufficiently broad and extensive view of human affairs, conclusions of general and lasting certainty may be formed.

121. It is stated by Napoleon that a fleet of thirty ships of the line, with guns and complement of men complete, may be considered as corresponding at sea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men at land. Judg. ing by this standard, the battle of Trafalgar, which rendered useless fully twenty-five ships of the line and made prize of twenty, must be considered as equivalent to a victory where ninety thousand men out of one hundred and twenty thousand were destroyed. The annals of war exhibit no instance of such a success with land forces; it is double what even the bulletins claimed for Napoleon at Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. Even at Waterloo, where alone a blow approaching to that inflicted at Trafalgar was struck, the loss of the French has never been estimated at above forty thousand men. The loss by which that decisive victory was purchased, on the side of the British alone, was nearly nine thousand; on that of the Allies, above twenty thousand: whereas the total loss of the English at Trafalgar was only sixteen hundred and ninety men; a smaller number than perished in many inconsiderable actions attended with little or no result in Spain.* This affords a striking instance how comparatively bloodless, when viewed in relation to the importance of the successes achieved, are victories at sea: and although the losses of the defeated party are much more severe, yet even they bear no sort of propor

* The loss at Talavera, out of 19,000 British, was 5000: that at Albuera, 4500 out of 7500; and out of 16,000 who formed the storming columns at Badajos, nearly 4000 lay on the breaches and in the ditches of that terrible fortress.

tion to the enormous effusion of blood in land fights. Lord Collingwood estimates the killed and wounded at Trafalgar, where the French navy was in a manner annihilated, "at several thousands:" while the Moscow campaign, where four hundred thousand men perished, was found insufficient to beat down the military power of Napoleon.

122. The battle of Trafalgar affords a decisive proof that it is owing to no peculiar manœuvre, ill-understood by others, of breaking the line, that the extraordinary successes of the English at sea are owing, but that the superior prowess and naval skill of their sailors are alone the cause of their triumphs. In truth, the operation of breaking the line, whether at sea or land, is an extremely critical and hazardous one, and never will be attempted, or, if attempted, succeed, but by the party conscious of and possessing greater courage and resources in danger than its opponent. From its superior sailing, and the lightness of the wind, the Royal Sovereign was in action at Trafalgar when the rear of the column was still six miles distant, and fully a quarter of an hour before another British ship fired a shot: and the whole weight of the conflict, for the same reason, fell upon the twelve or fourteen British ships which first got into action, by whom six-sevenths of the loss was sustained.† So far from the French and Spanish fleets being doubled upon and assailed by a superior force, the British fleet itself was thus situated; and the victory was in fact gained by half its force, before the remainder got into action. The arrival of this remainder, indeed, gave those first engaged a decisive advantage, and enabled the ships which hitherto had borne up against such desperate odds to overwhelm in their turn their dispirited, and now outnumbered, opponents; but had they not been, from the first, superior, and greatly superior, to their antagonists, they must have been

+"The total loss was 1690, of which 1452 belonged to fourteen out of the twentyseven vessels of the fleet. With a few exceptions, the ships so suffering were in the van of their respective columns."-JAMES, iv. 111.

taken prisoners in the outset of the fray, and lain useless logs alongside of their captors when the rear of the columns was getting into action. Would any but an enemy of superior courage have ventured to plunge, like Collingwood and Nelson, into the centre of their opponent's fleet, and, unsupported, single out the hostile admiral for attack, when surrounded by his own vessels? What would have been the fate of Alava and Villeneuve, of the Santa Anna and the Bucentaure, if they had thus engaged Collingwood and Nelson, the Royal Sovereign and the Victory, at the muzzle of their guns, in the middle of the English fleet, while three or four other hostile line-of-battle ships were pouring in their shot on all sides? Would they not have been compelled to strike their colours in ten minutes, before the tardy succeeding vessels could come up to their support?

123. In breaking the line, in short, whether at sea or land, the head of the column must necessarily be engaged with a vastly superior force before the rear and centre can get up to its support; and if, from accidental causes, their arrival, as at Trafalgar, is long delayed, it may happen that this contest against desperate odds may continue a very long time-quite long enough to prove fatal to an ordinary assailant. The conclusion to be drawn from this is, not that Nelson, Duncan, and Rodney did wrong, and ran unnecessary hazard, by breaking the line at Trafalgar, Camperdown, and Martinique-quite the reverse; they did perfectly right but that it is the manœuvre suited only to the braver and more skilful party, and never can prove successful except in the hands of the power possessing the superiority in courage and prowess, though not in numbers. It will succeed when the head of the column can sustain itself against double or treble its own force until the centre and rear get up, but in no other circumstances. The case is precisely the same at land: the party breaking the line there runs the greatest risk of being overpowered, if not able to bear up against superior forces, before support arrive from the rear; and an an

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tagonist who can trust his troops in line to resist the head of the column, will soon obtain a decisive advantage by assailing the attacking column on both flanks. This was what the Duke of Wellington felt he could do, and constantly did, with British troops; and, accordingly, Jomini tells us that the system of attacking in columns and breaking the line never succeeded against the close and murderous fire of the English infantry. It was the same with the Russians. Napoleon's system of bringing an overwhelming force against one point, and there breaking the line, answered perfectly, as long as he was engaged with the Austrians, who laid down their arms or retired the moment they saw an enemy on their flank; but when he applied it to the Russians, he soon found the attacking column fiercely assailed on all sides by the troops among whom it had penetrated; and the surrender of Vandamme, with seven thousand men, in the mountains of Bohemia, in 1813, taught him that it is a very different thing to get into the rear of an army drawn from the north and one from the south of Europe.

124. It is frequently said by the French writers, that at this period the fate of Europe depended upon chance, and that, if the parties to whom Napoleon remitted to report on Mr Fulton's proposal for the navigation of vessels by steam had given a different opinion from what they did, and that invention had been adopted at Boulogne, there can be no doubt that the invasion might have been successfully accomplished. There appears no solid ground for this opinion. Great discoveries, destined, like those of gunpowder, printing, and steam, in the end to change the face of the world, never come to maturity but by slow degrees. The sublimest genius, the most overwhelming power, is not able so far to outstrip the march of time, as to give to one generation the general use of a discovery destined by nature for another. Even if it were otherwise, and steam navigation could in a few years have been brought to perfection, or at least into common application, in the French navy, unquestionably the English would not have been idle; the

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