not required to file any written evidence of his authority to appear, nor can he be questioned as to his right to appear after the first term. Rules of C. Pleas, IV. Judge Howe expresses the opinion that the rule must be construed to mean, that the opposite party shall not, after that time, question the attorney, and not, that he may not show his want of power. He may prove at any time that the suit is prosecuted or defended without authority, and it will be dismissed. Howe's Prac. 32. If an attorney appear, that fact is always deemed sufficient for the opposite party and the Court. By licensing attorneys, the Courts recommend them to public confidence. These principles have been recognised in all the respectable Courts of the Union. Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheaton, 738; Smith v. Bowditch, 7 Pick. 137, where notice was given to the attorney of record, and held to be binding, though the party disavowed his authority. But in Brewer v. Holmes, 1 Met. 288, a review was granted on proof that the attorney, who entered his name of record for the defendant, was not authorized by him, and in Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232, where the effect of judgments of other States was very elaborately discussed, the Court say that when the record of such judgment sets forth that the party appeared by an attorney duly authorized, it is only primâ facie evidence of the fact, and it may be contested, as was allowed also in Aldrich v. Kinsey, 4 Conn. 380. The question was again discussed very fully in 4 Met. 333, where the same principles were reaffirmed and fortified by a reference to decisions in New York and Virginia. In Robson v. Eaton, 1 T. R. 62, where a party was sued, and paid the money demanded into Court, and it was taken out by plaintiff's attorney, and it turned

out that the power of attorney, under which plaintiff's counsel acted, was forged, it was held no bar to a second action for the same cause.

The later decisions, therefore, do not give to the appearance or acts of an attorney that conclusive character which was formerly assigned to them. There can be no reason, why a person should not be permitted to prove that one who undertook to act as his agent or attorney, was never authorized to represent him. The true principle seems to be, that the appearance of an attorney is sufficient to authorize the Court to proceed. The opposite party may question him as to right, at the first term, and if he be not in fact authorized and make false representations, he would undoubtedly be liable to such party.

Attorneys are exempted from serving as jurors. Rev. Stat. c. 95, § 2, though they have retired from practice, and engaged in other pursuits. Ex parte Swett, 20 Pick. 1. They are not bound to produce any paper entrusted to them by their clients. 8 M. R. 370, Anon.

No attorney can appear in any Court in the trial of a cause, which he has previously determined as a Justice, Rev. Stat. c. 85, § 34, or as a Judge, c. 89, § 8; nor can a Judge or Register of Probate appear in any suit or matter which may depend on or relate to sentences and decrees in the Probate Court. R. S. c. 83, § 26, 27. Judges of Probate and Masters in Chancery are prohibited from being in any way the counsel or attorney of the party, in relation to any matters connected with the proceedings under any assignments, over which they may have exercised any of the powers given them by the insolvent law. Stat. 1338, 17. District attorneys cannot be concerned

as counsel or attorney for either party, in

any civil action depending on the same state of facts, as any criminal prosecution to which it shall be their official duty to attend. Rev. Stat. c. 13, § 46. No attorney can purchase notes, demands, and other rights of action, or directly or indirectly loan or advance, or agree to loan or advance, money, &c. for the purpose of procuring himself to be employed in their collection, or making profit from their collection; Rev. Stat. c. 89, § 5, 6, Allen v. Hawks, 13 Pick. 89; and the same prohibition is extended to constables, coroners, sheriffs, and Justices, who are also prohibited from appearing as attorneys in any Court, and from drawing, making, filling up or altering any writ, declaration, plea or process for any such party. In 10 Pick. 45, where an officer altered a writ, it was held, that the attachment was void.

The Powers of attorneys, although extensive, are nevertheless subject to many restrictions and limitations.

They have power to bind their clients by agreements entered upon the record, or by writings filed in the case, or by admissions made on the trial of a cause, Howe, 38. Union Bank v. Gray, 5 Peters, R. 99. They may generally do everything necessary and proper in conducting the suit, become nonsuit, or refer the suit, (Cary v. Turner, 6, J. R. 51;) appeal from a judgment, and bind their clients by a recognizance to prosecute the appeal, (Adams v. Robinson, 1 Pick. 461;) but it is doubtful whether they can do this without express authority, and they can of course receive the amount due on an execution or judgment and discharge it. But they cannot compromise a suit, (Backland v. Con, way, 16 M. R. 396; Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436;)

nor discharge a debt on receiving collateral security for a larger amount than the debt, (Parker v. Downing, 13 M. R. 465;) nor discharge a debtor from imprisonment without satisfaction, (Langdon v. Potter, 13 M. R. 319; Lewis v. Gamage, 1 Pick. 347;) and it has even been held in New York, that if the gaoler discharge him on such order, he will be liable for an escape, (Jackson v. Bartlett, 8 J. R. 461; Kellogg v. Gilbert, 10 J. R. 220.) They may elect and control the remedy, and all the proceedings arising out of, and connected with it, but they cannot release or discharge the cause of action, without receiving payment. Jenney v. Delesdernier, 20 Maine, 183. They have no authority to release the indorser of a note or the liability of a person to pay costs to make them competent witnesses. York Bank v. Appleton, 17 Maine R. 55; Springer v. Whipple, Ib. 351. A delivery by a witness of a release of all interest in a suit to the attorney of the party calling him, is a good delivery to the party. Stephenson v. Mudgett, 10 N. H. 341.

The power of an attorney to commence and prosecute a suit, is revoked by the death of the constituent ; and without a new retainer he has no authority to appear in the suit for an executor or administrator, (Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333,) where an attorney suggested the death of the plaintiff, and caused the appearance of the administrator to be entered. It was held, that he acted without authority. Palmer v. Reiffenstein, 1 Man. & Gran. 94; Gale v. Tappan, 12 N. H. 145. His power is also revoked, if the client himself assume the management of the debt, by taking the execution into his own hands, or otherwise. Parker v. Downing, 13 M. R. 465. Otherwise it continues as long as he keeps the execution alive. 5 Peters, 99.

An attorney has, of course, powers co-extensive with his duties, and his duties are, generally, care, skill, and integrity, and if he be not deficient in any of these essential requisites, he is not responsible for any error or mistake arising in the exercise of his profession. "They ought to be protected, where they act to the best of their skill and knowledge; but every man is liable to error, and I should be very sorry, that it should be taken for granted, that an attorney is answerable for every error or mistake, and liable to be punished for it, by being charged with the debt sued for. Not only counsel, but Judges may differ, or doubt, or take time to consider; therefore an attorney ought not to be liable in cases of reasonable doubt." Lord Mansfield, in Pitt v. Yalder, 4 Burr. 2061. But in ordinary cases, if an attorney be deficient in skill or care, by which a loss arises to his client, he is liable to a special action on the cases for damage. He is made liable by Rev. Stat. c. 88, § 25, to the party injured, "for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct," and is also liable to be emoved for the same causes by the Court.

The duty of an attorney is not confined merely to the original suit, in which he was first retained, but extends to such subsequent proceedings, as in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, may effect the ultimate object for which the suit was instituted. If bail have been taken, it is his duty seasonably to sue the bail. Dearborn v. Dearborn, 15 M. R. 316. So, where an erroneous judgment has been entered to cause it to be reversed. Grosvenor v. Danforth, 16 M. R. 74. Where an attorney causes property to be attached and it is replevied, it is his duty to act in the defence of the replevin suit, and, if the defendant prevails, to