action of trover is already complete. Boise v. Knox, 10 Met. 40; Salisbury v. Gourgas, Ib. 442. But in other cases, where the original taking was lawful, and the detention only illegal, it is absolutely necessary. A demand and refusal are only presumptive evidence of conversion, and may be explained. In making a demand, the value of the goods should be so fully described, as at least not to mislead. Leaving a written demand at the residence of a party is sufficient, if followed by a general and absolute refusal to deliver the goods; Logan v. Houlditch, 1 Esp. R. 22; but it is apprehended that this will not be sufficient, where there is no obligation on the party to incur the expense of conveyance to the person demanding. 1 Chitty, Prac. 567.

Where goods are seized by a sheriff as the property of a person, who has them on hire for a term, it is advisable, and may be necessary, according to a late case (Dean v. Whitaker, 1 C. & P. 447), for the reversioner to give notice that they were hired for a term, and that they were the property of the reversioner, and that the sheriff must sell only the limited or temporary interest. If the reversioner have actual knowledge of the seizure, his neglect to give notice would be very strong evidence, at least, against his right.

Where a demand is made by an attorney, the party has a right to require reasonable evidence of his authority; but if no exception be taken at the time, a subsequent commencement of the suit by the party in wnose behalf it was made, claiming under such demand is a ratification of it, and is primâ facie evidence, at least, that it was made by his authority. Payne v. Smith, 12 N. H. 34.

As to the place where a demand should be made, it

must no doubt be made properly and reasonably, according to the nature of the case. Where one promised to deliver articles when called for, a demand at his dwelling-house, though he was absent, was held to be proper, (Mason v. Briggs, 16 M. R. 453;) and it was held to be necessary to make it at defendant's house, (in Barber v. Jones, 8 N. H. 413,) where the defendant had his election to pay for a clock, or return it and pay for its use.

If a demand be necessary, it should be made, not only at a proper place, but at a proper time. Thus, where a demand was made by the payee on the maker of a note at eight o'clock of the morning of the day when it became payable, and payment not being made, a suit was immediately commenced, it was held to be premature. Lunt v. Adams, 17 Maine, 230. In the case of Staples v. Franklin Bank, 1 Met. 43, the question was raised, whether a note could be put in suit on the last day of grace, and if so, at what time on that day, and all the leading English and American authorities are cited in the elaborate and learned opinion of the Court. It was held, that if payment be demanded, at any reasonable hour, on the last day of grace and refused, an action may be instantly commenced against the promissor, and after actual or constructive notice, against the indorser.

CHAPTER III.

ATTORNEYS.

By the eighty-eighth chapter of the Revised Statutes, any citizen of the Commonwealth, of the age of twenty-one years, and of good moral character, who shall have devoted three years to the study of the law, in the office of some attorney within this State, shall be admitted to practice as an attorney in any Court of this Commonwealth. When satisfactory proof of these facts is furnished, either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Common Pleas, which is usually done by the certificates of the attorneys, with whom he has studied, he is admitted on motion and without examination.

When a person shall not have studied three years, within the State, he may, on the recommendation of any attorney within this Commonwealth, petition to be examined, and the Court is required to appoint a suitable time and place for such examination, and if satisfied therewith, to admit him. The rules of the respective Courts on this subject will be found in the Appendix.

A person who has been admitted to the highest Court in another State, on becoming an inhabitant of this, may be admitted to practice here, upon satisfactory evidence of his good moral character and professional qualifications. In practice, such persons are

admitted on motion.

The distinction between counsellors and attorneys is abolished, and when a person is admitted in either

Court, he is entitled to practice in all the Courts of the Commonwealth.

Any person, of good moral character, may manage, prosecute or defend a suit, for any other person, provided he is specially authorized, in writing, or by personal nomination in open Court, and parties may also appear personally, but no more than two persons for each party shall be allowed, except by permission of the Court.

These statutory provisions have been in operation for about eleven years, and have effected but a very slight change in the character of the profession or the mode of conducting legal business. Very few persons are known to have availed themselves of the privilege of managing their own causes, and very few young men have applied for admission until they have studied three years. Applications to be examined are rarely made to the Supreme Court, and the practice recently introduced by the Court of Common Pleas of conducting the examinations in open Court, has proved to be a salutary check upon the eagerness of youthful students to rush into the profession. The restriction of two counsel to each party has been construed to mean, that but two persons shall be actively employed in the examination of witnesses and the argument of questions in Court. Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 478.

There are certain classes of persons, who are not permitted to sue or to defend personally or by attorney. Infants must sue by guardian or prochein amie and any person may bring an action in the name of an infant as his next friend. Miles v. Boyden, 3 Pick. 213; Smith v. Floyd, I Pick. 275. They sue by guardian, when they are under guardianship, and by prochein amie, when not. If the Court neglect to ap

point a guardian ad litem for an infant respondent in a petition for partition, the judgment for partition is not absolutely void, but it is voidable by him and his privies in blood, but by no other persons. Austin v. Trustees, 8 Met. 196. Where a previous demand is necessary, as in case of a legacy, the action must necessarily be by guardian, and infants must always defend by guardian. Married women must appear in person for the purpose of pleading coverture. Oulds v. Sansom, 3 Taunt. 261. In cases of idiocy, lunacy, and insanity, if the fact be made known to the Court, such measures are taken, by the appointment of a guardian ad litem, or otherwise, as to protect the rights and interests of the incompetent party, which all Courts, including Justices of the Peace, are specially authorized to do by Rev. Stat. c. 79, § 8, and c. 76, § 12. Clark v. Gilmanton, 12 N. H. 515. If an infant plead by attorney and the fact appear, the plea will be treated as a nullity, and a guardian ad litem be appointed, who may plead de novo. Mitchell v. Kingman, 5 Pick. 431. It is the duty as well as the interest of a plaintiff to move for the appointment of a guardian to an infant, and in all the cases of disability above mentioned, as the judgment will be otherwise reversible for error. Bac. Abr. Infancy, K. 2. In prosecutions for bastardy, if the complainant be an infant, she need not act by prochein amie or guardian, nor can her guardian control or dismiss the proceedings. Low v. Mitchell, 18 Maine R. 372.

The Privileges and Restrictions of Attorneys.

When an attorney has been regularly admitted to practice, in any of the modes above mentioned, he is