PRESENTING THE INTERNATIONAL CODE.

Address before the British Social Science Association, at Norwich, in October,

1873.

SEVEN years ago, at the meeting of this Association, held at Manchester, it was my good fortune to propose the appointment of a committee to prepare the outlines of an International Code. The proposition was received with favor, and a committee was appointed, composed of jurists from different countries. In the distribution of the labor of preparing the outlines a portion was assigned to me, it being understood that the different members of the committee should first interchange what they had respectively prepared, and then meet for a general revision. This, however, was found to be difficult. The members lived at too great distances from each other for an easy interchange. Under this embarrassment I thought it more convenient for the other members of the committee, as well as myself, to undertake a draught of the whole work, hoping that the others would take the same course. The work thus undertaken by me has been completed after several years of labor, and I come now to lay it before my colleagues, and, with their permission, before the Association itself.

It should seem proper, therefore, for me to give you a brief account of the scope and contents of the work to which I thus venture to invite your attention. The importance of the subject no reflecting person can doubt. One has but to open his eyes upon what is passing before him to perceive the necessity and extent of public law. Whether he remains at home or goes abroad, whether he travels by sea or by land, this law is ever present with him. Let us suppose him to be at sea. Let us take for example the great ship, the City of Chester, in which the other day I crossed hither from the farther side of the Western Ocean. As this vast fabric of wood and iron, cordage and canvas, with its outspread wings and its heart of fire, swept on its triumphant way, scarcely moving to the right or to the left, for aught that wind or storm could do, I thought what an illustration it afforded of the public law of the world!

The passengers

The ship was English, with an English crew. were members of various nationalities-English, American, German, French, Italian, and I know not how many more. The freight was destined to different ports of Europe. Observe, now, in what manner and by what standard the rights and duties of this mixed company of passengers, of master and mariners, and of the owners of the ship and cargo, were to be measured and judged. To avoid collision with other ships, precautions had to be taken by the display of lights at night, by signals in thick weather, and by steering a particular course when other ships appeared in sight, in conformity with the rules of navigation now adopted by maritime nations. On meeting other vessels we conversed with them in that common language of sea-signals which the mariners of every nation should learn. If a collision had occurred, the wrong-doer and the amount of wrong done would have been adjudged by the first Court of Admiralty to which the case should come, according to the general rules of maritime law. Had another ship, sailing in the same sea, fallen into peril and been rescued by us, salvage would have been awarded by the same Court and according to the same law. Had the vast and complex machinery by which we were impelled broken down, and in a disabled condition we had been driven upon the French coast, we should have fallen under the jurisdiction of the French courts, where our rights would have been adjudged, not so much according to French law as according to that law which is common both to France and England, to America and to all the world-the law of nations. If, to escape a sea peril, a portion of the cargo had been thrown overboard, the loss arising from the jettison should have been apportioned according to a rule of average common to all civilized nations, though unfortunately a common rule has not yet been agreed upon. Besides these questions, how many others might arise! Suppose a contract or a testament to be made during the voyage, by what law is it to be interpreted, or its validity determined? Suppose a contract between an Englishman and an Italian, and the same to be brought before a French court; or suppose a testament to be made by a German, according to the form used in Germany, and to be brought before an English court; where are

the rules to be found by which the questions are to be decided? We might imagine other questions, and many of them, in respect of collision, jettison, wreck, salvage, or personal violence, and ask ourselves how those questions would be solved by the courts of England, of France, or Belgium, or Holland, and we should see more clearly the importance of that law, which is not confined to one country or race, but is or should be common to all countries and all races.

From these illustrations in relation to a single vessel, out of thousands on the seas, it is easy to perceive how vast is the extent and how varied are the details of that public law which is designated variously as international law or the law of nations. In the outlines of that science which I have attempted will be found a scheme of classification, and an arrangement of subjects; not, perhaps, the best that can be made, but the best that I could make. The work is divided into two books, one relating to peace, the other to war; or, to speak more accurately, the first treats of the relations of nations and of their members toward each other, except as they are modified by a state of war; the second treats of the modifications in those relations produced by a state of war. The first book is further subdivided into two portions, one containing the rules respecting the relations of nations to each other and to the members of other nations; the second respecting the relations of the members of each nation to the members of other nations; the first being that which is commonly known as public international law; the second that which is known as private international law. Bearing these divisions in mind, let us glance at some of the more important provisions which they contain. Besides the regulations which are usually discussed in works of international law, there are many others which, though often mentioned in treaties, do not usually find a place in general treatises. Thus, after considering the essential rights of nations, such as their sovereignty, equality, perpetuity, territory, property, of their extra-territorial action in respect of navigation, discovery, exploration, and colonizations, of fisheries and piracy, of the intercourse of nations with each other by means of accredited agents, of international compacts, of asylum and extradition, of national character and jurisdiction, of domicile

and of the reciprocal duties of nations to foreigners, and of foreigners to the nation where they live, in respect of residence, occupation, religion, obedience to the laws, taxation, civil and military service, other provisions for mutual convenience are inserted, to the subjects of which I attach much importance. These relate to shipping, imposts, quarantine, railways, telegraphs, postal service, patents, trade-marks, copyrights, money, weights and measures, longitude and time, and sea-signals.

In respect to copyright, patent-right, and trade-marks, I would assert the right of the author, inventor, or first designer as one to be held sacred and maintained in all countries. Longitude I would compute everywhere, as do the English, from Greenwich, instead of taking it for the maps of one country from Paris, and for those of another from Washington. For weights and measures I would adopt the metric system of the French; and as for money I would have a uniform coinage of certain pieces of gold, which should pass current in every country, and thus save travelers and traders from the loss and embarrassment to which they are now subject.

Then comes that part of the Code which contains provisions intended for the preservation of peace. They would require, first, that there should be a simultaneous reduction of the enormous armaments which now weigh upon Europe; secondly, that, if any disagreement or cause of complaint should arise between nations, the one aggrieved should give formal notice to the other, specifying in detail the causes of complaint and the redress sought, and that this complaint should be formally answered within a certain period. If such a course had been pursued by France and Germany before the fatal declaration of July, 1870, we should probably have been spared the last Franco-German War. A provision somewhat similar has already been inserted in the treaties of the United States with Portugal, Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, San Salvador, and New Granada. Thirdly, it is provided that, when the parties do not otherwise agree, they shall appoint five members of a Joint High Commission, who shall meet, discuss the differences, and endeavor to reconcile them. If the reconciliation thus sought fail, nevertheless, a high tribunal of arbitra

tion is to be appointed in this manner-each nation joining in the Code transmitting to the parties in controversy the names of four persons, and from the list of these the parties concerned alternately striking off one after another, until the number is reduced to seven, which seven is to constitute the tribunal. Is there anything chimerical or impracticable in this? Let me refer you to the last great arbitration at Geneva for an answer to this question. Let me go further back and refer to the history of the American Confederation. We began with arbitration. When the independence of the colonies was declared, they formed articles of confederation, one feature of which was that disputes between the States should be decided by commissioners selected by the disputants, or, if they failed to select them, by commissioners chosen in this way: three to be named by Congress from each State, each disputant to be at liberty to strike off alternately one name till the number was reduced to thirteen, from which thirteen not more than nine, nor less than seven, as Congress might direct, were to be chosen by lot to constitute the commission. A more perfect system was afterward established under the present Constitution, which created a Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter between contending States. Controversies between States have already been adjudged by this Court: one between Rhode Island and Massachusetts; one between Iowa and Missouri, in which the Court fixed the boundary between them, and enjoined each other from exercising jurisdiction beyond it. A suit was begun by New Jersey against New York respecting the boundary along the Hudson, which was finally compromised by the agreement of 1833, entered into between the two States, with the sanction of Congress. Suits have been brought by New York against Connecticut; by Alabama and Florida each against Georgia; and between Maryland and Virginia, and between New Jersey and Dela

ware.

Why could not the plan of arbitration be extended to Europe? This continent contains eighteen independent states, counting the little communities of San Marino, Monaco, and Andorra, and considering Sweden and Norway as one, and Germany as united, wanting only the Austrian provinces. Ten