FIRST DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER TERM, 1874. the public prisons managed by commissions, or by public officers; the only difference being, that, in respect of the class of offenders who may be committed to its care, the legislature has seen fit to create a body corporate, with all the official functions necessary to their restraint, discipline, punishment and reformation which could be used by the managers of jails and prisons if the offenders. had been committed to their custody; to which have been superadded, in tenderness to the youth of such offenders, means supposed to be adequate to rescue them from the path of crime, and restore them to a life of usefulness and virtue. We know of nothing in the Constitution of 1821, under which this society was incorporated, to prevent the legislature from creating a body corporate for such purposes; nor do we see why such a corporation should not be deemed, in considering the question now before us, as much a body politic, as a municipal corporation clothed with the same functions, or a board of commissioners whose authority and powers are the same. But this is an immaterial question, so long as the uses of the institution are altogether public, and in no sense private. It is the uses that must control, and not the character of the person or body who exercises them, when the question of the right of the legislature to appropriate public moneys is challenged on such a ground as that under consideration. We think it is perfectly manifest, that the license fees appropriated by the act of 1872, are given exclusively to uses, which, in every sense, are as public as those of any other branch of the administration of criminal justice. It is by no means necessary to establish, for the purposes of this case, that the legislature has power to make donations to public or private charities; but only to maintain that it may provide for the administration of criminal justice toward youthful offenders, for whom reformation is more desirable than severe punishment, in a manner different from that to which old and hardened criminals are subjected; and, for that purpose, may create instrumentalities. which to it seem best adapted to accomplish the end. Whether such instrumentalities be public officers or boards of commissioners, or a municipal or other body corporate, they are engaged, when lawfully set in operation, in the administration of a portion of the public functions and uses for which the government itself is created; FIRST DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER TERM, 1874. and they ought not to be let down to the rank of trading corporations, organized for traffic and individual gain, for the purpose of upholding fine-spun theories of constitutional law. The idea that the appropriations made by the legislature to such bodies are charities to private corporations for personal uses, has no basis in fact, and can have none in law when it is considered that the uses to which the appropriation can lawfully be applied are a part of those for which the government itself was created, and is bound in some form to discharge. Our conclusion is, therefore, that the appropriation of the license fees, by the act of 1872, to the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, is not a gift to private charity, but a provision for public uses, lawfully administered through that corporation, and is clearly within the constitutional power of the legislature. It is a pertinent and illustrative fact, that in the radical restrictions to be imposed on the legislature by the amendments to the Constitution adopted at the late election, and to take effect on the first of January next, the power we have been considering is expressly retained. Section 10 of such amendments is in these words: (6 Neither the credit nor the money of the State shall be given or loaned to or in aid of any association, corporation or private undertaking. This section shall not, however, prevent the legislature from making such provision for the education and support of the blind, the deaf and dumb, and juvenile delinquents, as to it may seem proper." But if the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents is to be regarded as a mere private corporation, and the appropriation of the act of 1872 as a mere gift to such a corporation for private use, yet, in view of the objects of the society, it is clearly sustainable by numerous authorities. The cases familiarly known as "the Fire Department cases," * seem to us controlling upon this question. In those cases the question was as to the constitutional validity of the acts of the legislature, which required the agent of every foreign insurance company or underwriter, to pay to the treasurer of the fire department two per cent of all premiums for insurance, made or agreed * Reported in 3 E. D. Smith, 440, 453. FIRST DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER TERM, 1874. to be made in the city of New York, and to execute a bond to such treasurer that he will make such payments. A penalty of $1,000 was imposed for each insurance made before executing such bond, to be recovered by the fire department; and other heavy penalties were imposed for violations of the act, which were to be recovered in the name of the people of the State for the use of the fire department. The fire department was a corporation created by the Laws of 1798; its origin and history are fully traced in the opinion of the court, in The People v. Pinckney.* Its objects and purposes, as defined in its charter, are "for the relief of such indigent and disabled firemen and their families as may be interested therein and who may, in the opinion of a majority of the trustees, be worthy of assistance." The cases were elaborately and ably argued; and the questions raised seem to have been identical with those urged upon us. The validity of the acts was sustained first at Special Term, by WOODRUFF, J., and again at General Term by INGRAHAM, DALY and BRADY, JJ., and their decision was finally unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as stated in note to the report. If we doubted the correctness of this decision we should not deem ourselves at liberty to disregard it. It is on nearly every point presented, on all fours with the case before us. But it is urged that the authority of those cases is shaken by the late case of The People v. Batchellor. § The question in that case was, whether a mandatory statute compelling a municipal corporation, without its own consent, to issue its bonds and exchange them for the stock of a railroad company, was valid. It was held that the municipal corporation could not be compelled to become a stockholder in the railroad company, against its own will and consent. We are not able to see that the questions in this case, or in the fire department cases, were involved in or affected by The People v. Batchellor. The cases on this subject are so numerous that the bare citation of them, is all that can be justified in this place. They establish that the power of the legislature, in the absence of constitutional restriction over the object of taxation, is supreme; *32 N. Y., 377–388, et seq. ‡3 E. D. Smith, p. 440. + Davies' Laws of the City, p. 392. FIRST DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER TERM, 1874. that the whole subject is exclusively within legislative discretion, and that the legislature is to determine the subject and the class to be taxed, the district within which the tax is to be laid, the manner of its collection, and the purpose to which, when collected, it shall be applied. * And they establish, also, that the constitutional inhibitions against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and against the deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, are not limitations upon the taxing power. The absence of restrictions in this State has led to the adoption of the amendments to the Constitution already referred to, in order to guard against abuses of this absolute legislative discretion. They will operate, it is to be hoped, with signal benefit to the people; but however desirable such restrictions might be, it was never in the power of the courts to impose them, even in cases where the abuse of the discretion was revoltingly apparent. We may enjoy, but we cannot otherwise utilize the admirable argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, in defense of theatrical exhibitions, such as those conducted by his client. It is not our duty to defend the justice or wisdom of the law which he seeks to condemn. It is enough for us that the legislature has power to enact it, and in its discretion has seen fit to do so. In such case, our duty to uphold and enforce it is very simple and plain. Yet, it might be no difficult task to show that the system of licenses, and its consequent preclusion of unworthy exhibitions, from which license is or ought to be withheld, is greatly advantageous to such establishments as the plaintiff's, by preventing the degradation of all such performances in the public estimation, which would be quite certain to grow out of the promiscuous and unrestrained exhibitions which would spring up in the absence of legal restrictions. The order of the court below must be reversed, and the injunction dissolved, with ten dollars costs of this appeal besides dis *1 Kent's Com., 441; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend., 65; People v. Mayor, 4 Coms., 420; The Fire Department case, 3 E. D. Smith, 440; Guilford v. The Supervisors, 3 Kernan, 143; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y., 116; Matter of Trustees, N. Y. P. E. School, 31 id., 582; Darlington v. The Mayor, 31 id., 190; Howell v. Buffalo, 37 id., 267; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 id., 123; People v. Lawrence, 41 id., 137; People v. Harlem Railroad (see opinion in this case infra. - REP ); People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y., 404. FIRST DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER TERM, 1874. bursements, and ten dollars costs of the motion in the court below. DANIELS and LAWRENCE, JJ., concurred. Ordered accordingly. *THE PEOPLE EX REL. THE NEW YORK AND HARLEM RAILROAD COMPANY v. WILLIAM F. HAVEMEYER, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. Mandamus ·when proper remedy against public officer - when not denied though action may be brought — legislature — judgment of, not subject to be reviewed by the courts- State Constitution, chap. 702 of 1872; art. 1, §§ 6, 9; art. 3, § 16; art. 10, §§ 2, 6. When an act of the legislature directs an officer of a municipal corporation to sign a warrant for the payment of public moneys (already raised by taxation) upon certain things having been done, and it is conceded that the provisions of the act have been complied with, a proceeding by mandamus is the proper one by which to require the officer to sign such warrant. Conceding that an action might be brought to enforce the payment by the corporation, that does not preclude the party from proceeding by mandamus. The legislature has the power to judge of the relative benefits resulting to a municipal corporation and a railroad company, from an alteration in a public avenue over which the railroad track passes, and its judgment is not subject to review by the courts. A municipal corporation like an individual, may, by neglecting to object when it ought to speak, waive its right to insist upon the performance of a contract which has been violated by the acts thus done without objection on its part. If the title of an act fairly and reasonably announced the subject, and that is a single one, and if the various parts thereof have respect or relate to that subject, the provision of the Constitution that no local or private bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title (State Const., art. 3, § 16) is complied with. The degree of relationship of each provision is not essential if it legitimately tends to the accomplishment of the general purpose. The provision of the State Constitution which declares that every law which imposes, continues or revives a tax, shall distinctly state the tax and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or object relates to the State finances. The affairs of cities and counties, so far as they are regulated by the Constitution, are treated of in other provisions. The creation, by the legislature, of a board of State engineers, to superintend a work in changing the tracks of a railroad on the highway, in a municipality, is not a violation of article 10, section 2, of the Constitution in relation to the appointment of certain officers, nor is the assent of two-thirds of the members *This opinion was delivered at the New York Special Term, August, 1874. HUN-VOL. III. 13 |