FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1875. twenty-second section;" and this twenty-second section is the identical one in which the words "competent tribunal" occur. Reading them together, as they must be to arrive at their intention, they read for the government of this case thus: No court or officer, on the return of any habeas corpus or certiorari, issued under this article, shall have power to inquire into the legality or justice of any process, judgment or decree of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction. The very question before us is the "legality” of the judgment of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of the city of New York. The want of power to determine this is, apparently at least, expressed in such simple, striking and far reaching words, that it becomes us to hesitate in the acceptance of a construction given to other words not necessary to their meaning, which brings them in plain and direct collision. The consequences, then, of the construction claimed by the counsel of the relator, placing the practical power of reversing the judgments of a superior court of original criminal jurisdiction in the hands of inferior judicial officers; its making a whole section that giving the power to decide whether, in the issue of "civil process," a court or officer has exceeded its jurisdiction unnecessary, and its direct collision with another, cause us to give the words "competent tribunal" a different meaning from that claimed by the relator. Judicial construction should harmonize all the provisions of our statutes relating to a single subject. No interpretation of particular words or phrases can possibly be allowed, which renders other portions of the same act unnecessary, and conflicts with other plain commands. In this case, there is no difficulty in thus harmonizing them. If we construe these words, "competent tribunal," to mean a tribunal having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person, the whole act is harmonious. Such a tribunal is a "competent" one-competent to try the question and party before it. The decisions of such a body, according to the whole theory of our laws, are to be reviewed by a superior one, and not summarily disposed of by an inferior officer. If it errs in the extent of the judgment which it renders, the party injured is not remediless, but his alleged grievance must be deliberately examined upon appeal by a higher court, and not summarily passed upon by a local magistrate clothed with certain limited judicial power. It FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1875. was, we submit, this plain and natural construction just given, which induced the framers of the habeas corpus act to insert the clause giving the power, when the detention was upon "civil process," to inquire into the excess of the jurisdiction assumed, and without which a party thus confined would also have been remediless. The question we have discussed has not been considered so directly in this State as the same is now presented, and yet in several cases the language employed indicates a concurrence in the view we have taken. The People v. Cassels * involved the validity of a commitment of a witness for a contempt in refusing to answer a question upon an examination before a justice of the peace. A reference to the full text of the statutes, before cited in part, will show that commitments for contempts, and upon final judgment, are placed upon the same footing as to their capability of being reviewed upon habeas corpus. In that case, Judge BRONSON says:+ "A contempt was specially and plainly charged in the commitment, and it was the duty of the judge forthwith to remand the prisoner. (2 R. S., 567, § 40.) The statute expressly forbids an inquiry into the justice or propriety of the commitment in such a case. (§ 42.) If there had been no such statute, it is clear upon principle, that the judgment or decision of any court or officer of competent jurisdiction cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus. If there has been error, the remedy is by certiorari or writ of error." In the People v. Spalding a Supreme Court commissioner had, upon habeas corpus, discharged a person committed for a contempt in not paying a fine imposed by the Court of Chancery. It was held both by the chancellor and the Court of Errors (Chief Justice NELSON delivering the opinion of the latter court), that the commissioner was utterly without jurisdiction in the premises, as the statutes prohibited him from inquiring "into the justice or propriety of the commitment." In the very recent case of The People v. Fancher,§ the writer of this opinion had occasion to examine this same question, and nothing has transpired to shake his confidence in the soundness of the *5 Hill, 164. + Page 167. 10 Paige, 284; S. C., 7 Hill, 301. $4 N. Y. Sup. Court (Thompson & Cook), 467; 9 Sup. Court Reports of N. Y. (2 Hun), 226. FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1875. views therein expressed. Every consideration of public policy, and the express language of our statutes, require us to hold that the judgment of a competent court-competent by reason of its having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the party — cannot be practically reversed and annulled by any officer empowered to grant the writ of habeas corpus. Plain words should not be refined away by legal subtlety, and when our written statute law emphatically declares, that "no court or officer, on the return of any habeas corpus or certiorari, issued under this article, shall have power to inquire into the legality or justice of any judgment" "of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction," it is but our simple duty to obey its mandate, and not permit a power to be assumed, which our statutes declare the officer or tribunal granting the writ does not possess. * * * The application of the conclusion we have reached, will now be made to the several points raised in behalf of the relator, which such conclusion affects; and they relate, first, to the several convictions and sentences upon a single indictment; second, to the lawfulness of the jury; and, third, to the legality of a sentence to imprisonment upon several of the counts in the indictment contained. Each of these will be examined in the order mentioned. First. The alleged illegality of the several convictions and several sentences upon a single indictment. The jurisdiction of the court over the crimes and the accused being conceded, what does this point present more than the "legality" of the judgment which has been pronounced? That it does involve anything more will scarcely be argued; and yet this is the very thing which the statute declares the court or officer upon the return to the writ is powerless to touch. The language of such forbidding is simple, direct and sweeping. Our argument thus far has been useless, if we have failed to prove that the excessiveness of a judgment (which is all that even counsel claim this point involves), in a criminal case, cannot be inquired. into upon this proceeding. Ample power so to do is expressly conferred when a party is detained upon civil process, but its exercise in a criminal one, where the court which pronounced the judgment had power to try the offense and render a judgment, is forbidden by an express declaration that the court or officer shall have no "power to inquire into the legality or justice" thereof. The mere FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1875. repetition of the language of the act forecloses discussion. But does this case really present a question of excess of jurisdiction? It is not denied that Mr. Tweed has been tried and convicted of several misdemeanors, and that several judgments have been pronounced thereon. Nor is it pretended that the aggregate of the several punishments is in excess of what the court was authorized to inflict. The point then necessarily is, that the joinder of the several offenses in a single indictment, their investigation upon a single trial, and the separate convictions and judgments thereon, were illegal. This proposition admits the jurisdiction, but questions the manner of its exercise. While the power to do the several acts is conceded, the mode of doing them is denied. The proper step to acquire jurisdiction having been taken by the presentation of an indictment, and the judgment upon the crimes and the offender being no greater than the law allowed, what are the intervening steps but simply questions of practice, which, while they may be pronounced erroneous, in a proper proceeding to review them, cannot, and do not render the judgments void? The prosecution of Mr. Tweed was begun by an indictment found by a grand jury. It accused the relator of sundry misdemeanors, and presented them by separate counts in a single accusation. Assuming that this was a misjoinder of offenses, did the court thereby lose its jurisdiction of the crimes and the party charged therewith? Suppose, in a civil action, the defendant is brought before the court by proper process, and when the court has thus acquired jurisdiction, he is required to answer a complaint which improperly unites various causes of action, and after issue thus joined the cause proceeds to trial and judgment, is such judgment void, provided it was not in excess of the power of the court over all the causes of action separately? This will hardly be pretended, and yet it is the identical question presented. The court before which Mr. Tweed was tried, was a competent one for that purpose; there was no lack of jurisdiction in regard to the person or the accusations; but, because the power was exerted by compelling him to defend himself against all the charges upon a single trial, by the joinder of the offenses in a single complaint, called an indictment, it is urged that the whole proceeding is void. The soundness of this proposition can only be established by showing FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1875. that the grouping of offenses in a single indictment is so illegal as to make null the preliminary proceeding, thus rendering all subsequent steps thereunder void. To do this, it must be demonstrated that every indictment, in order to give the court jurisdiction over the offender and the offenses, must accuse of a single, and only a single crime; and when this is proved, and not before, will it follow that in case this practice is departed from, the court acquires no power to proceed, and its action is a legal nothing. When this has been done, the illegality of the major part of our criminal convictions has been exhibited, and the illegal and unauthorized imprisonment and judicial murder of many individuals, has been conclusively shown. This is no overstatement, for the practice of all courts, from time immemorial, has been to unite offenses in words at least, if not so actually. Scarcely an indictment is drawn or presented, which does not contain several counts, each one of which, in theory at least, presents a different accusation. Several offenses being thus charged, all convictions thereunder are illegal and void, if the arguments of the relator are sound. A The reasoning which starts with the assumption that a court obtains no jurisdiction over several offenses and the offender when they are charged in a single indictment, certainly overlooks all precedents and practice. The right to frame an indictment, with different counts to meet the proof, is based upon a directly opposite theory. Every indictment which contains more than a single count, assumes to charge a separate and different offense in each. demurrer, or a motion in arrest of judgment, in every such case would necessarily prevail, if different offenses could not be joined; for, upon the face of the bill, there are several offenses charged. There is no necessity, however, for abstract reasoning to show that the joinder of offenses in a single presentation does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The authorities are numerous to show that this practice, so far from rendering the whole proceeding void, is not even irregular, but, on the contrary, it is the well settled course of procedure of criminal courts. Burns' Justice* thus states the rule: "If there be one offender and several offenses committed by him, as burglary and larceny, they may be contained in one indictment." Hawkins, in his Pleas * Vol. 2, page 502. |