FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1875. such clerk and assistant, he did and performed extra work, labor and services for the county of New York, in furnishing naturalization papers and reindexing naturalization books, etc., in the said Marine Court. The specification by the complaint of the "extra work, labor and services," shows that they were clerical work pertaining to the office of clerk of the court, and to be performed by the clerk, his deputies and assistants. This court is bound to take judicial notice that "furnishing naturalization papers" by the clerk of a court, "and indexing naturalization books" when necessary, are part of the duties devolving upon the clerk by law; and extra work, labor and services thereupon, can mean nothing more than meeting the exigencies of some unusual pressure of that class of duties upon the officer, either by working out of ordinary office hours, or with greater skill and diligence during such hours. The answer alleges in substance, that the plaintiff was, as such clerk and assistant of the Marine Court, a salaried officer, and that it was his duty to perform the services mentioned in the complaint, without extra charge or compensation beyond the salary appurtenant to his office, and that all the salary appurtenant to his office has heretofore, and before the commencement of this action, been paid to him in full. And it was admitted on the trial, that the plaintiff had received his salary as alleged in the answer. The plaintiff on the trial put in evidence a resolution of the board of supervisors, adopted August 23, 1871, in these words: "Resolved, That the comptroller be and he is hereby authorized and directed to draw his warrant in favor of James Cowan, third assistant clerk of the Marine Court of the city of New York, for the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000), for extra services, viz., for furnishing copies of naturalization papers, and reindexing naturalization books, etc., of said court, and charge the same to the proper appropriation." This resolution shows a little more clearly that the work done pertained altogether to the office of the clerk, as part of his official duties. The first point made by the appellants, is, that the respondent had no legal claim against the county for the services alleged to have been rendered; and this point is based upon the ground that he was a salaried officer, and bound to perform such official duties for the salary pertaining to his office, and without additional compensation. A legal claim is one which the party HUN-VOL. III. 80 FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1875. asserting it may enforce by action, or by some proceeding at law, or in equity. We think the plaintiff's claim was not of that character. In Bright v. The Supervisors of Chenango,* it was held, that where services were rendered specially for the benefit of the county, and for which other provision had not been made, they formed a proper subject of compensation by the board of supervisors; but, in Matter of Mallory v. The Supervisors of Cortland County, † it was held that the county clerk, who was by law clerk of the Courts of Oyer and Terminer and General Sessions, was not entitled to fees for services as clerk of such courts, because the course which the legislature had taken with the revised fee bill, evinced "that they did not mean to allow any compensation" for such services. In the People ex rel. Phoenix v. The Supervisors of New York the relator was district attorney of the county of New York. The statute provided that the district attorney of the city and county of New York, shall receive for his services an annual salary of not less than $2,500, nor more than $3,500, to be fixed and paid by the common council of that city.§ The salary was fixed at $3,000. Subsequently, the legislature devolved upon him new duties before then pertaining to the sheriff of the county. It was claimed that he was entitled to additional compensation for such new duties, beyond the amount of his salary. The court held otherwise, BRONSON, J., by whom the opinion was pronounced, saying: "By charging the attorney with the duty of suing for fines, without making provision for the payment of costs, the legislature has, in effect, declared that the salary of the officer is to be deemed the compensation for these as well as for other services. It is impossible for a salary officer to make title to an increased compensation, on the sole ground that a new duty has been cast upon him by the legislature." And, in Palmer v. The Mayor, it was held that an officer had no valid claim for extra remuneration, for services required and rendered in the duties of his office, on a day (Sunday) on which he was not legally bound to work; and see Hatch v. Mann.** As it cannot be doubted that the services rendered by the respondents were within the scope of the official duties of the clerk, it seems *18 Johns., 242. +2 Cowen, 531. Statutes of 1830, chap. 320, § 52. 1 Hill, 362, 367. T2 Sandford, 318. §1 R. S., 383, § 95. ** 15 Wend., 44. FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1875. very clear that no claim for extra labor and services, in performing them, could have been enforced by suit or mandamus. But it is argued that the questions, whether these services were rendered, whether they were extra, whether they should be paid for, and what compensation should be paid for them, belonged to the board of supervisors, who were sole judges in respect of them, and that their action was in the nature of a judicial determination, and was conclusive. Conceding the argument to be sound, in the absence of any statutory prohibition or restriction, the question cannot be the same where such a statute exists. By section 7, of chapter 190, of the Laws of 1870, it is declared, that "no allowance or payment, beyond legal claims, shall ever be allowed by the board of supervisors." This provision is only applicable to the board of supervisors of the county of New York. It is insensible and idle unless it operates to take away from that body all jurisdiction and authority to allow and pay claims which are not legal; and especially is this so, when the amount demanded and attempted to be allowed is beyond the legal claim of the party for the services embraced in his claim. Without doubt, the plaintiff had an entirely legal claim for the services mentioned in his complaint, and all other services rendered by him in the discharge of the duties of the clerk of the court. That claim was his salary; and, since it appears that it was paid to him, we must assume that it was lawfully audited and allowed. When, therefore, the supervisors undertook, upon their own sense of propriety or justice, to direct $1,000 more to be paid to him, for a part of the same services which would otherwise have been covered and compensated by his salary, they were attempting to allow and pay an amount beyond his legal claim, because, as we have seen, no law awarded it to him, and no court, by any suit or proceeding, could have adjudged it to him. This was, in our judgment, an excess of authority, in plain violation of a statute; and, if the acts of supervisors are, when within their jurisdiction, to be deemed judicial, this was extra judicial because beyond such jurisdiction. We do not consider these views at all in conflict with Outwater v. Green, or the People ex rel. Brown v. Green,* for the question whether the supervisors could audit and allow a claim not legal, or an amount for official services beyond the legal claim of a salaried *2 N. Y. S. C., 18, 23. FIRST DEPARTMENT, MÁRCH TERM, 1875. officer, in violation of an express statute of prohibition, was not before the courts in either of those cases. Without considering the other questions raised in the case, we think the one discussed fatal to the plaintiff's recovery, and therefore reverse the judgment and direct a new trial, with costs to abide the event. DANIELS and BRADY, JJ., concurred. Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide event. IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD B. KELLY. Attorney-improper conduct of-liability of, for costs imposed on account of - Precept for collection of — form of — when may direct the confinement of attorney. Where an attorney, from improper motives and without just cause, institutes proceedings to procure the removal from the bar of another attorney, he is properly chargeable with the costs and disbursements incurred in such proceedings; and upon his failure to pay the same, a precept may lawfully issue, committing him to the county jail until such payment be made. It is not necessary that the amount of the costs and disbursements should be specified in the order imposing the payment of the costs upon the attorney; it is sufficient that the same should be duly taxed upon notice to him. The order and the adjustment of the costs are to be read together, and are a sufficient specification of the sum ordered to be paid. People v. Nevins (1 Hill, 154) followed. APPEAL from an order of the Special Term, denying a motion to set aside a precept granted for the collection of costs, ordered by the General Term to be paid by Henry H. Morange, an attorney of this court. H. H. Morange, in person. Wm. H. Arnoux, for the respondent. DAVIS, P. J.: The appellant, Henry H. Morange, an attorney and counselor of this court, made a motion at the last October term of this court, to strike Richard B. Kelly, another attorney and counselor, from the FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1875. roll. The motion was founded upon affidavits and an order to show cause, and was met by opposing affidavits. Mr. Morange was heard fully in favor of his motion; but, it satisfactorily appearing to the court that the conduct of Mr. Kelly in the matter mentioned in the affidavits had been strictly honorable, and in entire good faith, the court declined to hear counsel on Mr. Kelly's behalf, and denied the motion, with ten dollars costs of opposing same and disbursements; and, it appearing to the court that the proceedings had been prosecuted by Mr. Morange with improper motives, the court ordered that the costs and disbursements be paid by him personally. The costs and disbursements were afterward duly taxed by the court at $115.30, upon due notice and the appearance of Mr. Morange on such taxation. A copy of the taxed bill was served, and payment demanded and refused. Thereupon, application was made and granted, on the 17th day of November, 1874, at Special Term, that a precept issue to the sheriff, commanding him to take the body of said Morange and commit him to the county jail, and keep and detain him in custody until he should pay the said sum of $115.30, and ten dollars costs of the application. Precept was accordingly issued, and Morange was taken into custody thereon. He then moved at Special Term on affidavit to vacate and set aside the precept, which motion was denied with costs, and from the order denying the same this appeal is taken. The only questions made here are as to the regularity of the mode adopted to enforce payment of the costs, and the alleged informality of the order of the General Term, in not specifying the amount of costs and disbursements to be paid. We think the second of these points is disposed of by People v. Nevins,* which substantially holds, that the order and the adjustment of the costs are to be read together, and are a sufficient specification of the sum ordered to be paid. In this case the taxation was made by the court at the sum named in the precept, and Morange not only attended such taxation on notice, but was served with a copy of the taxed bill. It is provided by the Revised Statutes, that, "when any rule or order of the court shall have been made for the payment of costs, or any other sum of money, and proof by affidavit shall be made of the personal demand of such money, and of a refusal to pay it, the *1 Hill, 154. |