SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1875. certain assessments and assessment sales on plaintiffs' land declared void. E. Ellery Anderson, for the appellants. The authority to assess was limited to the amount determined and certified. The object of the certificate was clearly to give to the property owners the protection of a determination signed by the assessors, and made public either to the commissioners for the improvement, or to the common council, by which the proportion of the total cost of the improvement which was to be assessed on their property should be fixed and determined. The following cases all hold that any departure from the requirements of the statute will render void any assessment or tax: Van Rensselaer v. Witbeck (7 N. Y., 517); Wheeler v. Mills (40 Barb., 644); In re Douglass (46 N. Y., 42); In re Cameron (50 id., 502); Platt v. Stewart (8 Barb., 493). An assessment which is required to be certified by the assessors to the common council, and is not signed by the assessors, is not valid. Jesse Johnson, assistant attorney for Brooklyn, and William C. De Witt, corporation counsel, for the respondents. The burden of proof in every portion of this action is with the plaintiffs. Their affirmative proposition, as to the apparent validity of the assessment, must be fully sustained before they have shown a wrong or burden which entitles them to ask relief from the equity side of this court. (Mooers v. Smedley, 6 Johns. Ch., 28; Mayor of Brooklyn v. Meserole, 26 Wend., 138; Scott v. Onderdonk, 14 N. Y., 9; Mace v. City of Newburgh, 15 How., 161; Bouton v. City of Brooklyn, 15 Barb., 375; Heywood v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 534.) The provision of the statute, relative to the certificate, is directory. (People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y., 318, 328; People ex rel. Crimmins v. McManus, 34 Barb., 620, 627; People v. Allen, 6 Wend., 486; Howland v. Luce, 16 Johns., 135; Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill, 9, 24; Coles v. Trustees of Williamsburgh, 10 Wend., 659; Matter of the Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y., 199, 220; Sears v. Burnham, 17 id., 445; Robbins v. Gorham, 26 Barb., 586; Matter of Election of Directors of M. and H. Railroad, 19 Wend., 135, 143; Hall v. Tuttle, 6 Hill, 38, 42; Ostrander v. Walter, 2 id., 320; Cleveland Tele SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1875. graph Co. v. Fire Commissioners, 55 Barb., 288; Matter of McCormack, 60 id., 128.) BARNARD, P. J.: The plaintiffs seek by action to have declared void certain assessments, sales thereunder, and certificates thereon, as a cloud on their title. By chapter 298 of Laws of 1861, the legislature appointed a commission to improve Atlantic avenue, in the city of Brooklyn. Under this act the assessors were directed to estimate the cost of grading and paving the avenue. The assessors were directed to certify this cost to the commission, and this amount was to be deducted from the whole cost of the work, and was to be assessed upon lands fronting on the avenue, and the remainder of the cost was to be assessed upon the first twelve wards of the city of Brooklyn. The assessors made no certificate to the commission, beyond passing a resolution fixing the cost of grading and paving. The first objection is made by the plaintiffs, that the omission to give this certificate was fatal. If the commission imposed the tax, and only had power to impose such a tax as should be certified by the assessors, the objection would be a serious one, but in this case the commission laid no tax. The legislature imposed that, and directed the assessors to lay it on lands fronting on the avenue. The omission to certify to the commission, had no relevancy to the tax. It would simply inform the commission what part of the whole expense should be laid on the twelve wards. Under this law of 1861, no tax was laid. In 1869,* the commission was ordered to complete the improvement without delay, and to report to the common council, on or before the 1st of June, 1869, the total cost, and the commission was thereby dissolved after said 1st of June, 1869, and the further work was to be done by the common council. By the second section of this act, the assessors were, upon the making of such report, directed to determine the cost of grading and paving the avenue, and certify the same to the common council, and the said cost and expenses were to be assessed, levied and collected, as provided by the previous law. No certificate is * Chapter 744, Laws of 1869. SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1875. proved to have been given, and the commission did not report until February 28, 1870. Both these objections are urged against the assessment. The direction to make the report by a certain date was directory, and not essential to the validity of the tax. * The certificate to the common council was not a step needed to the validity of the imposition of the assessment. The law imposed the tax for the grading and paving the avenue, and the assessors were directed to lay it. They got, and were to get, no authority from the common council. The common council had, perhaps, a portion of the tax to collect of certain wards in the city, and the information as to the amount which was to be deducted from the whole costs, may have been the reason why the legislature directed the information to be certified to them; but the tax in question was imposed by the legislature, and the assessors must lay it under the law. The objection taken to the manner in which the assessors performed their duty, and the form of their oath to the tax levy, cannot be reviewed collaterally. The assessors had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and their acts must stand until reviewed by a direct appeal from their determination. † Judgment affirmed, with costs. Present BARNARD, P. J., TAPPEN and DONOHUE, JJ. Judgment affirmed. * Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y., 199; Sears v. Burnham, 17 id., 445; People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 id., 318. + Rusher v. Sherman, 28 Barb., 416; Stanton v. Ellis, 2 Kernan, 575; Buffalo & State Line R. R. Co. v. Sup. of Erie Co., 48 N. Y., 93. SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1875. JOHN R. STEPHENS AND ANOTHER, APPELLANTS, v. WILLIAM F. MINNERLY AND OTHERS, RESPONDENTS. AND THE PEOPLE EX REL. AMBROSE C. KINGSLAND ANOTHER, APPELLANTS, v. WILLIAM F. MINNERLY AND OTHERS, RESPONDENTS. Village-incorporation of when proceedings for, not enjoined. Courts will not enjoin parties from taking proceedings, authorized by law, to incorporate a village, because the parties applying for the injunction will be subjected to burdens of local government, disproportionate to the benefits accruing to them therefrom. APPEAL from an order dissolving an injunction granted in this action. George W. Parsons, for the appellants. The papers show that defendants' proceedings would be specially injurious to plaintiffs' property. The distinction in this case, in respect to special interest of plaintiffs, is manifestly clearer and stronger than existed in the leading case of Milhau v. Sharp, reported first in 28 Barbour, 228, and affirmed in 27 New York, 611. The plaintiff in that case showed that there would be explicit injury to his property by the construction, but not differing in principle from injury which might be common to all the owners on the street. (2 Abb., 252; Hanlon v. Supervisors, etc., 8 Abb. [N. S.], 268; S. C., 57 Barb. 390; Francis v. Schoellkoff, 53 N. Y., 154, 155; see, also, Davis v. The Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 14 id., 526, and cases there cited; Doolittle v. The Supervisors, etc., 18 id., 163.) It was proper for these plaintiffs to sue for the benefit of any and all similarly situated. (Code, 119; Towner v. Tooley, 38 Barb., 598; Edwards on Parties, 136, 137; 3 John. Ch., 555; 1 Paige, 273.) The complaint shows that the number similarly situated was indefinite, and could not be fully known. (Coe v. Beckwith, 10 Abb., 296; S. C., 31 Barb., 339; Bouton v. City of Brooklyn, 15 id., 392.) Statutes must be expounded according to the meaning, and not according to the letter. (Pillow v. Bushnell, 5 Barb., 156; People v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 13 N. Y., 78; affirming, 25 Barb., 199; Holmes ▾. SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1875. Carley, 31 N. Y., 290; Chase v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 26 id., 523; Bac. Abt., tit. Stat., 1, 5, 10; Dwarris' Stat., rule 8 [American Rules], 144; People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns., 380, 381, THOMPSON, Ch. J.; 1 Kent, 462; Bac. Abr., tit. Stat., 1, 15; Plow., 18, 88: 2 Coke's Inst., 64; 5 T. R., 449; Jackson v. Collins, 3 Cow., 89, 96, SAVAGE, Ch. J.; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532; Donaldson v. Wood, 22 Wend., 395; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, etc., 128; Rule 13 of the 45 Maxims of Vattel; Plowd., 465; Vattel, Bk. 2, chap. 17, § 285; 3 Sir E. Coke's R., 15 [Caudey's case]; 2 Coke's Insts., 25; vide 1 E. Coke's 1st Insts., 24, b.) Thomas Nelson, for the respondents. The possible increase of taxation to which plaintiffs may be subject, or their liability to contribute to the expense of creating and maintaining said incorporation, gives the plaintiffs no right to bring this action. (Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome Co., 18 N. Y., 155; Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 id., 323; Ayres v. Lowrie, 63 Barb., 458; Tift v. City of Buffalo, N. Y. Sup. Ct., vol. 1, p. 150; High on Injunctions, 291, 522; Hill. on Injunctions, 45, § 92.) This statute is one of the legal provisions to enable communities to frame for themselves and carry on their own municipal government, and the statute is to be construed liberally, so as to enable the object for which the law was made to be accomplished, and not in a narrow spirit. (Weed v. Tucker, 19 N. Y., 422, 433; White v. Wager, 32 Barb., 250; 25 N. Y., 328; Fort v. Burch, 6 Barb., 60-75.) It is proposed, under the general law, to incorporate the village of North Tarrytown, to comprise an area of two square miles. Certain citizens, residing or owning property within the proposed village limits, bring an action to enjoin the persons and officers, of a class designated by law to act in such cases, from consummating the undertaking, upon the allegations that some square mile of the mapped territory does not contain the requisite population; that plaintiffs would be subjected to burdens of local government, vastly disproportionate to the benefits accruing therefrom; and that the proceedings therefor, for the incorporation, have not been shown. to have been entirely formal. The plaintiffs, if injured at all, will |