Section 882 of the Revised Statutes, also, re-enacting earlier acts of congress, provides that "copies of any books, records, papers or documents in any of the executive departments, authenticated under the seals of such departments, respectively, shall be admitted in evidence equally with the originals thereof." And by section 1076 the court of claims has "power to call upon any of the departments for any information or papers it may deem necessary," "but the head of any department may refuse and omit to comply with any call for information or papers, when, in his opinion, such compliance would be injurious to the public interest."

The certificate of the officer of the United States in charge of the Confederate archives office, embodied in the findings of fact, would appear to have been furnished upon a call from the court of claims; and it is not open, at this stage of the case, to objection for not being under the seal of the war department, since that court has found that the papers in that office show the facts stated in that certificate. Those facts consist of official communications, between high civil and military officers of the Confederate States, including a dispatch from one of their generals in Kentucky, October 31, 1861, to the secretary of

the navy, that the price of the Eastport was $12,000; a reply of the secretary of war of the same date, giving authority to the general to buy her if thought worth that sum; a letter of January 5, 1862, from the general to the secretary of war, informing him that, by virtue of that authority, he had bought her, and she was being converted into a gunboat; a letter of January 16, 1862, from the secretary of war to the general, saying that he would at once order to be forwarded the nec essary funds for the Eastport; and a statement of disbursements, dated February 2, 1863, by the general to the secretary of war, in which one item was a sum of $9,688.92, "expended in purchase of steamer Eastport." *Not going beyond what is required for the purposes of this case, we are of opinion that the originals of these communications, and consequently the certified copies thereof from the Confederate archives office, are competent and persuasive evidence that the Confederate authorities did not obtain possession of the Eastport by capture or by other forcible and compulsory appropriation.

The claimant therefore wholly fails to support the allegation of her petition that the Eastport was captured by the insurgents. Judgment affirmed.

as to the amount involved, and the court in which the proceedings in attachment were commenced, and the judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. BANK OF COMMERCE. (May 15, 1899.) No. 363. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. H. L. Stone, for city of Louisville. W. S. Taylor, for Stone, auditor, and others. James P. Helm and Helm Bruce, for Bank of Commerce.

Mr. Justice PECKHAM. In the above case the same question is involved that has just been determined in No. 362 (19 Sup. Ct. 747), and there will be a like order reversing the judg ment, and remanding the case to the circuit court, with directions to dismiss the bill.

Mr. Justice HARLAN and Mr. Justice WHITE dissented.

CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. CITIZENS' NAT. BANK. CITIZENS' NAT. BANK OF LOUISVILLE v. STONE, Auditor of Public Accounts, et al. (May 15, 1899.) Nos. 365 and 405. Appeals from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. H. L. Stone, for city of Louisville. W. S. Taylor, for Stone, Auditor, and others. James P. Helm and Helm Bruce, for Citizens' Nat. Bank.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The Citizens' National Bank was organized on the 8th day of August, 1874, its charter being stipulated to endure for a period of 20 years. On April 1, 1894, the charter was renewed and extended for 20 years. The bank in these two cases filed its bills to enjoin the collection of certain taxes on the ground that, by the effect of a statute of the state of Kentucky, usually referred to as the "Hewitt Act," an irrevocable contract had been entered into between the state and the bank, from which it resulted that the taxes complained of could not be levied without impairing the obligations of such contract. It was moreover averred that the existence of this contract had been judicially determined in a suit between the Third National Bank and the city of Louisville, to which suit the Citizens' National Bank, although not a party. was a privy, because of certain agreements alleged to have been made between the city of Louisville and the bank at the time the suit was brought by the Third National Bank. In consequence of this fact it was alleged that the existence of the contract between the Citizens' National Bank and the state had been judicially determined, and the decree to that effect was pleaded as res judicata. In addition, the taxes in question were alleged to be illegal, because imposed upon the franchise and property of the bank, and because they were discriminatory, and they were averred, besides, to be illegal under the state constitution and laws. The lower court held that the plea of res judicata established an irrevocable contract as to the taxes for years prior to the date of the extended charter, but that the thing adjudged did not conclude that there was an irrevocable contract as to taxes imposed after the date of the extension of the charter, because such taxes were not, and could not have been, in controversy in the cause in which the prior judgment had been rendered. Upon these grounds, in the second case (that is, No. 405) it decided that the complainant was without right to relief, and in the first case (No. 365) that it was entitled to the relief sought.

These two cases are in all material respects identical with the cases of Bank v. Stone, 19 Sup. Ct. 759, and City of Louisville v. Third Nat. Bank, infra, which have been just decided. For the reasons given in the decisions

rendered in those cases, it is ordered that the decree below rendered in No. 365 be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, and that rendered in No. 405 be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and that the last-mentioned case (viz. No. 405) be remanded to the court below, with directions to take such further proceedings as may be in conformity to this opinion, and it is so ordered.

CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. THIRD NAT. BANK. (May 15, 1899.) No. 364. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. H. L. Stone, for city of Louisville. James P. Helm and Helm Bruce, for Third Nat. Bank.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellee, the Third National Bank, filed its bill to enjoin the collection of certain taxes, relying upon grounds in all respects like unto those alleged in case No. 404 (Bank v. Stone [just decided] 19 Sup. Ct. 759). There was, however, this difference between the facts of the latter case and those arising on this record: In this case the taxes sought to be enjoined were levied prior to the renewal of the charter of the bank. Because of this difference the court below concluded that the want of power to assess and levy was conclusively established by the presumption of the thing adjudged arising from the decree of the court of appeals of Kentucky (31 S. W. 1013), to which we have referred in case No. 404. We need not, however, consider the question of res judicata, upon which the court below based its conclusion, as we have in case No. 404, just announced, held, entirely without reference to the plea of res judicata, that taxes in form exactly like those here in question were illegal because levied upon the property and franchise of the bank, and not upon the shares of stock in the names of the shareholders. It follows, therefore, that the decree below which restrained the collection of the taxes was correct, and it is therefore affirmed.

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. WARNER. (October 24, 1898.) No. 336. Appeal from the United States circuit court of appeals for the Fifth circuit. See 31 C. C. A. 238, 87 Fed. 829. Samuel L. Gilmore and Branch K. Miller, for appellant. Richard De Gray, J. D. Rouse, William Grant, and Wheeler H. Peckham, for ap pellee. No opinion. Dismissed on the authority of Tennessee v. Bank of Commerce, 152 U. S. 454. 14 Sup. Ct. 654; Sawyer v. Kockersperger, 170 U. S. 303, 18 Sup. Ct. 946.

Mr. Justice WHITE took no part in the consideration and disposition of this motion.

CLIFFORD v. HELLER. (November 14, 1898.) No. 304. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of New Jersey. William D. Daly, for appellant. James S. Erwin, for appellee. No opinion. Order affirmed, with costs.

CONSOLIDATED WATER CO. et al. v. BABCOCK et al. (March 20, 1899.) No. 231. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of California. Horace S. Oakley, C. K. Davis, Frank B. Kellogg, and C. A. Severance, for appellants. H. E. Doolittle, Wm. J. Hunsaker, A. B. Browne, and A. T. Britton, for appellees. No opinion. Dismissed on the authority of Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, 14 Sup. Ct. 353; Van Wagener v. Sewall, 160 U. S. 369, 16 Sup. Ct. 376; Davis v. Geissler, 162 U. S. 290, 16 Sup. Ct. 796; Cornell v. Green, 163 U. S. 75, 16 Sup Ct. 969, and cases cited.

COVINGTON & C. EL. RAILROAD & TRANSFER & BRIDGE CO. v. WILSON. (October 10, 1898.) No. 173. In error to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. C. B. Simrall, for plaintiff in error. No opinion. Dismissed, with costs, on authority of counsel for plaintiff in error.

DAVIS. UNITED STATES. (December 12, 1898.) No. 633. Appeal from the court of claims. No opinion. Docketed and dismissed on motion of Sol. Gen. Richards, for the appellee.

DEPOSIT BANK OF OWENSBORO v. CITY OF OWENSBORO et al. (April 3, 1899.) No. 149. In error to the court of appeals of the state of Kentucky.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The relief sought by the plaintiff in error was the nullity of certain taxes levied by the city of Owensboro for the years 1893 and 1894. The grounds upon which this relief was prayed are in all material respects like unto those relied on in the two cases against the city of Owensboro, just decided. The charter and an amendment extending the same were both enacted after the act of 1856.

Indeed, this case, along with the other two, was disposed of by the Kentucky court of appeals in the same opinion, because of the identity of the questions presented. 39 S. W. 1030.

For the reasons given in the opinion in Citizens' Sav. Bank v. City of Owensboro (No. 669, this term) 19 Sup. Ct. 530, the decree is affirmed.

V.

DEPOSIT BANK OF OWENSBORO DAVIESS COUNTY et al. (April 3, 1899.) No. 150. In error to the court of appeals of the state of Kentucky. See 39 S. W. 1030.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

By a written stipulation it is agreed that this cause abide the result of No. 149,-Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. City of Owensboro, supra. The decree in that case having been affirmed, the same result is therefore necessary in this, and accordingly the decree of the court of appeals of Kentucky in this case is also affirmed.

DREXEL et al. V. UNITED STATES. (March 20, 1899.) No. 47. In error to the United States circuit court of appeals for the Third circuit. See 23 C. C. A. 581, 77 Fed. 944. Richard C. Dale, G. S. Graham, and Clayton E. Emig, for plaintiffs in error. The Attorney General, for the United States. No opinion. Dismissed, per stipulation, on motion of Sol. Gen. Richards, for the defendant in error.

DURANGO LAND & COAL CO. v. EVANS et al. (October 10, 1898.) No. 131. Appeal from the United States circuit court of appeals for the Eighth circuit. See 25 C. C. A. 523, 531, 80 Fed. 425, 433. David C. Beaman and Lucius M. Cuthbert, for appellant. John R. Smith, for appellees. No opinion. Dismissed per stipulation.

FARMERS' BANK OF NORBORNE et al. v. ROSELLE. (November 7, 1898.) No. 157. In error to the supreme court of the state of Missouri. Morton Jourdan, for plaintiffs in error. William B. King and William E. Harvey, for defendant in error. No opinion. Writ of error dismissed on the authority of Meyer v. Cox, 169 U. S. 735, 18 Sup. Ct. 944; McLish

v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 12 Sup. Ct. 118; Missouri v. Andriano, 138 U. S. 496, 11 Sup. Ct. 385; Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 666, 14 Sup. Ct. 452; Insurance Co. v. Kirchoff, 160 U. S 374, 16 Sup. Ct. 318.

FARMERS' & TRADERS' BANK OF OWENSBORO v. CITY OF OWENSBORO et al. (April 3, 1899.) No. 151. In error to the court of appeals of the state of Kentucky. W. T. Ellis, Geo. W. Jolly, Wilfred Carico, and J. A. Dean, for plaintiffs in error. Chapeze Wathen, J. D. Atchison, and Robert S. Todd, for de fendants in error.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was chartered by the legislature of Kentucky in 1876. The charter limited the taxing power to 50 cents on each $100 of capital stock during the life of the corporation, which was fixed at 25 years. This suit was commenced by petition, asserting the nullity of certain taxes levied by the city of Owensboro for the years 1893 and 1894. The petition was twice amended. The cause of action alleged was, in every material respect, the same as that relied on in the case of Citizens' Sav. Bank v. City of Owensboro (No. 669 of the docket of this term) 19 Sup. Ct. 530, which we have just decided. For this reason the opinion in that case disposes of all the issues arising in this, and for the reasons therein given the decree of the court of appeals of Kentucky in this case rendered is affirmed.

Ex parte FAYERWEATHER et al. (two cases.) (December 5, 1898.) Roger M. Sherman, for petitioner. No opinion. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of mandamus denied. Announced by Mr. Justice HARLAN. The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the determination of this motion.

Ex parte FAYERWEATHER et al. (November 7, 1898.) Roger M. Sherman, for petitioner. No opinion. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of mandamus denied. Announced by Mr. Justice HARLAN. The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration and disposition of this motion.

Ex parte FAYERWEATHER et al. (January 23, 1899.) Roger M. Sherman, for petitioner. No opinion. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of certiorari denied. Announced by Mr. Justice HARLAN. The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision on this motion.

FIDELITY TRUST & SAFETY-VAULT CO. v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE. SAME v. STONE, Auditor of Public Accounts, et al. LOUISVILLE TRUST CO. v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE. SAME v. STONE, Auditor of Public Accounts, et al. (May 15, 1899.) Nos. 406409. Appeals from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. In these cases the respective trust companies who are appellants, all four being Kentucky corporations chartered subsequent to the year 1856, filed their respective bills to enjoin the assessment and collection of certain taxes. The want of power to assess and collect the taxes complained of was in each bill made to depend upon two substantially identical grounds, which were briefly

these:

First. That a legislative act of the state of Kentucky, passed in 1886, and designated as the "Hewitt Act," had created an irrevocable contract between the state and the complainants, from which it arose that the taxes sought to be enjoined could not be assessed and collected with