all persons asserting any interest in the award of the Commission to determine whether that award was obtained, as to the whole sum included therein or as to any part thereof, by fraud effectuated by means of false swearing or other false and fraudulent practices on the part of the company or its agents, attorneys, or assigns, and, if so determined, to bar and foreclose all claim in law or equity on the part of the company, its legal representatives or assigns, to the money or any such part thereof received from the Republic of Mexico for or on account of the award. By that act full jurisdiction was conferred on the Court of Claims, with right of appeal to this court, to determine such suit, to make all proper interlocutory and final decrees therein, and to enforce the same by injunction or other final process. The act further authorized the return to Mexico of any moneys paid by it on the award and remaining in the custody of the United States if the issue of fraud was determined adversely to the company. If the decision was favorable to the company, it was made the duty of the Secretary of State to proceed with the distribution of the funds in his hands. The act of 1892 was presented to the President on December 20. Two days thereafter Congress took a recess until January 4, 1893. The President signed the bill on December 28, 1892. Held:

(1) That the act of 1892 was not invalid by reason of its having been signed during a recess of Congress. Whether the President can sign a bill after the final adjournment of Congress for the session was not decided;

(2) The suit brought by the Attorney-General involved rights capable of judicial determination and was a "case" within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution extending the judicial power of the United States to all cases in law and equity arising under that instrument, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made by it or under its authority. The act did not in any wise trench upon the constitutional functions of the President. Nor was it simply ancillary or advisory to him. Whatever decree was rendered by the Court of Claims was, unless reversed, binding and conclusive upon the United States and the defendants;

(3) The act was not liable to the objection that it was inconsistent with the principles underlying international arbitration. On the contrary, such legislation is an assurance in the most solemn and binding form that the Government of this country will exert all the power it possesses to enforce good faith upon the part of citizens who, asserting that they have been wronged by the authorities of another country, seek the intervention of their Government to obtain redress:

(4) This court was entitled to look at all the evidence in the cause on the issue as to fraud, because the act did not contemplate a special finding by the Court of Claims of the ultimate facts established by the evidence;

66

(5) The question stated in the act of 1892-whether the award in question was obtained as to the whole sum included therein, or as to any part thereof, by fraud effectuated by means of false swearing or other false and fraudulent practices on the part of the said La Abra Silver Mining Company, or its agents, attorneys, or assigns"-is answered in the affirmative as to the whole sum included in the award.

The United States v. The Oregon and California Railroad Company. (176 U. S., 28.)

The question involved in this case was the right of the United States to about 218,000 acres of land near Portland, Oreg., granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company by the act of July 2, 1864, and forfeited, for failure to construct the road, to the Government by the act of September 29, 1890, in view of the overlapping grant to the Oregon and California Railroad Company by the act of July 25, 1866, under which that road was constructed and the lands patented to it.

The original suit was brought by direction of Attorney-General Miller to cancel the patents to the Oregon and California and restore the lands to the public domain. The court held that as the route of the Northern Pacific had not been definitely fixed prior to the time of the grant to the Oregon and California and the date of the definite location of the latter road the lands were lawfully entered by the Oregon and California and were rightfully patented to it. The syllabus of the case is as follows:

By the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365, c. 217), Congress granted lands to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from a point on Lake Superior in Wisconsin or Minnesota to some point on Puget Sound, with a branch, via the valley of the Columbia River, to a point at or near Portland, in the State of Oregon. The grant was of "every alternate section of public land, not mineral, designated by odd numbers, to the amount of twenty alternate sections per mile on each side of said railroad line as said company may adopt through the Territories of the United States, and ten alternate sections of land per mile on each side of said railroad whenever it passes through any State, and whenever, on the line thereof, the United States have full title, not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated, and free from preemption, or other claims or rights, at the time the line of said road is definitely fixed, and a plat thereof filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office; and whenever, prior to said time, any of said sections or parts of sections shall have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, or preempted, or otherwise disposed of, other lands shall be selected by said company in lieu thereof, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, in alternate sections, and designated by odd numbers, not more than 10 miles beyond the limits of said alternate sections." In March, 1865, the president of that company filed in the Land Department a map which, if of value for any purpose, was only a map of "general route," not one of definite location between Wallula and Portland. That map was not accepted. By act of July 25, 1866 (14 Stat., 239, c. 242), Congress made a grant of land in aid of the construction of a railroad and telegraph line between Portland, Oreg., and the Central Pacific Railroad Company in California. That grant was in the usual terms employed in such acts. Subsequently the benefit of that grant as to the part of the road to be

constructed in Oregon was conferred upon the Oregon Central Railroad Company. The lands here in dispute, whether place or indemnity, were within the limits of the grant of 1866. The entire line of road of the Oregon and California Railroad Company, which was the successor of the Oregon Central Railroad Company, was fully constructed and duly accepted by the President, and at the time this suit was begun was being operated and had been continuously operated by that company. The Oregon Company filed its map of definite location in 1870, and it was accepted by the Land Department. By the act of September 29, 1890 (26 Stat, 496, c. 1040), all lands theretofore granted to any State or corporation to aid in the construction of a railroad opposite to or coterminous with the portion of any such railroad not then completed and in operation, for the construction of which such lands were granted, were forfeited to the United States. There never was any withdrawal of indemnity lands on the proposed line of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company between Wallula and Portland, nor was there any definite location or construction of its road opposite to the lands in suit. Held,

(1) That nothing in the act of 1864 stood in the way of Congress subsequently granting to other railroad corporations the privilege of earning any lands that might be embraced within the general route of the Northern Pacific Railroad..

76

(2) That as the grant contained in that act did not include any lands that had been reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated at the time the line of the Northern Pacific Railroad was definitely fixed;" as the route of the Northern Pacific Railroad had not been definitely fixed at the time the act of July 25, 1866, was passed, or when the line of the Oregon Company was definitely located; as the lands in dispute are within the limits of the grant contained in the act of 1866; as the route of the Oregon Railroad was definitely fixed, at least when the map showing that route was accepted by the Secretary of the Interior on the 29th day of January, 1870-the Northern Pacific Railroad Company having done nothing prior to the latter date except to file the Perham map of 1865; and as prior to the forfeiture act of September 29, 1890, there had not been any definite location of the Northern Pacific Railroad opposite the lands in dispute, there is no escape from the conclusion that these lands were lawfully earned by the Oregon Company and were rightfully patented to it. Of course, if the route of the Northern Pacific road had been definitely located before the act of 1890 was passed and had embraced the lands in dispute different questions would have been presented.

The United States v. The Northern Pacific Railroad Co. (177 U. S., 435.)

This was a suit brought by the Government to cancel the patent granted to the Northern Pacific for a tract of land more than 10 miles east of Duluth, Minn. The question involved was whether Duluth, Minn., or Ashland, Wis., is the eastern terminus of the Northern Pacific under the act of July 2, 1864. In this suit the Government contended that Duluth, Minn., is the eastern terminus; but the court,

following the decision in Doherty v. Northern Pacific, argued and decided at the same time, held Ashland to be the terminus. The following is the syllabus:

The important questions of fact and law are substantially the same in this case and in Doherty v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, ante 421, and that case is followed in this in regard to the questions common to the two cases.

The obvious purpose of this suit was to have the question of the proper terminus of the company's road determined; and if that terminus was found to be at Ashland, then the complainant would not be entitled to any relief.

Under the act of July 4, 1864, noncompletion of the railroad within the time limited did not operate as a forfeiture.

As the bill in this case does not allege that it is brought under authority of Congress for the purpose of enforcing a forfeiture, and does not allege any other legislative act looking to such an intention, this suit must be regarded as only intended to have the point of the eastern terminus judicially ascertained.

As the evidence and conceded facts failed to show any mistake, fraud, or error in fact or in law in the action of the Land Department in accepting the location of the eastern terminus made by the company, and in issuing the patent in question, the bill was properly dismissed.

The United States v. The Bellingham Bay Boom Company. (176 U. S., 211.)

This was a suit brought by the Attorney-General, upon the request of the Secretary of War, under the authority conferred by the river and harbor act of September 19, 1890, to enjoin the Bellingham Bay Boom Company from maintaining a boom in the Nooksak river, a navagable stream in the State of Washington. The boom company contended that its boom was authorized by the law of Washington and that whether it was constructed in accordance with that law was a State question, to be determined by the courts of the State of Washington, with which the Federal courts could have no concern. This was the view taken by the lower courts, but the Supreme Court reversed the case, holding that the question whether the boom was an obstruction to navigation and whether it was affirmatively authorized by the State law were questions to be passed upon by the Federal courts. The Supreme Court held that the boom was an obstruction and was not authorized by the State law. The following is the syllabus:

The power of Congress to pass laws for the navigation of public rivers, and to prevent any and all obstructions therein, can not be questioned.

When the Attorney-General acts under the authority conferred by the river and harbor act of September 19, 1890, c. 907, he has the right to call upon the court, upon proper proofs being made, to enjoin the continuance of any obstruction not authorized by statute, and the court has jurisdiction, and it is its duty, to decide

whether the existing obstruction is or is not affirmatively authorized by law.

In such inquiry the court is bound to decide whether the boom, as existing, is authorized by any law of the State, when such law is claimed to be a justification for its creation or continuance.

There is no doubt that the boom in question in this case violates the statute under which it was built, because it does not allow free passage between the boom and the opposite shore for boats or vessels as provided for in the State law.

Rider v. The United States. (178 U. S., 251.)

In this case Rider and his associates, the county commissioners of Muskingum County, Ohio, were indicted and convicted under the act of September 19, 1890, for failing to comply with an order of the Secretary of War directing them to remove an obstruction to the navigation of the Muskingum River by altering in a certain way a bridge across that river which the law of Ohio placed under their control. Without passing upon any questions raised in the case, the court held that the conviction could not be sustained, because it appeared that the commissioners did not have in their hands, and under the laws of Ohio could not obtain, public money that could be applied in execution of the order of the Secretary of War within the time fixed by that officer to complete the alteration of the bridge.

The fourth and fifth sections of the river and harbor act, approved September 19, 1890, provide: "Sec. 4. That section 9 of the river and harbor act, act of August 11, 1888, be amended and reenacted so as to read as follows: That whenever the Secretary of War shall have good reason to believe that any railroad or other bridge now constructed or which may hereafter be constructed over any of the navigable waterways of the United States is an unreasonable obstruction to the free navigation of such waters on account of insufficient height, width or span, or otherwise, or where there is difficulty in passing the draw opening of the drawspan of such bridge by rafts, steamboats, or other water crafts, it shall be the duty of said Secretary, first giving the parties reasonable opportunities to be heard, to give notice to the persons or corporations owning or controlling such bridge so to alter the same as to render navigation through or under it reasonably free, easy, and unobstructed; and in giving such notice he shall specify the changes to be made and shall prescribe in each case a reasonable time in which to make them. If at the end of such time the alteration has not been made, the Secretary of War shall forthwith notify the United States district attorney for the district in which such bridge is situated to the end that the criminal proceedings mentioned in the succeeding section may be taken. Sec. 5. That section 10 of the river and harbor act of August 11, 1888, be amended and reenacted so as to read as follows: That if the persons, corporations, or associations owning or controlling any railroad or other bridge shall after receiving notice to that effect, as hereinafter required, from the Secretary of War, and within the time prescribed by him, wilfully fail or refuse to remove the same,