were on the appellate and 18 on the original docket. Of this number 375 were disposed of during the October term, 1899, of which 371 were on the appellate and 4 on the original docket, leaving undisposed of at the close of the October term, 1889, 317 cases, of which 303 were on the appellate and 14 on the original docket.

The number of cases actually considered by the court was 328, of which 174 were argued orally and 154 submitted on printed arguments. Of the 371 appellate cases disposed of, 129 were affirmed, 65 reversed, 58 dismissed, 30 settled by the parties and dismissed; in 9, questions certified were answered, and 80 were denials of petitions for writs of certiorari under the act of March 3, 1891.

The total number of cases on the appellate docket in which the United States was a party or had a substantial interest disposed of at the October term, 1899, was 74. The United States was appellant, etc., in 18 of these cases and appellec, etc., in 56.

Of the 18 cases appealed, etc., by the Government, 8 were decided in its favor and 8 adversely, and 2 cases were dismissed by it.

Of the 56 cases in which the Government was appellee, etc., 36 were determined in its favor and 8 adversely, 1 was dismissed by the appellant, 2 were dismissed by the court for failure of the appellant, etc., to comply with the rules, 7 were docketed and dismissed, and 1 was dismissed by the court and 1 decided in part in favor of the United States.

Of the above 74 cases, 8 were appeals from the Court of Claims, of which 1 was taken by the Government. The 1 case so appealed was decided in favor of the Government, while of the 7 cases in which it was appellee 6 were decided in its favor and 1 was dismissed by the court for noncompliance with the rules.

Of the 74 cases disposed of 3 were capital, of which 1 was decided in favor of the United States and 1 adversely and 1 affirmed in part. Ten cases were appeals, etc., from the circuit court of appeals, of which 6 were decided in favor of and 2 against the United States, 1 was dismissed for noncompliance with the rules, and 1 was dismissed by the court.

Eighteen cases were from the Court of Private Land Claims, 8 of which were appealed by the Government and 10 by the other side.

Of the 8 cases appealed by the Government 4 were decided in its favor, 2 adversely, and 2 dismissed by it, while of the 10 cases in which the United States was appellee 4 were decided in its favor and 6 were docketed and dismissed.

The United States was respondent in 6 petitions for writs of certiorari under the act of March 3, 1891, and in 2 petitions for certiorari to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia in capital cases, which were denied.

Of the whole number of cases in which the Government had a substantial interest heard and decided by the court, 45 were decided in its favor, 1 in part for the United States, and 16 against the United States.

In addition to the above, in 2 original cases in which the Government was respondent motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari were denied.

Among the many cases heard and decided by the Supreme Court of the United States during the October term, 1899, the following are the more important:

The Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. The United States. (175 U. S., 211.)

This case grew out of a combination of six shops, located, one in Ohio, one in Kentucky, two in Tennessee, and two in Alabama, which were engaged in making cast-iron pipe for gas, water, and sewer purposes. These shops controlled the market in that commodity in thirtysix States west of the Allegheny Mountains and south of Virginia. They entered into an agreement to control prices by suppressing competition among themselves. This was done by appointing a representative board of one from each shop, to which all inquiries for pipe were referred. The board fixed the price it thought the job would stand. The job was then sold over the table, the shop which bid the highest bonus for the benefit of the pool getting it. At the public letting the shop that got the job bid the fixed price, and the other shops overbid in order to deceive the public.

On behalf of the combination it was contended that the power of Congress, under the interstate commerce clause, does not extend to agreements among private corporations, but is limited to acts of interference by the States and by quasi public corporations, such as railroads. Private manufacturing corporations, it was insisted, are not public agencies and can not be compelled to keep their shops running or sell their goods to any person who applies. In the next place, it was urged that there was no restraint put upon interstate commerce, and that under the decision in the Knight case the creation of a monopoly in the manufacture of a commodity is not prohibited by the antitrust law.

The Supreme Court held, however, that Congress may prohibit the performance of any agreement between individuals or corporations where the natural and direct effect of it is to regulate or restrain interstate commerce. In other words, the antitrust law applies to every agreement in restraint of interstate trade, whether made by corporations or individuals.

In the next place the court held that any agreement or combination which directly restrains not only the manufacture but the sale of a commodity among the several States comes within the antitrust law.

The distinction between direct and incidental restraint is to be observed. A combination formed for the purpose of monopolizing the manufacture of a commodity within the States may, indirectly and incidentally, suppress competition in the sale of the articles among the several States. But the Supreme Court held in the Knight case that such indirect and incidental result would not be sufficient to bring the combination within the reach of the act. It must be shown that the combination was formed not only to monopolize the production of the commodity, but to suppress competition and enhance prices in its sale among the several States. The syllabus of the case is as follows:

Under the grant of power to Congress, contained in section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with Indian tribes," that body may enact such legislation as shall declare void and prohibit the performance of any contract between individuals or corporations where the natural and direct effect of such a contract shall be, when carried out, to directly, and not as a mere incident to other and innocent purposes, regulate to any extent interstate or foreign commerce.

The provision in the Constitution regarding the liberty of the citizen is to some extent limited by this commerce clause; and the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce comprises the right to enact a law prohibiting the citizen from entering into those private contracts which directly and substantially, and not merely indirectly, remotely, incidentally, and collaterally, regulate, to a greater or less degree, commerce among the States.

Interstate commerce consists of intercourse and traffic between the citizens or inhabitants of different States, and includes not only the transportation of persons and property and the navigation of public waters for that purpose, but also the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.

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The power to regulate interstate commerce and to prescribe the rules by which it shall be governed is vested in Congress, and when that body has enacted a statute such as the act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, entitled an act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," any agreement or combination which directly operates, not alone upon the manufacture, but upon the sale, transportation, and delivery of an article of interstate commerce, by preventing or restricting its sale, thereby regulates interstate commerce to that extent, and thus trenches upon the power of the National Legislature and violates the statute.

The contracts considered in this case, set forth in the statement of facts and in the opinion of the court, relate to the sale and transportation to other States of specific articles, not incidentally or collaterally, but as a direct and immediate result of the combination entered into by the defendants; and they restrain the manufacturing, purchase, sale, or exchange of the manufactured articles among the several States, and enhance their value, and thus come within the provisions of the "act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies.'

When the direct, immediate, and intended effect of a contract or combination among dealers in a commodity is the enhancement

of its price, it amounts to a restraint of trade in the commodity, even though contracts to buy it at the enhanced price are being made.

The judgment of the court below, which perpetually enjoined the defendants in the court below from maintaining the combination in cast-iron pipe as described in the petition, and from doing any business under such combination, is too broad, as it applies equally to commerce which is wholly within a State as well as to that which is interstate or international only.

Although the jurisdiction of Congress over commerce among the States is full and complete, it is not questioned that it has none over that which is wholly within a State, and therefore none over combinations or agreements so far as they relate to a restraint of such trade or commerce; nor does it acquire any jurisdiction over that part of a combination or agreement which relates to commerce wholly within a State, by reason of the fact that the combination also covers and regulates commerce which is interstate.

La Abra Silver Mining Company v. United States (175 U. S., 423) and Weil et al. v. United States.

It is gratifying to say that the cases which had occupied the attention of this Government in its three departments, successively, for nearly a quarter of a century have been absolutely disposed of, and that the money in the hands of this Government abiding their determination (namely, the sum of $60,863.85) has been paid back to the Government of Mexico.

These cases it will be remembered had their origin in the claim of Mexico that the awards made against her in favor of La Abra Silver Mining Company, a corporation created by the State of New York, and Benjamin Weil, a citizen of the United States, under the treaty between the United States and Mexico, of July 4, 1868 (15 Stat., 679), had been obtained by fraud effectuated by means of false swearing or other false and fraudulent practices on the part of said claimants. The seriousness of the evidence supporting the representations of Mexico, on the one hand, and the express provision of the treaty, on the other, that the awards made under it should be absolutely final and conclusive upon each claim decided" and that "full effect" should be given to such awards, "without any objection, evasion, or delay whatsoever," presented a queer situation, which seriously menaced the friendly relations between the two Governments.

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Mexico, with the utmost good faith, paid to the United States every dollar awarded against her in favor of the said claimants, but at the same time insisted that there was nothing in the treaty or in the law of nations that prevented this Government from defeating the attempt to make it an instrument in consummating the fraud and perjury charged by turning over to the perpetrators, its own citizens, the money resulting therefrom.

The executor, finding itself unprovided with the means of dealing effectively with the questions presented, turned the whole matter over to Congress, after having distributed to the said claimants a considerable part of the money paid to this Government by Mexico under the said awards, namely, $412,572.70, with the recommendation that provision should be made by proper legislation for a judicial examination and determination of said questions.

After much discussion and delay Congress finally passed the two acts, dated, respectively, December 28, 1892 (27 Stat., 409-410), giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine the question of fraud in suits to be instituted by the United States against La Abra Company and Benjamin Weil, respectively, and those claiming under them, and providing that, in case the court should find fraud and perjury to have been used in procuring either of said awards or any part thereof, the claimants should be barred and foreclosed as to the whole or such part of said award, and the money paid thereunder returned to Mexico.

The suits contemplated by said act of Congress were duly brought, and, after volumes of testimony introduced and much laborious and protracted discussion in the Court of Claims and in the Supreme Court of the United States, decided in favor of the United States; in other words, that the awards in question had been obtained by means of fraud and perjury as to the full amounts thereof.

Thus has ended a litigation which will be always memorable in the history of this Government.

The syllabus is as follows:

The commissioners appointed under the treaty between the United States and Mexico concluded July 4, 1868, and proclaimed February 1, 1869 (15 Stat., 679), having differed in opinion as to the allowance of the claim of the La Abra Silver Mining Company, a New York corporation, against Mexico, the umpire decided for that company and allowed its claim, amounting, principal and interest, to the sum of $683,041.32. Mexico met some of the installments of the award and then laid before the United States certain newly discovered evidence which it contended showed that the entire claim of the La Abra Company was fictitious and fraudulent. The Secretary of State thereafter withheld the remaining installments paid by Mexico, and, upon examining the new evidence, reported to the President that in his judgment the honor of the United States was concerned to inquire whether, in submitting the La Abra claim to the commission, its confidence had not been seriously abused, and recommended that Congress exert its plenary authority in respect of the disposition of the balance of the funds received from Mexico and remaining in the hands of the United States. Finally, Congress passed the act of December 28, 1892 (27 Stat., 409, c. 14), by which the AttorneyGeneral was directed to bring suit in the name of the United States in the Court of Claims against the La Abra Company and