3. GRANT TO RAILROAD: CONSTRUCTION. The Cedar Rapids and Missouri
River Railroad Company, to which a grant of lands had been made,
was permitted by an act of Congress of June 2, 1864, to modify and
change the location of the uncompleted portion of its line, said aet
providing that the company should be entitled, for such modified line,
to the same lands, and to the same amount of lands per mile,
as originally granted to aid in the construction of its main line, subject
to the conditions and forfeitures mentioned in the original grant." The
line as modified and constructed was shorter by several miles than the
one first proposed: Held, that words "per mile" in the act were words
of limitation, and that the company was limited thereby to the same
number of acres per mile of constructed road that it would have been
entitled to receive under the original grant. The C. R. & M. R. R.
Co. et al. v. Herring, 687.
1. LIABILITY FOR FIRES: NEGLIGENCE. A railroad company may show
its freedom from negligence to escape liability, under section 1229 of
the Code, for fires caused in the operation of its road. Following
Small r. The C., R. I. & P. R. Co., 50 Iowa, 338. BLCK, CH. J., and
DAY, J, dissenting. Libby v. The C., R. I. & P. R. Co., 92,
2. LIEN: JUDGMENT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES. The lien of a judgment
for personal injuries against a railroad company is purely statutory, and
the claim becomes a lien upon the road only when reduced to judgment.
Following The B. C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Verry, 48 lowa, 458. White
r. The K. & D. M. R. Co., 97.
: RECEIVER. Pending the foreclosure of a railway mortgage the
plaintiff commenced an action against the receiver in charge of the
road to recover for personal injuries sustained through the alleged neg-
ligence of the receiver's employes, between the date of the foreclosure
sale and the execution of the sheriff's deed thereon. After the receiver
had appeared and answered in the action, a sheriff's deed was executed,
and the receiver made final settlement and was discharged: Held, that
the judgment subsequently rendered in the action against the receiver
did not become a lien upon the property in the hands of the purchaser
at the foreclosure sale. Id.
4. PASSENGERS: NEGLECT TO PURCHASE TICKET.
though having opportunity, neglected to purchase a ticket, held, that
it was error to instruct the jury that the reasonableness of the regula-
tion of the company making an additional charge in such cases was a
question of fact for their determination. Hoff bauer v. The D. & N. W.
R. Co., 342.
: BEFUSAL TO PAY FARE. It was also error to charge the jury
that if the conductor received and retained the fare tendered by the
passenger he was not justified in expelling such passenger for a refusal
to pay the additional sum demanded. Id.
After the train had been stopped for the expulsion of
the passenger, he could not by a tender of the amount demand d reim-
pose upon the railroad company the obligation of the contract which
he had violated by a refusal to pay in the first instance, and he was
rightfully ejected notwithstanding such tender. Id.
7. RIGHT OF WAY: TRESPASS. A railway company which occupies with its
track land over which it has not acquired the right of way is a mere
trespasser, and a purchaser of the land after such occupation may
maintain an action to recover the value of the land appropriated, and
the damages occasioned by the trespass since his purchase. Dɔnald v.
The St. L., K. C. & N. R. Co. et al., 411.
8. COMMON CARRIERS: CONTRACT LIMITING LIABILITY.
A regulation of a
railway company to the effect that no valuable live stock shall be
received for shipment until a contract is signed by the owner, releasing
the company from all liability for inquiry to such stock in shipment,
above the value of ordinary stock, is void, under section 1398 of the
Code. McCune v. The B. C. R. & N. R. Co., 600.
: NEGLIGENCE. The failure of the owner of stock shipped to
inform the agent of the carrier that the physical condition of the
animals renders extraordinary care necessary in their handling, will not
release the carrier from liability for negligence causing injury to the
stock. Id.
10. RIGHT OF WAY: MEASURE OF DAMAGES. In estimating the damages
for the location of a railroad over a farin, the injury should not be lim-
ited to the legal subdivisions of land traversed by the road, but the
injury to the farm as a whole should be considered. Hartshorn v. The
B. C. R. & N. R. Co., 613.
-: EVIDENCE. Where an attempt had been made by the owner
to lay out certain land over which a railroad was located into an addi-
tion to a town, lots and streets having been surveyed and staked out
thereon and a plat made of the same, though such plat had not been
certified and recorded so as to constitute a valid and legal addition, it
was held that evidence of the subdivision and the plat were admissible
to show the condition of the property, it being further shown that cer-
tain lots upon each side of one of the streets, as surveyed, had been
sold, which would render it impossible to restore the property to its
former condition. Id.
12.: MEASURE OF DAMAGES. Any inconvenience in the cultivation
or use of a farm resulting from the location of the road thereon, and
which would affect its market value, is proper to be considered as an
element of damages. Id.
--: INTEREST. Where an appeal is taken by the land-
owner from the award of damages by the sheriff's jury, and upon the
trial a larger sum is awarded, it is proper to allow interest thereon from
the date of the award appealed from. Id.
See CLERK OF COURTS, 1, 2, 3.
EVIDENCE, 1, 13.
PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT, 7.
1. OWNERSHIP: EVIDENCE. In an action of replevin against an officer who
held the property under an execution against another than the plaintiff.
a petition of intervention was filed claiming it under a bill of sale from
the execution defendant. The plaintiff having abandoned the case, held.
that the defendant could not show title in the plaintiff to defeat the claim
of the intervenor. Burrows v. Waddell and Schaller, 195.
-: NOTICE. A written notice of the intervenor's ownership, served
upon the deputy who levied upon the property, was sufficient. Id.
3. EVIDENCE: NOTICE. In an action of replevin by the assignees of a lease
to recover the landlord's share of the crop, which had been levied upon
by defendant under an execution against the landlord, held, that evi-
dence of notice to the defendant and the officer of plaintiffs' ownership.
given before the levy, was material and should have been admitted.
Lufkin & Wilson v. Preston, 235.
4. LEASE: ASSIGNMENT OF. While the landlord has no property in the
crop of his tenant until matured and his portion is set apart, he may
make an assignment of his lease, and such assignment, when valid.
vests in the assignee the right to the rent when so set apart, and he may
maintain replevin to recover it from one who levies upon and takes
possession of it as the property of the landlord, with notice of the as-
signment. Id.
5. TITLE TO OFFICE. The legality of an officer's title to his office cannot
be determined in an action of replevin to which he is not a party. Id.
6. DEMAND. Where both parties claim title to personal property, and the
right of possession thereunder, a demand is not necessary to enable
either to maintain an action of replevin therefor. Redding v. Page et
al., 406.
7. MEASURE OF RECOVERY: LOSS OF PROPERTY. Where the defendant
in an action of replevin is successful the measure of his recovery upon
the bond of the plaintiff is not affected by the fact that a portion of the
property has perished in the plaintiff's hands. Lillie ». McMillan, 463.
See MORTGAGE, 6.
1. DEFENSE NOT PLEADED. Matters which would have constituted a de-
fense to an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage, and if true would
have prevented an absolute decree of foreclosure, bat which were not
pleaded, were held not to be available as a defense to an action for pos-
session of the property under the foreclosure sale. Mally et al. v. Mally
et al., 654.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3.
1. RECORDING OF CONTRACT: ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS.
sonal property was sold and possession given under an agreement that
the title should remain in the seller until the payment of the purchase
money, held, that an assignee for the benefit of the creditors of the pur-
chaser, who took possession of the property with full knowledge of the
agreement, held it subject thereto, although the contract of sale was
not recorded. Warner v. Jameson et al., 70.
2. CHANGE OF POSSESSION: NOTICE. Where standing corn was levied upon
under an execution against the owner of the land, who raised the corn,
it was held that the levy was good as against a prior purchaser, there
having been no visible change of possession under the sale, and no
written instrument of sale recorded, and the officer making the levy not
having actual notice thereof. Nuckolls v. Pence, 581.
3. CONDITIONAL: NOTICE. A bill of sale, executed and recorded by the
seller two months after the actual sale and delivery of possession of the
property, was held not to impart constructive notice, to a purchaser
from the person having possession, of the conditions upon which the sale
was inade. Pash n. Weston, 675.
See EVIDENCE, 11, 12.
INSTRUCTIONS, 5.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 3.
1. DEBT OF DISTRICT TOWNSHIP: JOINDER. Where a district township
abandons its organization and the territory is organized into independent
districts, a creditor of the district township may join such independent.
districts as defendants, in an action upon his claim, and a joint and
several judgment may be rendered against them therein. The District
Township of White Oak et al. v. The District Township of Oskaloosa
et al., 73.
-. Neither section 1715 nor section 1820 of the Code has any appli-
cation to the claim of one district township against another, accruing
after the division of the debtor township into independent districts. Id.
3. SETTLEMENT BETWEEN DISTRICT TOWNSHIPS. A warrant issued by
one district township to another as the result of a settlement, by which
the former was to receive certain delinquent taxes due upon the territory
of the latter, is based upon sufficient consideration. The fact that the
latter had collected and kept a portion of such taxes would not estop it
to maintain an action upon the warrant, although it might constitute a
counter-claim thereto. Dist. Township of Wesley v. Dist. Township
of Algona, 153.
4. BOARD OF DIRECTORS: DESIGNATION OF FUND. It is the province of
the board of directors of a district township to designate the fund or
funds upon which orders shall be drawn for the payment of judgments,
and a creditor is not required to specify in his demand for the issuance
of such orders the amount of his claim against each fund. The Dis-
trict Township of Coon v. The Board of Directors of the District
Township of Providence et al., 287.
1. IMPLIED CONTRACT: PARENT AND CHILD. Facts considered which were
held insufficient to support the claim of a son to compensation for ser-
vices alleged to have been rendered his parents. Wilson v. Wilson, 44.
2. LIEN OF ATTORNEY: BURDen of proof. In an action to recover the
balance of a sum of money collected by defendants for plaintiff, which
was retained by defendants upon a claim for services rendered as attor-
neys, held, that the burden was upon them to prove the services ren-
dered and their value. Stanton v. Clinton, Hart & Brewer, 109.
3. CARE OF RELATIVE: MEMBER OF FAMILY. Where the mother of the
plaintiff's wife, who was aged and infirm. requested plaintiff to take
her to his home and care for her, which he did, boarding and nursing
her until her death, she being helpless and unable to perform any ser-
vice during all the time, and it was shown that she expressed a desire
to pay plaintiff for her care, it was held that she did not become a
member of his family, and that he was entitled to recover the value of
the services rendered by him and his family from her estate. Wence e.
Wykoff, 644.
STATUTES CITED, CONSTRUED, ETC.
Rent. Martin v. Stearns et al.,
1330. Life Insurance. Rhode v. Bank,
et al., 376.
Sec. 711. Taxation. Mulroy v. Church-
man et al., 249.
66 766. Sale. Brundige v. Maloney, 218.
2302. Rent. Martin c. Stearns et al.,
349.
Highway. Cook v. Trigg, 710.
937, 939, 916. Highway. Kessler v.
Hirshire, 569.
934. Highway. Carey v. Weitgenant,
661.
981. 982. Highway. Tobin v. The
Township of Emmetsburg, et al.,
996. Highway. Tobin v. The Town-
ship of Emmetsburg, et al., 83.
997. Highway. Tobin e. The Town-
ship of Emmetsburg, et al., 82.
1053. Corporations. Larson v. Dayton
et al., 593.
1182. Life insurance. Rhode t. Bank
et al., 376.
1308. Common carriers. McCune v.
The B. C. R. & N. R. Co., 602.
1309. Railroads. White v. The K. &
D. MR. Co., 101.
1331. Paupers. Scott c. Winneshiek
County, 580.
1526, 1531. Intoxicating liquors. Tay-
lor & Co v. Pickett et al., 469.
155). Intoxicating liquors. Taylor &
Co. v. Pickett et al., 471.
1557. Latoxicating liquors. Huggins
v. Kavanagh, 389.
1715. School District.
The District
Township of White Oak et al. .
The District Township of Oska-
loosa et al., 79.
1733, 1739, 1748. School District. The
District Township of Coon r. The
Board of Directors of the District
Township of Providence et al., 200.
1753, 1766, 1757. County Superintend-
ent. Bailey v. Ewart, 111.
1787. School District. The District
Township of Coon v. The Board
of Directors of the District Town-
ship of Providence et al., 290.
1820. School District. The District
Township of White Oak et al. v.
The District Township of Oska-
loosa et al., 79.
1867. Auditor. The State v. Morse,
510.
1922. Sale. Warner v. Jameson et
al., 72; Pash v. Weston, 676.
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