Moses agt. Hasbrouck. sum of money has been recovered, which was for costs upon the affirmance on appeal of a previous judgment and order. Having declared this fact, and averred that "the above-named appellant being aggrieved thereby, intends to appeal therefrom to the court of appeals," therefore, the persons named, "undertake that the said appellant will pay all costs and damages which may be awarded against him on said appeal, not exceeding five hundred dollars; and do also undertake, that if the said judgment so appealed from, or any part thereof be affirmed, or the appeal be dismissed, the said appellant will pay the amount directed to be paid by the said judgment, or the part of such amount as to which the said judgment shall be affirmed, if it be affirmed only in part, and all damages which shall be awarded against said appellant on the said appeal." Looking at the recital in the beginning of the undertaking, which describes a judgment for costs, and the promise to pay "the said judgment," or a "part of such amount," in certain contingencies, it is obvious that security has only been given for the payment of the judgment recovered for the costs on the affirmance, and not for the original judgment which was affirmed at the general term. In short, to repeat again the language of section 1332, the undertaking is not "the same, as if the judgment or order, from which the appeal is taken, was to the same effect as the judgment or order affirmed. The undertaking, given upon the appeal, must also be held defective upon this ground, and the relief sought by this motion must be granted. Crawford agt. Kastner. SUPREME COURT. FRANCIS CRAWFORD agt. ROSA KASTNER, administratrix. Specific performance- Lease - When specific execution of a new lease will be ordered-Jurisdiction of district courts in certain cases of summary pro ceedings. A. executed to B. a lease of certain premises for the term of four years, with the "privilege of six years more at the same rent:" Held, that the words "with the privilege of six years more at the same rent" are equivalent to a covenant of renewal, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a specific performance of the covenant by the execution of a new lease. District courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. When a justice pro sides in a summary proceeding provided by statute, his powers are limited and restricted. Equitable defenses are not available. Whether B. was entitled to the renewal which was contemplated by the original agreement, depends entirely upon facts and circumstances, which, if disputed, necessarily required the adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction, and was an issue of law which a district court justice was not competent to determine for want of jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that, when the defense is an equitable one, in a summary proceeding, application may be made to, and the powers of a court of equity invoked to restrain the proceedings, and to transfer the contention to its jurisdiction. First Department, General Term, January, 1882. Before DAVIS, P. J., BRADY and DANIELS, JJ. APPEAL from judgment in favor of the plaintiff, on a demurrer to the complaint. Joseph Fetterich, for respondent. The action was brought for a specific performance, i. e., to compel the execution of a new lease of the premises described in the complaint for the term of six years, in pursuance of the terms of the original lease between the plaintiff and the defendant's intestate. The only question to be determined on this appeal is, did the com Crawford agt. Kastner. plaint contain the necessary allegations to support an action for specific performance? If it did, the court below was right in overruling the demurrer, and its judgment should be affirmed. The complaint alleges: 1st. The making of the original lease between Adolph Kastner, defendant's intestate, and the plaintiff, containing the words "with privilege of six years more at the same rent." 2d. The death of the lessor, Adolph Kastner, seized of an estate for years in the premises 956 Third avenue, including the portion occupied by plaintiff, and defendant's appointment as sole administratrix. 3d. The preparation and tender of a paper in exact form as the original lease (except some provisions relating to alterations which had been performed), and demand for execution by the defendant. 4th. The defendant's refusal to execute such proposed paper, or any other papers to carry out the same purpose. Certainly nothing more is necessary in the matter of allegation to authorize a decree of specific performance. There can be no question but that the words "with privilege of six years more at the same rent," in the original lease, are equivalent to a covenant of renewal (Chretien agt. Dorsey, 1 Com., 422; Tracey agt. Albany Exchange Co., 7 N. Y., 472; Kelso agt. Kelly, 1 Daly, 420; Reed agt. St. John, 2 Daly, 213). This being so, the right to a specific performance of the covenant cannot be denied. The plaintiff's right to interpose his claim by way of defense in the summary proceedings instituted by the defendant not only does not appear to be sustained by authority, but has been expressly denied in such a case (Graham agt. James, 7 Robt., 468). The plaintiff having the right to have his term definitely fixed in an affirmative action in a court of equity, the court, as an incident thereto, had the right to enjoin any proceedings before the magistrate, until the plaintiff's right to a new lease for the extended term was determined, and thereby avoid multiplicity of actions and proceedings (Brady agt. McCosker, 1 N. Y., 214). Ashbel P. Fitch, for appellant. Crawford agt. Kastner. BRADY, J.-This action was commenced to compel a specific performance of a covenant in the lease executed between the plaintiff and the intestate, Adolph F. Kastner. The agreement is dated the 18th of March, 1876, and the premises named in it rented for the term of four years, with the "privilege of six years more at the same rent." It appears that on the 31st of March, 1880, the defendant was appointed administratrix of the goods, chattels and credits of the intestate, and that she duly qualified; that the plaintiff elected to exercise the privilege contained in the lease, and caused to be prepared an agreement, or lease, in accordance with the privilege mentioned. He executed the lease and tendered it to the defendant, and demanded that she should execute it and thus carry into effect the intention of the parties. The defendant refused to execute it, or any paper whatever, to carry into effect the agreement mentioned. It also appears that on the twentieth of May she instituted a summary proceeding before a justice of a district court in this city, to remove the plaintiff from the premises, whereupon the plaintiff commenced this action for the purpose of restraining the continuance of such proceedings and securing the extension of the lease to which he was entitled under the original agreement. There can be no doubt that the words, "with the privilege of six years more at the same rent," were equivalent to a covenant of renewal, and it is equally free from doubt that the plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to a specific performance of the covenant (Chretien agt. Dorsey, 1 Com., 422; Tracy agt. Albany Exchange Co., 7 N. Y., 472; Kelso agt. Kelly, 1 Daly, 420; Reed agt. St. John, 2 Daly, 213). The objection to the maintainance of this action depends chiefly upon the proposition that the plaintiff's remedy is complete by law, and that in any proceedings to remove him the original lease would be a perfect protection, if the proceedings were predicated of an allegation that the term had expired. Crawford agt. Kastner. District courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. When a justice presides in a summary proceeding provided by statute, his powers are limited and restricted. Equitable defenses are not available. The justice is not vested with any power in equity, and can only investigate defenses of a purely legal character. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to the renewal which was contemplated by the original agreement, depended entirely upon circumstances the faithful discharge of the duties imposed by the original lease, the right to exercise the privilege, the exercise of the privilege in a proper way and the performance of such acts in reference to it as were necessary to secure the right to demand the extension of the lease in accordance with it. These facts and circumstances necessarily required the adjudication, if disputed, of a court of competent jurisdiction, and whether the plaintiff, under all the circumstances disclosed, was entitled to a renewal of the lease, or the extension of the term, was an issue of law which the justice was not competent to determine for want of jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that where the defense is an equitable one, in a summary proceeding, application may be made to and the powers of a court of equity invoked to restrain the proceedings and to transfer the contention to its jurisdiction (See Graham agt. James, 5 Robt., 473). For these reasons the proposition suggested by the defendant cannot be maintained. The agreement set forth in the complaint, which was tendered to the defendant for execution, seems to be in harmony with the privilege to which it related, but the allegation is broader than the mere presentation of that paper, because it is alleged that the defendant refused to execute any paper whatever to carry into effect the agreement between the plaintiff and her deceased husband, and this allegation was admitted by the demurrer. But it appears also in this connection, from an averment in the complaint, and affirmatory of the intention of the defendant not to recognize the continu |