Matter of Hartford Life and Annuity Insurance Company. and 7 by section 2939; subdivision 8 by section 2891; subdivision 9 by section 2941; subdivision 10 by section 2943; subdivision 11 by sections 2944 and 3077; subdivision 12, last clause, by sections 3025 and 3027; parts of subdivisions 12 and 13 by section 2034; subdivision 13 by section 3043; subdivision 14 by section 2942; subdivision 15, first clause, by section 2879, and part of subdivision 15 by section 2892. Section 2879 relates to "service of summons upon a corporation," and section 2892 to permitting a "defendant to offer to compromise," and to "proceedings thereupon.' It is, therefore, clear that these courts no longer possess the power of interpleader, a fact much to be regretted. Motion for interpleader denied, but, as the question is new, no costs are allowed. PER CURIAM. We are of opinion that the justice had no discretion under the statute. He was bound to see that the answer was filed on the return day of the summons, and he had no power to adjourn without the filing of an answer. All his subsequent proceedings were without jurisdiction, and the judgment must necessarily be reversed. SUPREME COURT. In the Matter of the HARTFORD LIFE AND ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT. Mandamus-When will not be allowed to compel the superintendent of the insurance department to file their annual report required by chapter 256 of Laws of 1881- Issuance of certificate required by this act in the discretion of the superintendent. The supreme court cannot review, by mandamus, a matter put in the quasi judicial discretion of the superintendent of the insurance department. The giving of the certificate of authority required by chapter 256 of Laws of 1881, to entitle associations and societies, whether voluntary or incorporated, to do business in this state, is within the discretion of the superintendent of insurance department. Matter of Hartford Life and Annuity Insurance Company. Where the annual statement required by this act has been presented to the superintendent, and he has examined the same and has determined against the company on the matter of solvency and ability, a mandamus will not be allowed to compel the filing of the same. Where a company who has been doing business in this state, but has ceased to do business here, and desires again to renew its business, the matter rests with the superintendent to refuse admission if he thinks best. Albany Special Term, March, 1882. Kobbe & Fowler and M. T. Hun, for relator. Peckham & Rosendale, for superintendent o insurance department. LEARNED, J.-The notice of motion in this case was for a mandamus to compel the defendant to file the annual statement of the relator for the year 1881, and to issue a renew al certificate of authority to Sherwood Sterling, authorizing him to issue new policies, and authorizing the company to do business in this state. The oral argument of the relator's counsel was to the same effect, that is, it was insisted not only that the annual statement should be filed, but also that the certificate of authority should be issued and the company authorized to do business. The affidavits which were used on the hearing were directed, not so much to the bare right of the relator to file a statement, but to the duty of the superintendent to issue the certificate of authority and to authorize the relator to do business. But the printed brief handed to the court by the relator subsequently to the argument, states that the mandamus is to compel the superintendent to file the statement, and "to proceed to thereafter determine the relator's right to do business in New York." So that by this printed brief the relator seems to abandon that part of the motion which sought to compel the issue of a certificate of authority, and the authorizing the relator to do business, and seems to limit his motion Matter of Hartford Life and Annuity Insurance Company. to the mere filing of the paper, and to the compelling the superintendent to thereafter determine the relator's right to do business in New York. One very important suggestion at once arises if this position is taken by the relator. It appears by the affidavits presented by the superintendent that he has examined the statement which the relator desires to have him file, and that he considers it unsatisfactory under the statute. Irrespective of the "safety fund certificate" business, he is not satisfied as to the solvency and ability of the company. The affidavits do not merely state this conclusion of the superintendent, but they give, in detail, the facts on which that conclusion is based. And it may be said, in passing, that the facts thus shown, principally from the statement of the relator itself, completely justify the conclusion of the superintendent. Thus it appears that the superintendent has already done one thing which the printed brief asks that he be compelled to do. He has, upon the statement which the relator desires to file, determined adversely the question of its right to do business in this State. It need hardly be said that this court cannot review by mandamus a matter put in the quasi judicial discretion of the superintendent. And therefore the only question, according to this printed brief, must be as to the right simply to file the statement; that is, the right to put on the files of the office a statement which the superintendent has had presented to him, which he now shows that he has examined, and from which he has decided that the relator is not in that condition of solvency that he ought to permit it to do business here. Now, if the relator asks that the superintendent determine its rights, the answer is that he has determined them, on a consideration of that very statement which the relator wishes to file. If the relator asks simply that the statement be filed, the mere matter of filing is not a thing of any consequence. The superintendent is not a merely ministerial officer, as was the town clerk in The People agt. Collins (7 Johns., 554). Matter of Hartford Life and Annuity Insurance Company. Nor can the mere filing of the statement be of any value to the relator, so far as I can see, except as a basis of the action of the superintendent. If there be any penalty for not filing, that could not be incurred when the relator had offered to file a statement. If there is any wrong sustained by the refusal to file, the common law remedy is open. There is no special benefit to be obtained by a mandamus. The relator argues that the superintendent cannot determine the relator's rights until after the filing of the statement (Laws 1853, chap. 463, sec. 14). It is very possible that on the mere question of the solvency and ability of the company the superintendent could not decide without an examination of the annual statement. But the superintendent has seen and examined this annual statement, as his affidavits manifestly show. It was presented to him at his office, and he has determined against the relator on the matter of solvency and ability, and, therefore, the question returns, of what benefit can the mere filing be? For the very object of that filing is to obtain the determination of the superintendent. Why ask for a mandamus when nothing can be gained by it? There are, however, some other matters which should be considered, and in considering them it must be noticed that as the case is presented I must take, on any disputed point, the allegations of the answering affidavits as admitted (People agt. Superintendent, 73 N. Y., 173). The relator was authorized to do business in this state (under another name) by chapter 279, Laws of 1867. Subsequently the relator engaged in the business of issuing what are called by it "safety fund certificates." These are certificates by which the relator, in consideration of ten dollars paid, and of three dollars per annuin to be paid, agreed to deposit the ten dollars with a certain trustee, and agreed that, on the death of a person holding one of these certificates, an assessment should be made on all persons holding such certificates, and the amount received (not exceeding $1,000) should be paid to the legal representatives of the deceased. VOL. LXIII 8 Matter of Hartford Life and Annuity Insurance Company. The certificate contains other provisions, but these are enough to indicate its nature. In August, 1880, the superintendent called the attention of the relator to the matter, and stated that the relator had no right to issue these certificates in this state, and requested the relator to notify its agents that they were prohibited from soliciting for such certificates. To this the relator replied that it would at once notify its agents of the action of the insurance department. Thereupon the superintendent assumed that the relator had ceased issuing such certificates; but he learned the contrary in January, 1881. The deputy superintendent then went to the office of the relator in Hartford, January 14, 1881, and was there informed that the relator was still issuing such certificates. He then informed the secretary of the relator that if this were so the superintendent would not renew the certificates of authority for the ensuing year. The secretary of the relator said that he believed the insurance department could not interfere, if they restricted their canvassing to these safety fund certificates. The secretary of the relator asked the deputy superintendent what the department would do if they should not file their statement? No definite reply was made, and the secretary of the relator said they would gracefully withdraw from the state and not ask for a renewal of its license. The deputy superintendent replied that he would so inform the superintendent, and that the withdrawal would render unnecessary an examination of the books and papers which he was authorized to make. On the return of the deputy superintendent to Albany, the superintendent issued, January 17, 1881, a notice to the agents of the relator that their authority was revoked. On the 20th of January, 1881, the relator sent a notice to one of its agents that the insurance department had nothing to do with this safety fund business, and directed him to go on with such business; that the revocation of license only related to "old line business." On the 12th of May, 1881, chapter 256 of the Laws of |