The People ex rel. Town of Knox agt. Supervisors of Albany Co. diction, the mode pointed out must be complied with or the proceedings will be a nullity (The People agt. Board of Police, 6 Abb., 164; Wells on Juris. of Courts, secs. 70, 72, 82). 3. "The notice must conform to the statute" (Pierce on Railroads, 183). 4. The maxim is familiar “that notice is of the essence of things required to be done," and it applies to all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings (Black. on Tax Titles, 237), and when the statute prescribes the form of a notice or advertisement it must be strictly complied with (Black., supra, 247). A notice to interested parties is jurisdictional, and the notice is strictly construed (Wells on Juris. of Courts, p. 411, sec. 418). 5. The rule is stated in Cissell agt. Pulaski Co. (10 Federal Rep., 893), thus: "It is a rule without qualification or exception, that when it is sought to conclude a party by constructive notice by publication, a strict compliance with the requirements of the statute is required. Nothing can be taken by intendment, and every fact necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction, based on this mode of service, must affirmatively appear in the mode prescribed by the statute." And parol evidence cannot be received to supply the omission (Noyes agt. Butler, 6 Barb., 617; Lanny agt. Cady, 4 Vt., 506). 6. The notice to be served and published in the case at bar was required to contain: 1st. A notice of intention to apply to the board. 2d. A description of the disputed line. 3d. The line as proposed to be acted upon. The notice in question did not contain a description of the disputed line, and the failure to designate this line omitted an essential prerequisite to jurisdiction. It was evidently designed by the statute that the notice should specify the gist of the controversy, setting forth the line about which the quarrel existed as well the claimed line. The conjunction "and" in the sentence, and occurring after the comma, emphasizes and makes plain the intent of the legisla ture to be that the line in dispute, as well the proposed line, should be particularized; the old line representing the town of Knox and the proposed line the town of Berne. As no The People ex rel. Town of Knox agt. Supervisors of Albany Co. subsequent pleading or statement was required by the statute from either town, to make the supervisors cognizant of the nature of the trouble, the first notice of necessity should give a plain and concise summary of the facts required to be stated by the statute, to the end that an intelligent line of action might be adopted by the board. For all that may appear, if the disputed line was inserted, the town of Knox might not deem it necessary to put in an appearance, as the difference could then be seen and understood. 7. Judge HEBARD, in Briggs agt. Georgia (15 Vt., 72), voices the settled doctrine: "I am not very well satisfied with the summary mode of getting rid of a statutory provision by calling it directory. If one positive requirement and provision of a statute may be avoided in that way, we see no reason why another may not." III. The town of Knox had the capacity to institute these proceedings in order to protect itself, the subject-matter being a controversy between towns (1 R. S. [7th ed.], 840, title 5). IV. The writ of prohibition was the proper remedy in the premises. In no other way could relief be obtained. 1. The board of supervisors were invested by the statute with judicial powers. This is apparent from the consideration of the two statutes relating to town lines. At the annual meeting, by a two-third vote, the board may establish and alter town lines without let, hindrance or notice to anybody; but where this is not done, the only power exists under the statute that requires a notice and prescribes its form and how it shall be served. It would be idle to require service of a notice, unless that meant something. Why be present if you could not be heard; and how heard? If you could give no testimony, the alleged hearing would be a farce; unless, therefore, the board was obliged to weigh and consider such evidence, why receive it; and if they are to weigh and consider such evidence, is not this the exercise of judicial power. 2. The board of supervisors exercising, as it does in this regard judicial powers, the functions of a court, and by virtue The People ex rel. Town of Knox agt. Supervisors of Albany Co. thereof proceeding to inflict what was and is claimed to be a great wrong upon an important division of the county, it is eminently appropriate that the functions of the supreme court should be invoked to prevent an act of oppression by this tribunal which assumes and usurps a jurisdiction it failed to acquire. 3. The writ of prohibition, and the practice in relation to it, is provided for by the Code of Civil Procedure, article 5, section 2091, etc. 4. Prohibition lies to restrain a mayor from removing a police commissioner when he has not power to do so (The People ex rel. Wheeler agt. Cooper, 57 How. Pr., 426). It lies against excise commissioners (The People agt. Com. of Excise, 61 How. Pr., 514). 5. In 25 Albany Law Journal, 290, an opinion of judge ARNOUX (of the New York 'superior court, handed down March 14, 1882), is published, from which the following excerpts are taken: "Although the writ of prohibition is comparatively infrequent, nevertheless it is deemed to be a beneficial writ, and one that should issue where a subordinate court or inferior tribunal attempts to act without jurisdiction or beyond its jurisdiction (Ex parte Braudlacht, 2 Hill, 367; People agt. Supervisors of Queens, 1 id., 201; People agt. Seward, 7 Wend., 518; People agt. Marine Court, 36 Barb., 341; People agt. N. Y. Common Pleas, 18 Abb., 438; People agt. Oyer and Terminer, 27 How. Pr., 19; People agt. McAdam, 58 id., 442; People agt. Cooper, 57 id., 426; People agt. Special Term, 57 id., 467). As the court of appeals say in Appo agt. People (20 N. Y., 531, 540): ‘It is a proper remedy when the inferior tribunal either enter tains a proceeding in which it has no jurisdiction, or when having jurisdiction it assumes to exercise an unauthorized power.' With this the old English authorities agree, for Jacob quaintly says it issues against inferior courts acting without jurisdiction, or ' if in handling of matters clearly within their cognizance, they transgress the bounds prescribed to them by the laws of England (Law Dict., tit. "Prohibition"). The reason why this writ is esteemed as beneficial is well The People ex rel. Town of Knox agt. Supervisors of Albany Co. * * expressed by SELDEN, J., in Appo agt. The People (supra). 'It is far better to prevent the exercise of an unauthorized power,' he says, 'than to be driven to the necessity of correcting the error after it has been committed.' No question but jurisdiction can be tried in a proceeding inaugurated by prohibition. In such cases the inquiry relates to jurisdiction simply (People agt. Nichols, 79 N. Y., 582, 591). * The first inquiry then under the foregoing authorities, is this: Is the board of excise acting without jurisdiction? Jurisdiction has been defined to be the right to pronounce judgment acquired through due process of law (1 Hurd on Freedom and Bondage, 22; Sprague's New Science of Law, 4; Du Ponceau on Jurisdiction, 21; Austin on Jurispru dence, 793)." Oliver M. Hungerford, for town of Berne. WESTBROOK, J.-The Revised Statutes (1 R. S. [6th ed.], 865, sub. 15, sec. 14), which give to boards of supervisors power "to fix, establish, locate and define disputed boundary lines between the several towns in their respective counties," require, as preliminary to their action, the publication and service of such a notice as is therein provided. The notice must specify the line to be fixed, concerning which the dispute exists, "particularly describing the same," and it must also describe "the line as proposed to be acted upon by such board." Until such a notice is given the board has no authority to act. The notice given in this case is defective, for while it particularly describes the proposed line, it fails to describe with particularity the line concerning which the dispute exists. As to this fact there is no denial, and the omission is fatal to the whole proceeding. The statute is plain, and cannot be disregarded. The fixing and settlement of this boundary line by the board is judicial action, and if attempted without having obtained jurisdiction, as required by law, may be restrained. The peremptory writ must issue. VOL. LXIII 53 Town of Thompson agt. Norris. SUPREME COURT. THE TOWN OF THOMPSON agt. NORRIS. State courts-When will not interfere by injunction to prevent the prosecution of a suit in a federal court-When court will not order bonds delivered into its custody pending the action. Where a corporation brings an action in a state court to restrain the transfer of certain bonds and annexed coupons purporting to be issued by it, and to have such bonds surrendered up and canceled, and to restrain the further prosecution of an action commenced by defendant against the plaintiff on some of these coupons, which action is now pending in the United States circuit court: Held, first, that as plaintiff claims, the bonds on their face give notice of their invalidity, and no person to whom they may be transferred can be such a bona fide holder that plaintiff cannot set up such defense of invalidity against him, the court will not order that the bonds be deliv ered into its custody pending the action. Second. Though the state courts will probably decide a point in one way, or even have already so decided, a state court ought not to enjoin a federal court having jurisdiction, on the ground that that court will probably decide the other way. Albany Special Term, July, 1882. Two motions are made; the one by the defendant to dissolve an injunction, the other by the plaintiff to require the deposit in court, pending the action, of the securities which are the subject of controversy. The action is brought to restrain the transfer of a certain bond and the annexed coupons, and of certain other coupons issued (or purporting to be issued) by the plaintiff, and now the property of the defendant; to restrain, also, the further prosecution of an action commenced by this defendant against this plaintiff on some of these coupons now payable, which action is now pending in the circuit court of the United States, southern district of New York, and to compel the surrender to this plaintiff of the bond and of the coupons. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff issued certain bonds |