Matter of Ramscar. trate with a certified copy of the inquisition and testimony is the clerk referred to in section 778 with whom the inquisition and testimony is directed to be filed by the coroner. This interpretation of the statute seems to me to harmonize all the various sections to which I have referred and to make them consistent with each other, and consistent with what is deemed by me to have been the design of the legislature, that a person against whom an inquisition has been found by a coroner's jury, whether arrested before or after the filing of such inquisition, is entitled to a hearing before a magistrate in the same manner as if he had been arrested upon an ordinary information as defined by section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If this is not so, what becomes of section 779 directing the coroner to deliver the testimony to the magistrate if the defendant has been arrested before the inquisition can be filed, and of the provisions of sections 781 and 783 providing for a hearing before a magistrate on an arrest after an inquisition has been found and filed? And, furthermore, what becomes of the provisions of section 784 requiring a certified copy of the inquisition and testimony to be furnished to the magistrate where the warrant of the coroner has been executed after the inquisition found? My examination of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, above referred to, has led me to the conviction that it was the intention of the legislature that in every case a prisoner should have an opportunity of being heard before one of the magistrates of the county in which he was apprehended, or in which the crime with which he stands charged is alleged to have been committed. And I am strengthened in this conviction from the fact that in the case of the People agt. Collins (20 How. Pr. R., 111) it was held by Mr. justice BALCOM that on an inquest before a coroner's jury the coroner had no power to take testimony to establish the innocence of the prisoner, nor had the prisoner the right to cross-examine the witnesses produced before the coroner. It is said, however, on the part of the people, that Matter of Ramscar. the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to which I have adverted, have been materially changed by chapter 465 of the Laws of 1881 (page 627), which is an act entitled "An act to amend chapter 256 of the Laws of 1878," entitled "An act relating to the coroners of the city and county of New York," their duties and compensation, passed June 6, 1881. Section 2 of that act provides: "The same act is hereby amended by adding thereto the following sections to be known as sections 7 and 8, respectively: "SECTION 7. Each of the coroners of the city and county of New York shall file with the clerk of the board of coroners, in all cases that may come before him, an abstract of the testimony taken by him, and a copy of the verdict rendered by the jury, and the clerk of said board shall keep the same on file until it is turned over to the board of health and a receipt taken therefor, except in the case of a homicide, in which case he shall transmit the same without delay to the district attorney of the city and county of New York." It is not claimed that section 8, added by the act in question to the act of 1878, has any bearing upon the point now under consideration. But it is claimed that section 7, which I have just recited, was intended "to create an exception in the city of New York as to coroners therein, and practically to reaffirm the local New York statute as to coroners by continuing them as magistrates, giving them the power to hold examinations, and providing, in cases of homicide, that such examination should be transmitted, like those of any other magistrate, to the district attorney for the action of the grand jury." And it is maintained that, as by section 963 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that when the Code is construed in connection with other statutes it must be deemed to have been enacted on the 4th day of January, 1881, so that any statute enacted after that day is to have the same effect as if it had been enacted after this Code. The act of 1881 changes the general provisions of that Code and, in substance, repeals certain provisions of them as to the city and county of New York. Matter of Ramscar. If I found any inconsistency between the provisions of the Code and the act of 1881, I might give my assent to this contention. But there is no such inconsistency. The provisions of sections 778, 779 and 784 of the Code are quite consistent with the provisions of the second section of the act of 1881. Construed together they seem to me to mean that in addition to filing the inquisition and testimony with the clerk of the court of sessions, &c., and in addition to furnishing a certified copy thereof to the magistrate in cases of homicide, the coroner shall transmit an abstract of the testimony taken by him and a copy of the verdict rendered by the jury to the district attorney. I can discover in the act of 1881 no intention on the part of the legislature to subvert the entire scheme of the statute in relation to proceedings against those charged by a coroner's jury with the commission of a crime. I do discover in the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure an intention on the part of the legislature to give to persons thus charged an opportunity to be heard, whether arrested before or after an inquisition filed or found in the same manner in all respects as upon a warrant of arrest on an information (See Code, secs. 783, 779, 784 and 145, and secs. 188 to 221, inclusive). I am not prepared to say that the intention of the legislature has been declared to be changed or altered by the statute to which I have been referred. If the foregoing views are correct it is the right of the prisoner to be heard before a magistrate as upon a warrant of arrest on an information. When the order, which is now sought to be modified or set aside was made, it was assented that the hearing should be had before the magistrate designated in the order. If that assent is withdrawn the order will be that the prisoner is entitled to a hearing before one of the magistrates of this county. If it is not withdrawn the order will stand as heretofore entered. Alexander agt. Katte. N. Y. COMMON PLEAS. LAZELLE E. ALEXANDER, receiver, plaintiff, agt. Walter KATTE, defendant. In an action brought to restore notes alleged to have been canceled, in pursuance of a wrongful scheme to which defendant was not a party but of which he was cognizant, the parties to that scheme are necessary parties. The absence of such parties may be taken advantage of by demurrer. Where a complaint demands equitable relief and a defendant demurs to it the judgment granted could not be more favorable than that demanded, even though a cause of action at law is stated in the complaint. Special Term, May, 1882. Nathaniel Myers, for receiver. Charles B. Alexander, for defendant. J. F. DALY, J.-The allegations in the complaint are sufficient to warrant a decree for the relief demanded if the necessary parties to the controversy were before the court. This action is brought by the receiver of the Columbia Life Insurance company (formerly the St. Louis Life Insurance Company), a Missouri corporation, to have this court declare wrongful a certain transaction had on or about November, 1875, in the state of Missouri, between one George J. Davis, a director in said company, Alfred M. Britton, the acting president of said company, and the Life Association of America, another Missouri corporation, by which the latter corporation obtained possession of the assets, business and property of the first-named company, getting possession, among other assets, of certain notes of defendant and collaterals to secure the same, which notes and collaterals were delivered through said Davis to defendant, who thereupon Alexander agt. Katte. surrendered to Davis the stock of said St. Louis Insurance Company which he held as a subscriber, having, in payment of his subscription therefor, given the said notes and the collaterals to said company. The complaint prays judgment that defendant produce and bring into court said notes and collaterals and that they be declared assets of the said company and a trust fund for the payment of its creditors; that the collaterals be sold and applied to the satisfaction of defendant's indebtedness, and that plaintiff have judgment against defendant ou said notes. The complaint does not allege that defendant was a party to the wrongful transaction between the officers of the St. Louis Insurance Company and the Life Association by which merger of the companies were affected, or by which the latter corporation was enabled to get control of the former, but does allege that he had knowledge of the intention of the parties to that arrangement, and of the details of the scheme concocted between them. That scheme, as alleged, was that the Life Association should make and deliver to Davis its draft on its treasurer, at one day's sight, for $1,111,898.34, with which Davis was to obtain all the securities held by the St. Louis Insurance Company in payment of stock it had issued; that Davis should exchange with the subscribers for said stock their notes and securities thus obtained for their stock and thus practically cancel their subscriptions and relieve them from liability as stockholders; that it was never intended by the parties to the scheme that the said draft of $1,111,898.34 should be paid, but that the same should again come into possession of the Life Association when it obtained possession of the St. Louis Company. None of the parties to the arrangement which the court is asked to set aside is before it, and it would seem that they are not only proper but necessary parties (Alexander agt. Horner, 9 Cent. Law Jour., 111). Defendant is charged with having received the benefit of the alleged wrongful scheme by the |