certain innate or a priori forms or conditions whi make it necessary for the mind to function as it functions. But how is morality possible? Are the different imperatives or moral laws innate, as Cudworth and men of his ilk would assert? No, says Kant, not exactly. But there is present in the practical reason a formal principle or condition, a form or category of obligation or oughtness, not derived from experience, but prior to it, a priori, a universally valid law, by virtue of which man is a moral being. And, what does this categorical imperative enjoin? we ask. Kant answers, "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation."2 That is, do not perform acts of which thou canst not will that they become universal. deceiver cannot will that lying should become a universal law, for with such a law there would be no promises at all; and his maxim would necessarily destroy itself. This law or maxim is valid for all rational creatures generally, not only under certain contingent conditions, but with absolute necessity. Although common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they always really have it before their eyes, and use it as the standard of their decision.3

1 See Abbott, Kant's Theory of Ethics, p. 28.

2 Ib., pp. 17 ff., 38 ff.

The

"Man

3 Ib., pp. 20, 21, 93, 120 note, 192, 311, 321, 343. (even the worst) does not in any maxim, as it were, rebelliously abandon the moral law (and renounce obedience to it). On the

There is, then, a moral imperative inherent in the very nature of man, which categorically commands. But the question is, Whence does it come? Is it the voice of a suprasensible being speaking in the heart of man? In a certain sense, yes. It is the product of the free will, of the intelligible ego, of the thing-in-itself. "Freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law," that is, the free will imposes the law upon itself; and the moral law is "the ratio cognoscendi of freedom," that is, we must logically conclude from the fact that there is a categorical imperative in us, that there is a free will which imposes it.2 "The question, then, how a categorical imperative is possible, can be answered to this extent, that we can assign the only hypothesis on which it is possible, namely, the idea of freedom; and we can also discern the necessity of this hypothesis, and this is sufficient for the practical exercise of reason, that is, for the conviction of the validity of this imperative, and hence of the moral law: but how this hypothesis itself is possible can never be discerned. by any human reason." 3

contrary, this forces itself upon him irresistibly by virtue of his moral nature, and if no other spring opposed it, he would also adopt it into his ultimate maxim as the adequate determining principle of his elective will, that is, he would be morally good."

1 Abbott, Kant's Theory of Ethics, pp. 65 ff. Green: "It is the very essence of moral duty to be imposed by man upon himself.” 2" I can because I must."

3 Ib., p. 81. See also p. 84: "It is, therefore, no fault in our deduction of the supreme principle of morality, but an objection

(2) Although Charles Darwin1 did not work out a complete system of ethics, it will be interesting to examine his view of conscience before taking up Spencer's theory. Darwin bases our entire moral nature upon the social impulse or sympathy.2 He regards it as highly probable that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being herein included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well or nearly as well developed as in man. Let us imagine that the animal has certain self-regarding instincts, e.g., the desire to satisfy hunger or any passion such as vengeance, and social instincts, which lead it to take pleasure in the society of its fellows and to feel for them and to perform services for them. Such selfish instincts, though strong, are temporary, and can, for a time, be fully satisfied. With animals, however, which live permanently in a body, the social instincts are ever present and persistent. Now suppose that an enduring and always that should be made to human reason in general that it cannot enable us to conceive the absolute necessity of an unconditional practical law such as the categorical imperative must be." To the Kantian school belong, T. H. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics, 1883), Muirhead (Elements of Ethics), J. S. Mackenzie (Manual of Ethics), J. Seth (A Study of Ethical Principles), and D'Arcy (A Short Study of Ethics).

1 1808-1882. For exposition and criticism, see Schurman, Ethical Import of Darwinism; Sully, Sensation and Intuition, pp. 17, 18; Martineau, Types; Williams, Evolutional Ethics; Guyau, La morale anglaise contemporaine.

2 See his Descent of Man, chap. iv.

present social instinct has yielded to one of these other instincts which was stronger at the time, but did not endure nor leave behind it a very vivid impression (like hunger). And suppose the animal has the power of memory. It will remember its past actions and motives, and feel dissatisfaction or even misery because an enduring instinct was not satisfied.1

On the same principle we may explain why man feels that he ought to obey one instinctive desire rather than another; why he is bitterly regretful if he has yielded to a strong sense of self-preservation, and has not risked his life to save that of a fellow-creature, or why he regrets having stolen food from hunger.2 Man reflects and so cannot help remembering the past. He will be driven to make a comparison between the impression of past hunger, vengeance satisfied, etc., and the ever present instinct of sympathy, and his early knowledge of what others consider as blamable or praiseworthy. "This knowledge cannot be banished from his mind, and from instinctive sympathy is esteemed of great moment. He will feel as if he had been balked in following a present instinct or habit, and this with

1 The Descent of Man, pp. 98 ff. Darwin finds "something very like a conscience" in dogs. Thus, "a struggle may often be observed in animals between different instincts, or between an instinct and some habitual disposition, as when a dog rushes after a hare, is rebuked, pauses, hesitates, pursues again, or returns ashamed to his master; or as between the love of a female dog for her young puppies and her master, -for she may be seen to slink away to them, as if half ashamed of not accompanying her master." p. 107. 2 Ib., p. 110.

all animals causes dissatisfaction and even misery." He will then feel remorse, repentance, regret, or shame. "He will consequently resolve, more or less firmly, to act differently for the future; and this is conscience; for conscience looks backwards, and serves as a guide to the future.” 1 Prompted by his conscience man will become habituated to self-command, so that his desires and passions will yield instantly to his social instincts. It is possible that the habit of self-command may, like other habits, be inherited. "Thus at last man comes to feel, through acquired and perhaps inherited habit, that it is best for him to obey his more persistent impulses. The imperious word ought seems merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a rule of conduct, however it may have originated." 2

(3) According to Herbert Spencer3 the essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings. In the rudest groups of society, the leading check to the immediate satisfaction of desires is the fear of the anger of fellow-savages. When special strength, skill, or courage makes one of them a leader in battle, he inspires the most fear, and there comes to be a more decided check than before.

1 The Descent of Man, pp. 113 f.

2 See also the interesting passage on p. 124, which I have quoted in chap. iii, § 9, of this book. A. Sutherland has developed Darwin's theory in his able work, The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, 2 vols., 1898.

3 Born 1820. Principles of Ethics.