moral code. Now we have already noticed that ideals change and grow. One age and people is more combative or more peace-loving, or more selfish or more sympathetic than another, and will therefore emphasize the virtue of courage or submission or self-assertion or benevolence. Where the ideal is an ascetic one, the moral law will prohibit forms of conduct which are not only regarded as totally indifferent, but even essential in societies. aiming, say, at physical advancement. The care which the ancient Greek bestowed upon his body seemed not only foolish, but sinful, to the mediæval saint. Where the ideal is a political one, it is regarded as the duty of the citizen to take part in politics. When the sphere of persons sympathized with is a narrow one, as is frequently the case at the beginnings of historical life, the moral code embraces only the members of the same tribe or nation. The Greeks regarded all foreigners as barbarians and enemies, and the Jews always looked upon themselves as the chosen people of God.1

Now it frequently happens that the moral code of a people does not keep step with its ideals; indeed, it may even be an impediment to the realization of / the highest good. In such cases a conflict is apt to ensue between the old and the new. The conserva

1 Foreigner and enemy originally meant the same thing; think of the words gevós and hostis. See Rée, Entstehung des Gewissens, p. 150; Hearn, Aryan Household, p. 19; M'Lennan, Primitive Marriage, p. 107; and others quoted by Rée.

tive element will cling to the old rules, while the younger generation will turn its face to the future. When Jesus Christ preached the doctrine of universal brotherly love, and changed the old narrow Hebrew conception of God and His relation to man, he made a change in morality absolutely necessary.

Even where ideals remain practically stable, conditions may change to such an extent as to make old forms of conduct useless and even harmful, and new ones necessary. But human beings are creatures of habit, and look with suspicion on the new. Consequently, certain modes of conduct are often continued and enjoined as right long after they have lost their raison d'être.1

But there are many modes of conduct which remain moral in spite of all changes in ideals, and they are those without the observance of which no earthly ideal can ever be realized. No community can exist and pursue ideals, in which falsehood, murder, and treachery thrive. Even a band of thieves must obey some of the laws of morality in order to be able to live together at all. Only in case the ideal were death and ruin instead of life and happiness, would the commonly accepted rules of morality have to give way to others. A community seeking death

instead of life, ought not to foster the virtues of truth, honor, loyalty, honesty, justice, and chastity, for these are the very life of life. "The wages of sin is death."

1 See Paulsen's Ethics, Introduction.

11. Conclusion. Our conclusion is this: The

summum

bonum or highest good is that which human beings universally strive after for its own sake, which for them has absolute worth. It differs for different nations and times, depending upon different inner and outer conditions. Hence it is not possible to give a detailed picture of the highest good. All that we can do is to observe the similarities existing between the different ideals of humanity, and to embrace these under a general formula or principle. This formula or principle is, of course, bound to be vague and indefinite, a mere outline of the general direction of human strivings. We defined it as the preservation and unfolding of individual and social, physical and spiritual life, in adaptation to the surroundings. Whatever rules are developed by mankind for the realization of the highest good, and produce the moral sentiments referred to before, are called moral rules. The object of these rules is to make the realization of the ideal possible. Morality is a means to an end, just as / law is a means to an end. But in the case of morality the rules must, generally speaking, arouse certain sentiments, such as obligation, approval, disapproval, etc. Hence moral facts are characterized by the effects which acts and motives have upon the consciousness of the individuals as well as upon their general welfare.

The knowledge we have gained thus far will enable us to examine the different moral codes, and

to criticize them. We can now judge of a people's conduct in a more rational way; we can tell whether the race is realizing its purpose, the highest good. We can also tell what modes of conduct are necessary to the realization of the ideal, and say that they ought to be pursued. This part of our problem would belong to practical ethics.

CHAPTER X

OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM1

1. Optimism and Pessimism. We said that the end or aim of human life, i.e., the highest good, was the exercise of human functions. This means, of course, that human beings set a value upon things, that they regard certain ends as having absolute worth for them. They value their lives and those of others; they prize development and progress for its own sake. In other words, they regard life as worth living, as good, as the best thing for them (optimum). We may call this view optimism.

This conception is opposed by a set of thinkers who declare that life is not worth living, that it is not a good, but an evil, not the best thing, but the worst thing (pessimum). We may call this theory pessimism.

1 Dühring, Der Werth des Lebens; Hartmann, Zur Geschichte und Begründung des Pessimismus; Sully, Pessimism, A History and Criticism; Sommer, Der Pessimismus und die Sittenlehre; Plümacher, Der Pessimismus in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart; Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chaps. iii, iv, vii; Wallace, "Pessimism," Encyclopedia Britannica; Lubbock, The Pleasures of Life. See the bibliography in Sully's Pessimism, pp. xvii, xix. For much that is contained in the following chapter I am indebted to Paulsen's admirable chapters on "Pessimism,' ," "The Evil, the Bad and Theodicy," and "Virtue and Happiness."