which you must form into a system. We must pass from facts to principles. The mere observance of facts will lead to nothing. Only a highly synthetic, only an imaginative mind, one that can peer through the outward shell into the very heart of nature, is capable of advancing science.

12. Theoretical Ethics and Practical Ethics. - We may distinguish between theoretical ethics and practical ethics. A science or theory, as has been said, teaches us to know, and an art to do.1 In studying a subject theoretically or scientifically in this sense, we seek to discover the principles or laws governing our phenomena. Anatomy and physiology are theories in so far as they examine the general structure and functions of organisms. After we have found the principles or laws, we apply them, we put them into practice, we lay down certain rules which must be obeyed in order that we may reach certain ends. The science or theory of physiology teaches us how the body functions, what causes it to function in this way, what are the conditions essential to its functioning so. The art or practice of hygiene frames rules based upon these principles, the observance of which is essential to health. The science of psychology tells us what are the conditions or causes of certain mental phenomena; pedagogy applies the truths discovered by the psychologist in practice. Every art bases itself upon a theory; and the more developed the art the more developed, as

1 See Sully, Teacher's Handbook of Psychology, chap. i.

a rule, the theory upon which it rests. And the final end or purpose of every science or theory is to be of some practical use.1

Now there is also a science or theory of ethics and an art of ethics. The science discovers the principles, the art applies them. The science teaches us what is done, the art what ought to be done. Practical ethics is the application of theoretical ethics.2

13. The Value of Ethics. In conclusion, let us consider the value of ethics for the student. Why should we study ethics? Well, why study anything? Morality is a fact, and as such deserves to be studied. Man is a reflective being, and, therefore, bound to take cognizance of everything in the universe. His own conduct is surely important and interesting enough to merit the attention which is given to the study of physical occurrences. Man

1 See Drobisch, Logik, p. 165.

2 For views similar to the above, see the references to Münsterberg, Simmel, Paulsen, and Stephen, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. See also Ziegler, Sittliches Sein und sittliches Werden. Many writers, following Wundt (Ethik, Part I, Introduction), compare ethics to logic, and call it a normative science (Normwissenschaft). According to them, logic gives us the laws of correct thinking, the norms or rules which must be observed in order to reach truth. It also measures our thinking by these rules or norms, and judges its value accordingly. Ethics tells us how we ought to act in order to act ethically, or morally; it lays down norms, or rules of conduct, which the agent must obey in order to insure the morality of his conduct. See Hyslop, Muirhead, Mackenzie. In this sense, however, it seems to me, every science that can be applied in practice is normative. - Cf. Spencer, Social Statics, p. 458.

has conquered the forces of nature because he has thought about them, because he has subjected them to critical analysis. It is to be supposed that the examination of moral forces will be equally fruitful. The discovery of an ethical criterion will surely assist us in answering troublesome ethical questions. We do not always know what is right and what is wrong; we must reflect upon our conduct, we need a standard or ideal with which to measure it. There can be no great progress in morals without reflection. Men are often ignorant of the right; they have to reason it out, they need a firm foundation on which to base it. Or they often become sceptical with regard to morals; they observe a great divergence in modes of conduct, and are apt to regard morality as a collection of arbitrary rules having no real binding force. A closer study of the moral world will easily show the falseness of this view, and establish ethical truths upon a solid basis.

I do not, of course, wish to be understood as claiming that morality is impossible without reflection upon morality, or a science of ethics. This would be like saying that there can be no seeing without a science of vision. Before there can be a science of optics men must possess the power of sight; before there can be a science of ethics men But just as the science of optics greatly assists us in our attempts to see things, so the science of ethics is an aid to action.

must act.

It is held by some, however, that reflection upon

moral matters is apt to weaken a person's power of action, and that a study of ethics is, therefore, dangerous to morality. Even if this were so, it could not hinder men from theorizing on the principles of conduct. But the view is false. A careful and thorough examination of the field of morals will, . it seems to me, inspire us with a greater respect for morality, and strengthen our impulses toward the good. Of course, hasty and superficial judgments upon ethical facts are, like all half-truths, dangerous. But the best way to combat them is to prove their falseness; the best cure for a half-truth is always a whole truth.

CHAPTER II

THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 1

1. Introduction. - We pronounce moral judgments upon ourselves as well as upon others; we distin

1 For a history of ethical theories, see, besides the Histories of Philosophy: Köstlin, Die Ethik des classischen Altertums; Luthardt, Die antike Ethik; Ziegler, Die Ethik der Griechen und Römer; Gass, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik; Gass, Die Lehre vom Gewissen; Ziegler, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik; Luthardt, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik; Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophie; Gizycki, Die Ethik David Hume's; Whewell, History of Moral Philosophy; J. H. Fichte, System der Ethik; Vorländer, Geschichte der philosophischen Moral, Rechts- und Staatslehre; Mackintosh, On the Progress of Ethical Philosophy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries; Stephen, English Thought of the Eighteenth Century; Guyau, La morale anglaise contemporaine; Fouillée, Critique des systèmes de morale contemporains; Williams, A Review of Evolutional Ethics; Sidgwick, Outline of a History of Ethics; Janet, Histoire de la philosophie morale et politique; Paulsen, A System of Ethics, pp. 33-215; Wundt, Ethics, Vol. II; J. Seth, A Study of Ethical Principles, pp. 77-249; Watson, Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer; Hyslop, Elements of Ethics, pp. 18-89; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory; Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy, 16th edition, pp. 318 ff.; Eucken, Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker. For a history of ethical conceptions, see also Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen; Lecky, History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne; Friedländer, Die Sittengeschichte Roms; Keim, Rom und das Christentum. Sutherland's Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct contains much valuable material. Consult also the bibliographies in my translation of Paulsen's Ethics. For bibliog