point of rest, a stopping-place. The goal is a movable goal; in fact, there is no goal in the sense of a destination to be reached. History and anthropology show us how humanity has moved from ideal to ideal, how there has been a gradual unfolding and differentiation of faculties, how society has advanced from the simple to the complex. We may say that humanity has taken each step consciously, without, however, being aware of what the next step would be. Our thoughts are fixed upon the present and immediate mainly, and now and then we get a faint glimpse of the future and remote. We do the work that lies, nearest to us, and pass on to the next problem, without knowing what the solution will be and to what new problems it will give rise. So the human race performs its tasks, and takes up new ones when these are accomplished. We cannot tell what the next problem will be, although, of course, our knowledge of the past will, in a certain measure, enable us to indicate the direction in which the times are moving. As Jhering aptly says: "Wherein the weal and happiness of society consist is a question that cannot be answered by theory. The history of mankind answers it as she unrolls leaf by leaf of her book. Every end attained contains within itself a new one. The first goal must be reached before the next one can be sighted. Of the perfect form of the wellbeing of mankind we have no idea at all.”1

1 Der Zweck im Recht, Vol. II, p. 205. See also Höffding, Ethik, pp. 103 ff.: "Every achievement of an end is but the begin

S

3. Egoism and Altruism.1 The end or purpose, then, of all human striving, the summum bonum, is the preservation and perfection of human life. But the question at once arises, Whose preservation and perfection are we aiming at, our own or that of others? Here again, as we saw before,2 two answers are usually given. I may regard as the ideal my own good or the good of the race. In the one case we have egoism, in the other, altruism. Now which of these views is correct?

Let us formulate the problem of egoism and altruism in this way. Let us ask: (a) What is the end realized by human action? and (b) What is the motive in the mind of the agent?

4. The Effects of Action.-Generally speaking, the acts performed by mankind have the tendency to promote individual and social welfare. Whatever may be his motive, it may be said that every individual performs acts which influence, not only himself, but others. The relations between man and man are

ning of a new end. Welfare is therefore not a passive condition, but activity, work, development." See also Wundt, Ethics, and Paulsen, Ethics, Introduction, and Bk. II, chap. ii, §§ 7 ff.

1 For views similar to those expressed in the following sections, see the ethical works of Bacon, Cumberland, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Hume, A. Smith, J. S. Mill, Bain, Darwin, Sidgwick; Spencer, Data of Ethics, chaps. xi-xiv; Stephen, Science of Ethics, chap. vi; Höffding, Ethik, VIII; Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap. vi; Simmel, Einleitung, Vol. I, chap. ii; Williams, Evol. Ethics, Part II, chaps. v, vi; Harris, Moral Evolution; Drummond, Ascent of Man; Sutherland, The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct. 2 See chap. iv, § 6.

so close in a civilized community that every member's behavior is bound to produce effects upon the environment as well as upon the agent himself. The man who cares for his body, be his motive what it may, is benefiting others almost as much as himself; while he who has a proper regard for the health of his fellows cannot fail to be benefited in his own person by his action. What benefits my family has a tendency to benefit me, and what benefits me has a tendency to benefit my family. Similarly, what benefits the society in which I live tends to benefit me, and what benefits me tends to benefit the society of which I am a member.1 "The purely egoistic character of so-called personal virtues, for the assertion of which so much has been written, is a myth. No man can make a sot of himself, or indeed injure himself in any way, without reducing his power to benefit society, and harming those nearest to him."2 Similarly, "we are accustomed to regard honesty in economic life as a duty to others, but it is no less a duty of the individual to himself. Many proverbs express the experience of the race on this point: Honesty is the best policy; Ill-gotten goods seldom prosper; The biter is sometimes bit; Ill got, ill spent." 3 The organ which performs its own func

1 See Spencer, Data of Ethics, chaps. xi ff.; Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap. vi.

2 Williams, A Review of Evolutional Ethics, Part II, chaps. v and vi.

8 Paulsen, Ethics, p. 385. See Bishop Butler, Human Nature and other Sermons, Sermon i; end of Sermon iii; beginning of Sermon v.

tions properly promotes the health of the entire organism, and the health of the whole organism is advantageous to each particular organ. The individual is not an isolated atom, but a part of a whole, influencing the whole and influenced by it.1

2

We cannot, therefore, draw a sharp distinction between egoistic and altruistic acts according to their effects; an act affects not only the agent or another, but both. "There is no act," as Paulsen says, "that does not influence the life of the individual as well as that of the surroundings, and hence cannot and must not be viewed and judged from the standpoint of both individual and general welfare. The traditional classification, which distinguishes between duties toward self and duties toward others, cannot be recognized as a legitimate division. There is no duty toward individual life that cannot be construed as a duty toward others, and no duty toward others that cannot be proved to be a duty toward self." In its effects the act is both egoistic and altruistic. We may regard such acts as tend to promote both individual and social welfare as the products of evolution. Persons performing acts benefiting themselves, but interfering with the welfare of the group in which they lived, as well as persons performing acts benefiting the group, but injuring themselves, perished in the struggle for existence. Such persons,

1 See the systems of Cumberland and Shaftesbury, chap. vii, §§ 9, 10.

2 Ethics, p. 383.

however, as learned to perform acts benefiting both themselves and the community, survived, and transmitted their modes of behavior to their offspring, either by heredity or education, or both.

5. The Motives of Action.

Some thinkers divide.

acts into egoistic and altruistic according to the motives of the agent who performs them. Egoistic acts are such as are prompted solely by regard for self; altruistic acts are such as are prompted solely by regard for others. And it is asserted by some that there are no real altruistic acts in this sense; that all acts are egoistic or instigated by a selfish motive.

Thus Hobbes holds that every individual strives to preserve himself, that whatever furthers his own well-being is desired by him, that he cares for others only in so far as t they are means to his own welfare. But since every other individual has the same object in view, and since this object cannot be realized unless each individual makes certain concessions to his fellows, men also act for the good of others.1

According to Mandeville,2 "all actions including the so-called virtues spring from vanity and egoism.' Shaftesbury is wrong in assuming the existence of unselfish affections or impulses. Man is by nature self-seeking, fear makes him social. Actions which apparently imply the sacrifice of selfish inclinations

1 Chap. vii, § 7. This view was opposed by Cumberland. See chap. vii, § 9.

2 Fable of the Bees; or Private Vices Public Benefits, 1714; written in opposition to Shaftesbury's system.