which has to be proved, and has not been proved. (2) Even if it were true that I should not perform an act that gave me pain, this would not of itself prove that the pleasure is the thing I am after. It would be like asserting that I go to the theatre in order to get warm, because I would not go if the house were cold.1 We cannot think without the presence of arterial blood in the brain, but that will not allow us to conclude that arterial blood is the cause of thought, as Empedocles did. I cannot live without eating, but does that make eating the motive of my living? I will not eat of a certain dish unless it is seasoned properly, but is the seasoning the thing I am after? Do I eat my food for the pepper and salt it contains?

9. Pain as the Motive. According to another phase of hedonism, neither pleasure nor the idea of pleasure, but a feeling of pain or discomfort, impels us to action. We have certain needs or cravings, says Schopenhauer, and we feel pain unless they are satisfied. The will strives to free itself from pain, and therefore acts.3

Now, it is doubtless true that feelings of pain and discomfort often prevail in consciousness, and may be regarded as giving rise to action. My aching tooth may impel me to seek relief at the dentist's.

1 See Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, Vol. I, p. 316. 2 See Rolph, Biologische Probleme; Sergi, Physiological Psychology; Schopenhauer; and others.

8 See chap. x.

Or I may be bored to death in a certain town, and seek for a change of scene in consequence. But can we say that the feeling of pain is the sole motive to action? Do you eat and drink and plan and study and love and hate, simply in order to rid yourself of pain? I do not think so. Pain is a motive among others and a very effective motive at times-but it is not the only one. We have impulses and desires, and when they are not satisfied they may grow more intense and be felt as pain or discomfort. But they may be realized before this feeling arises. This feeling of discomfort is in many cases nothing but the intensification of the impulse itself, the exaltation of the tendency or "urgency from within outward."1 Perhaps it stands for the increased tension of the motor cells the energy increases until it reaches the explosion point; 2 perhaps it represents the muscular, tendinous, and articular excitations caused in different parts of the body by the overflow from the brain;3 perhaps it is due to both.1 At any rate, to say that this feeling is the cause of the explosion or the movement, is like saying that the intensification of the impulse is the cause of the impulse, or that I desire an act because I desire it strongly.

We must therefore say to the advocates of this view (1) If you claim that every act has for its

1 Külpe, Psychology, English translation, p. 266.

2 Bain, Wundt, Preyer.

4 Ladd, Psychology, pp. 221 ff.

3 James and Münsterberg.

motive a feeling of pain, as in the examples first mentioned, you are in error; not all acts are thus produced. (2) If by the feeling of pain you mean the feeling of uneasiness which accompanies an impulse, you are wrong again, for (a) this feeling is not an essential antecedent to every act, and (b) it cannot be said to precede the impulse and set it in motion, it is the impulse itself intensified.1

10. Unconscious Pleasure-Pain as the Motive. Psychology makes against the view that pleasure and pain, in any of the forms discussed above, are the sole motives to action. We are determined in our conduct not merely by pleasure and pain, or the hope or fear of pleasure and pain. Convinced of this fact, and yet unwilling to abandon his general proposition, the hedonist might say: True, the will is roused to action not merely by conscious pleasure or pain, or by a conscious idea of pleasure and pain, but by unconscious pleasure and pain, or by an unconscious presentation of pleasure and pain. That is to say, I am guided in many of my doings by unconscious pleasure and pain. My will is directed toward pleasure without knowing it. I strive after wealth, honor, fame, for the sake of the pleasure they will bring, without, however, always being aware of it. Wealth, honor, and fame, like the food which we eat, are sought after for the pleasure which they procure, though we may not be conscious of the fact.

1 Külpe, Psychology, p. 267.

This, it seems to me, is rather a weak basis upon which to rest a theory. What happens in the realm of the unconscious I have no means of telling; indeed, I do not even know whether there is such a thing as an unconscious soul-life. When the hedonist has recourse to the unconscious he has recourse to the metaphysical; he shifts the problem from psychology to philosophy. As Sidgwick says: "The proposition would be difficult to disprove. When once we go beyond the testimony of consciousness, there seems to be no clear method of determining which among the consequences of any action is the end at which it is aimed. For the same reason, however, the proposition is at any rate equally difficult to prove."1

But suppose we permit the concept of the unconscious to enter into our discussion. The hedonist claims that man blindly strives after pleasure, that he is unconsciously determined by pleasure or pain, or the idea of pleasure and pain. This assumption must be proved in some way. How can the hedonist prove it? How can he show us what takes place behind the curtain of the unconscious? By referring to the effects or results of the blind striving? That is, shall we say, Pleasure is the invariable effect of unconscious striving, hence pleasure is the unconscious motive? But even if the premise were true, would that make the conclusion true? Besides, is the premise true? Can we prove that pleasure 1 Methods of Ethics, p. 53.

is the invariable effect or consequence of all blind striving?

I believe not. In the first place many results follow our impulses: movements, sensations, feelings of pleasure and pain, feelings of satisfaction due to the realization of the impulse, ideas, other impulses, etc. The realization of every impulse is accompanied and followed by elements of thinking, feeling, and willing. Now why should I pick out one of these and say that it is the unconscious choice of the mind? Besides, waiving this point, does the pleasure always come? Say that I am striving after wealth. My ostensible aim is the money; but, says hedonism, the real aim is pleasure. Pleasure, which is the secret power behind the throne, invariably follows the realization of desire. Is this true? I work and struggle and accumulate money, but am I ever satisfied?

Hedonism in this form consists of nothing but a lot of unproved suppositions:

(1) That there are unconscious states of mind; (2) That there can be unconscious pleasures and pains, or unconscious ideas of pleasure-pains;

(3) That pleasure-pains are the only unconscious motives that can lead to action;

(4) That pleasure and pain are the universal accompaniments of action.

11. The Psychological Fallacies of Hedonism. I believe that we may now say without fear of contradiction that psychology makes against the