and the more I restrain myself the more I feel impelled to strike the blow. Here almost any movement will afford relief. We might call these acts impulsive acts.

(d) At other times a feeling of pleasure or a feeling of pain, or an anticipation of pleasure or pain, seems to push itself in between the idea and the act. This means simply that the idea is suffused with pleasure or pain, and that no movement will take place until these feelings are present. I make a movement; it gives me pleasure and I continue it, or it produces pain, and I stop it or make another. Or I think of a movement to be made, expect it to be pleasurable, and therefore make it.

(e) Most frequently many of these states together, i.e., ideas, feelings of pressure, feelings of pleasure, feelings of aversion, feelings of pain, precede the discharge of a movement.

(4) In all cases mentioned above, the act takes place without the intervention of a so-called decision of the will. Let us now examine states in which this element enters.

The question here is, What are the elements involved in willing as such, and what are the antecedents leading to an act of will, i.e., what makes men will what they will? What takes place in consciousness when I will something, and what has taken place there before I willed it?

Let us take a typical case of willing, one which everybody would accept as such. I am considering

a certain end or result, be it a specific act, or a whole series of acts, or a train of thought. I have in consciousness the idea of an end or purpose or project or something that has not yet been done, but may be done. The end may be a vague one; I may have nothing but a hazy outline of the result to be achieved, or it may be clearly defined; I may have worked it out carefully, even to the details. I may be said to will this end or result when I assume a certain attitude toward it, when I decide that it shall be done, when I utter the fiat; or decide that it shall not be done, or utter the veto. In the one case I say yes, in the other no. A peculiar state of consciousness surrounds the idea of the result, a state of consciousness to which I give expression in language by saying, I will; my mind is made up. We call this state of consciousness or process in which the ego decides for or against the realization of an idea, an act of will.1 Ziehen calls this state which accompanies the idea of an act in willing, "a positive emotional tone."2 Perhaps we had better speak of it, however, as decision, as an attitude of the ego toward its project.3 Höffding defines it as follows: "Volition proper is characterized psychologically by

1 By will I do not mean a substantial entity, a metaphysical essence or force that produces the act (Schopenhauer), but simply the process itself which introspection reveals to us.

2 See Introduction to Physiological Psychology, chap. xiv, pp. 265 ff.

3 James speaks of it as the voluntary fiat, the volitional mandate, the mental consent.

the ideas of the end of the action and the means to its realization, and by a vivid feeling of the worth of that end."1

The drama of willing is closed when this peculiar process enters. It makes no difference whether the thing willed is ever realized or not. I may will to pursue a certain line of conduct, and afterwards change my mind about it. I may will to perform an act and never have an opportunity of doing it, or I may will it and find that I have not the power to carry it out. I have willed it when I have decided that I am going to do it, when it has received my sanction. If the act willed is a possible one, it will follow the act of will, the decision, as soon as the ideas of the movements to be made (the kinæsthetic ideas, as they are called by the psychologists) or the ideas initiating these movements (the remote ideas, as James calls them) arise in consciousness. We are utterly in the dark as to how the process takes place ; we simply know, for example, that when we will to move the arm, it moves, and when we will to move the ear, it does not move.2 The essential element in an act of will is this fiat or veto, this volitional man

1 Psychology, pp. 308-356. See Steinthal's Ethik: "Will is the conscious idea whose realization is approved of because its result, the caused alteration in the external world, is also presented and desired."

2 All that we can do is to show how such kinæsthetic ideas are produced, and that when they are present in consciousness they may be accompanied by movements. See the psychologies of Lotze, Bain, Preyer, Baumann, James, which show how we learn to make movements.

date, the decision or "cutting short of the process of deliberation," this determination, selective volition, or choice. Unless this element is present, we cannot be said to will in the common sense of that term. Movements may be made, however, without the presence of this factor. Not all the acts performed by us are willed in the sense in which we have just spoken of willing; not every conscious act, in other words, is a willed act. Instincts, impulses, desires, ideo-motor action, etc., are not acts of the will; they are not necessarily willed, though, of course, they may be. In order to be willed in the real sense of the term, they need the consent or assent we have spoken of. We frequently perform acts impulsively and excuse ourselves by saying that we did not intend them, that we could not help ourselves.2

4. The Antecedents of Volition. We have found thus far that men are prompted to action by their

1 See Ladd's Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 613 ff.

2 It has become customary in modern psychology to extend the term will so as to make it synonymous with psychic energy. It is held that attention is involved in every state of consciousness, that no state can come to consciousness or be kept in consciousness without an act of attention. Just as a certain amount of physical energy must be present in the brain before an excitation can be produced there, so a certain amount of psychical energy must be present in consciousness before a state of consciousness can arise. This energy, or force, is called by Schopenhauer will, by Wundt and his followers will, attention, apperception, or conation. According to this view, every mental act is an act of will, and every physical movement that is preceded by consciousness is the same. We have preferred to use the term will in a narrower sense.

ideas, feelings, instincts, impulses, will, and combinations of these factors. We cannot say that feelings of pleasure are the only motives to action. But perhaps feelings of pleasure are the only motives to willed action, in the sense in which we have been using this term. Let us therefore investigate the antecedents of willing or volition a little more closely.

Let us ask, What causes me to decide for or against a project or end, or, rather, what happens in my consciousness prior to the decision or fiat?

Sometimes the bare idea of an end is sufficient to call forth the decision of the will. When the clock strikes eight I think of meeting my class, and without a moment's hesitation I utter the mental yes. Sometimes the decision is prompted by an instinct, an impulse, a wish, or a desire, by a feeling of pleasure or pain, or by the expectation of a pleasure or pain. I may will a course of conduct because I love or desire it, or because it promises me pleasure or freedom from pain, or because all these elements unite to gain my consent. Sometimes I feel impelled to act in a certain way which promises me pleasure, but feel a moral obligation to say no. It may require a severe effort on my part to say no, to decide against an act which is so charming; I seemingly have to force myself to consent to a course, which I finally do with a heavy heart.1 Sometimes

1 This feeling of effort is frequently spoken of as the will, or soul, in action; here we are supposed to feel the soul working,