the conditions essential to the vitality of the social tissue."1 Our moral judgments must condemn instincts and modes of conduct which are pernicious to the social vitality, and must approve the opposite; but it does not necessarily follow that it must disapprove or approve them because they are perceived to be pernicious or beneficial. It is essential to social vitality that actions result from inner feelings. Hence the moral law has to be expressed in the form, "Be this," not in the form "Do this."

3

The utilitarian theory, which makes happiness the criterion of morality, coincides approximately with the evolutionistic theory, which makes health of the society the criterion; for health and happiness approximately coincide. We may infer that the typical or ideal character, at any given stage of development, the organization, which, as we say, represents the true line of advance, corresponds to a maximum of vitality. It seems, again, this typical form, as the healthiest, must represent not only the strongest type, that is, the type most capable of resisting unfavorable influences, -but also the happiest type; for every deviation from it affords a strong presumption, not merely of liability to the destructive processes which are distinctly morbid, but also to a diminished efficiency under normal conditions.4

1 The Science of Ethics, 1882, chap. iv, ii, p. 148.

2 Ib.

3 Ib., p. 406.

4 Ib., p. 407. See chap. ix, pp. 359 ff.; also chap. x, pp. 404 ff.

13. Jhering. Rudolph von Jhering1 advances a similar view. All moral laws and customs have as their end the weal and prosperity of society. All moral norms are social imperatives. All these social imperatives owe their existence to social ends. The ends of society depend upon its conditions.2 The purpose of morality is the establishment and prosperity of society. Now, just as a house is not a mere mass of stones, society is not a mere aggregate of individuals, but a whole made up of individual members, and formed into a unity by a community of ends. The part must adapt itself to the whole if the whole is to stand. Hence the postulate of a social norm which prescribes to the individual such conduct as is necessary to the social order in so far as his own inclinations do not serve society, and the necessity of securing compliance with the norm by means of compulsion. But mere mechanical or legal compulsion is not enough. We have also psychological compulsion. The advantage of psychological compulsion lies in the fact that it stops before no relation in life; it presses in everywhere like the atmosphere, into the interior of the home as well as to the steps of the throne in places where mechanical compulsion can have no effect.

We may say that whatever human conduct is necessary to the existence of society is a constituent of the moral order and falls within the realm of

1 Der Zweck im Recht, 2 vols, 1874. 2 Ib., Vol. II, pp. 95 ff.

8 Ib., Vol. II, pp. 134 ff.

moral law. As now the individual is necessary to society, whatever is required that he may live, even eating and drinking, comes under the view of morals. Even acts which spring from egoistic motives are objectively moral when they further the ends of society. Even our pleasures, recreations, and enjoyments have high objective moral significance, for they are the indispensable sources of our strength, and this benefits not merely us, but society.

One thought runs through all creation-selfpreservation. Man raises himself up to the moral plane when he gains the insight that his individual self-preservation is conditioned by his social selfpreservation. The means which nature employs in order to realize the law of self-preservation is pleasure. The necessary condition of pleasure is wellbeing. Well-being is possession of full powers. The striving after well-being is called eudæmonism. Social eudæmonism is the principle of morals. Wherein the weal and happiness of society consists, the history of mankind alone can evolve. Eudæmonism and utilitarianism are the same thing, from different points of view, the former from that of end, the latter from that of means.1

14. Wundt and Contemporaries. -Wundt 2 reaches a similar result. He holds that the proper way to investigate the moral end is to begin with the empirical moral judgments. Find the moral end in

1 Der Zweck im Recht, Vol. II, chap. ix, pp. 204 ff.

2 Ethics, translated in 3 vols.

particular cases, and by means of them proceed to the general ethical principle. Such an investigation will show that the individual, be it oneself or another, cannot be the ultimate end of morality. Happiness may be an important motive to the will and even an indispensable means for realizing the moral ends, but it cannot be regarded as the moral end itself. The universal spiritual productions of humanity, such as the State, art, science, and universal culture, are the objects of morality attainable by But since the very essence of morality is a ceaseless striving, the moral steps attained must not be regarded as a lasting end. The ultimate end of moral striving becomes an ideal never to be attained in reality. Thus the ethical ideal is the ultimate end; the progressive moral perfection of humanity the immediate end, of human morality.1

us.

3

2

To the same school belong. H. Höffding, F. Paulsen, Th. Ziegler, A. Dorner, J. Seth, and others.

15 Kant. Even Kant, who regards himself as an opponent of all teleology, may, in my opinion, be classed among the energists. According to him, the highest good is not pleasure, neither my own nor that of mankind, but virtue, duty for duty's sake.

1 Ethics, Part III.

2 Ethik, 1887; Ethische Principienlehre, 1897.

8 System of Ethics, edited and translated by Frank Thilly.

4 Sittliches Sein und sittliches Werden.

5 Das menschliche Handeln.

6 A Study of Ethical Principles.

7 See chap. ii, § 7 (1).

The highest good in the world is a good will, and a good will is good not because of what it performs, but good in itself. That is, it acts from respect of the law, from a pure sense of duty. Now rational creatures alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, i.e., according to principles, i.e., have a will. The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative 3 There is an imperative-which commands a certain conduct immediately. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself the result. This is the categorical imperative. In order that this should be valid, it must be a necessary truth. This law follows necessarily from the very nature of the rational will. If there is anything of absolute worth, an end in itself, the reason must command it.6

Now rational nature exists as an end in itself. Every man necessarily conceives his own existence as an end in itself, and must therefore regard every other rational creature's existence in the same way. Hence the will must give itself this law, So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only. This principle is essentially identical with this other: Act upon a maxim which,

1 Abbott's translation, pp. 12, 16, 55, 164 ff., 180, 241.

4 p. 33. 5 p. 44. 6 pp. 46 ff.