free ourselves from the body and the senses, for the body is a fetter, the prison-house of the soul, an evil. "Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can, and to fly away is to become like God."1 Philosophy means the separation and release of the soul from the body,2 the losing of oneself in the contemplation of ideas, which are the true essences of things, the return of the soul to its former heavenly home.

Beside this ascetic ideal of life, Plato also presents a somewhat modified ethical scheme, adapted to the conditions of the world in which we live.3 The sense-world being a reflection of the ideal world, the contemplation of it will give us a glimpse into the truth and beauty of the other. Now in such a world what is the highest good? The highest good must be something perfect, something that does not need anything outside of itself, something desirable in itself, something the possession of which makes other things unnecessary. Now neither pleasure nor wisdom as such is a good. A life of pleasure devoid of intelligence and wisdom no one would call desirable. Nor would any one choose a life of reason that is free from pleasure and pain. The end is a MIKTOS Bíos, a mixed life of wisdom and pleasure. In such a life pleasure is not the highest factor, but the lowest. The pleasure must be controlled by wisdom.

1 Theatetus, 176 a.

2 Phædo, 64-67, 69, 79-84, 114. 8 See Schwegler, History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 228, 232. Téλeov; Philebus, 20 ff.

Wisdom produces order, harmony, symmetry, law. If pleasure were the highest, then the most intense, unbridled pleasure would be the best, which is not the case. The best life is one in which the lower soul-forces, the impulses and the animal desires, are subordinated to reason, one in which reason commands and the other elements obey.

3. The Cynics. After the death of Socrates, Antisthenes,1 one of his most devoted followers, founded the Cynic School, named after the gymnasium of Kynosarges, where he delivered his lectures. The Cynics opposed the hedonism of the Cyrenaics,2 and exaggerated certain phases of the Socratic doctrine. Pleasure, says Antisthenes, is not the highest good; indeed, it is no good at all, but an evil.3 Then what is the good? The very opposite of pleasure, πóvos, privation, exertion, work, struggle with passion, is good. We should make ourselves independent of the things of the world (eуkpáтela). The man who sets his heart on pleasure, wealth, honor, or fame, is doomed to disappointment. Let him renounce the uncertain, treacherous gifts of fortune, let him be indifferent to pleasure and pain alike; let him learn to want, and misfortune cannot conquer him.

labor.

Sweet are the pleasures that follow

Cease desiring, and you will be rich even in

1 Diogenes Laertius, Bk. VI; Mullach's Fragments, vol. II, 261 ff.; Ritter and Preller's Fragments, pp. 216 ff.

2 See chap. vi, § 3.

8 "I would rather go mad than feel pleasure," as he once said: μaviŋv μâλλov ĥ nobeinv. — Diogenes Laertius, Bk. VI.

a beggar's garb. To desire nothing is the greatest wealth. Virtue is the highest and only good. It is not, however, necessary to be very learned to be Virtue consists in action and conduces to

virtuous. happiness.1

4. Aristotle. - According to Aristotle,2 all human activity has some end in view. This end in turn may be the means to another higher end, but there must be some ultimate or highest end or good, which is desired for its own sake and not as a means to something else. Now what is this highest good? For some it consists in wealth, for others in pleasure, for still others in honor, wisdom, or virtue. But wealth is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Pleasure, too, is a good, but not the good. The truth is we strive after honor, pleasure, virtue, wisdom, for the sake of something else, which is sought after for its own sake. That end is eudæmonia (evdaιpovía), or happiness. In what does happiness consist? The welfare of every being consists in the realization of its specific nature. The end or happiness of man will therefore consist in the realization of that which makes man a man, that is, in the exercise of rational activity. The highest good of human existence is the exercise of reason.

Virtue, then, means the proper functioning of the

1 Diogenes of Sinope, the pupil of Antisthenes, whom Plato called a "Socrates gone mad," is an extreme representative of cynicism. "A man must not only learn to do without pleasure,' "" | "he must learn to do with pain."

he says, 2385-323 B.C.

Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Welldon.

soul. Now the soul is partly reflective or thinking or knowing, partly volitional or practical. Hence, there are dianoetical virtues (such as wisdom, prudence, insight) and ethical or practical virtues (such as liberality, self-control, courage, pride, magnanimity, etc.). Ethical virtue consists in the subordination of the lower soul-forces or impulses to correct reason. The impulses must be governed or controlled by reason or insight. Virtue is acquired, but based on preexisting dispositions of the soul. Virtue is the rationalization of impulses. But the question arises, When is an impulse rationalized? When it keeps the mean between two extremes, answers Aristotle. "Virtue is a disposition involving deliberate purpose, or choice, consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the mean being determined by reason, or as a prudent man would determine it."1

Virtuous activity, then, in a complete or full life is the highest good.2 Pleasure is the necessary and immediate consequence of such activity, but it is not the end. We should choose virtuous activity even though it were not accompanied by pleasure. The pleasure depends upon the virtuous activity, and only such pleasure as follows virtuous activity is good or moral. Certain external goods, however,

1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, chap. vi, Welldon's translation, p. 50.

2 "For one swallow does not make spring," Aristotle adds. 3 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, chap. ix.

are indispensable to eudæmonia, namely health, freedom, honor; certain capacities and talents; wealth, etc. Neither a slave nor a child can be happy.

5 The Stoics.-The Stoic school, founded by Zeno of Citium in the σróa Tоikian, shortly after 310 B.C., is the successor of the Cynics. The Stoics taught that the chief good is to live according to nature. For man this means to live according to his nature, i.e., according to reason, "that universal right reason which pervades everything.' "2 We live according to nature or reason, when we live according to virtue.

Now what does virtuous action demand? It demands that man conquer his passions, for passions are the irrational element in us. There are four fundamental passions (πálŋ): pain, fear, desire, pleasure (λύπη, φόβος, ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονή). These passions arise as follows: We have impulses which are in themselves good, like the impulse of self-preservation. These impulses may become too violent and give rise to a false judgment on our part. Such a false judgment is a passion. Thus a false judgment of present and future goods arouses pleasure and desire; of present and future ills, pain and fear. All these passions and their different species we must combat, for they are irrational; they are dis

1 See Diogenes Laertius, Bk. VII; Stobæus, Eclogues, Bk. II; Cicero, De finibus; the works of Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius; Ritter and Preller, pp. 392 ff.

2 Diogenes Laertius, p. 291.