happiness, the other because it tended toward perfection.1 Modern hedonists make the standpoint ultimately reached by the Greeks their starting-point. None of them asserts that pleasure is the highest good, without modifying the statement somewhat. The element of prudence or reason is emphasized by all. Even Bentham, who is the most radical representative of the modern school, makes the pleasure of a lifetime the end, and insists that we cannot reach this goal without exercising prudence. They would all agree, also, that the goal cannot be reached by the pursuit of sensuous pleasure, and that the exercise of the mental faculties procures the greatest happiness.- An important advance, however, is made by the modern advocates of the theory. Locke, Paley, and Bentham still incline toward egoistic hedonism, which was so prominent in the Greek systems; the highest good is the happiness of the individual, though this cannot be realized except through the happiness of the race. Hutcheson, Hume, J. S. Mill, and Sidgwick, on the other hand, recognize the sympathetic impulse in man as a natural endowment; the highest good is the happiness of the race. But this is a difference of principle only, which does not affect the practice of human beings; both systems empha 1 In Anniceris we even get a slight tendency to altruism; he advises us to forego our pleasure and submit to pain for the sake of friends and country. N 1 size the necessity of doing good to our fellows, the one because our individual happiness depends upon our regard for our neighbor, the other because man is by nature disposed to care for the good of his fellow-men. Another important change is made in modern hedonism by J. S. Mill. According to him pleasure i is the highest good and the standard of morality. But the experience of the race teaches that some pleasures, as, for example, the pleasures accompanying the exercise of our higher mental faculties, are preferred to others. The race prefers them, however, not because they are the most intense, but because they differ in kind or quality from those accompanying the lower functions. Men evidently prefer these pleasures because they cannot help themselves, they must prefer them, they prefer them absolutely; it is their nature to prefer them. The standard, therefore, is not pleasure as such, but a certain quality of pleasure, and man prefers this quality absolutely.1 Not pleasure as such, but the higher pleasures, move us to action. Or, rather, since "it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied," the highest good is really not pleasure so much as the exercise of the higher mental functions. In this form there is no radical difference between hedonism and energism.2 1 This view reminds one of Martineau's theory of conscience. See chap. ii, § 5, p. 45. ? See Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap. ii, end of § 6. Not only do we get in Mill an approximation to ♦ energism, but an approximation to intuitionism. According to him both the egoistic and altruistic or sympathetic impulses are innate or original possessions of the human soul. Besides, in so far as we make a qualitative distinction between different pleasures, absolutely preferring some to others, we may be said to possess an innate knowledge of the better and the worse, or an innate conscience. In Sidgwick this intuitional phase is more pronounced. Man is endowed with innate principles: the principle of self-love, the principle of benevolence, and the principle of justice. CHAPTER VII THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD: ENERGISM1 1. Socrates. Let us now turn our attention to a school of thinkers who deny that pleasure or happiness is the end of life and the standard of morality, and set up what they at least believe to be a different goal. Socrates 2 opposed the hedonistic teachings of the Sophists, and declared virtue to be the highest good. But what is virtue? Virtue is knowledge. We cannot be proficient in any line without knowledge of the subject. A man cannot be a successful general without a knowledge of military affairs, nor a statesman unless he has an insight into the nature and purpose of the State. But what is knowledge? To know means to have correct concepts of things, to know their purposes, aims, or ends, to know what they are good for. 1 See references under chap. ii. 2 469-399 B.C. See Xenophon's Memorabilia, translated in Bohn's Library; Plato's Protagoras, Apology, Crito, Symposium, etc., in Jowett's translation; Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bk. I, 6. Bibliography in Weber. 8 Xenophon, Memorabilia, Bk. IV, chap. vi, 11; Bk. I, chap. i, 16; Bk. II, chap. ix, 5. Everything has its purpose, is good for something, especially for man.1 If that is so, the man who knows what things are good for him, will do these things, and he alone will be able to realize his desires, his welfare and happiness. Hence knowledge or wisdom (oopía), without which a man cannot attain to happiness (ev (îŷv, ýdéws (îv), is the highest good (μéylotov ȧyalóv). That is to say, virtue is (μέγιστον the knowledge of good and evil, and the consequent doing of good, and the avoidance of evil. Hence no man is voluntarily bad nor involuntarily good. Vice is due to ignorance. Now what is good for man? What is useful to him? The lawful (vóμμov), says Socrates. Man must obey the laws of the State as well as the unwritten laws of the gods, i.e., the universal laws of morality. To be good or moral is to be in harmony with the laws of one's country and human nature. Virtue conduces to happiness. But should a conflict arise between virtue and happiness, virtue must never be sacrificed to happiness.2 - 2. Plato. Plato,3 the pupil and follower of Socrates, teaches that not pleasure, but insight, knowledge, the contemplation of beautiful ideas, a life of reason, are the highest good. We should seek to 29, 1 Memorabilia, Bk. I, chap. iv, 7–17; Bk. IV, chap. iii, 3 ff. 2 Bk. II, chap. vii, 10; Bk. IV, chap. iv, 4; Plato's Apology, 30. 8 427-347 B.C. See the Dialogues of Plato, especially Theœtetus, Phædo, Philebus, Gorgias, Republic, translated by Jowett. 4 Gorgias, 474 c ff.; Philebus, 11 b, 14 b, 19 d. |