with the nature, origin, and development of the State; it studies the different forms in which the State appears and has appeared, and strives to define the functions which it performs. It deals, let us say, with the principles of organized society. Now if ethics should discover that morality realizes a certain end or aim, and that the fact that it realizes such an end explains its existence, and if politics should find that the State realizes the same end, then there would evidently be a close connection between the two. Should we be fortunate enough to discover a principle or standard of morals, we should be able to say, in a general way, how a man ought to act in order to realize the ideal; we should be able to construct a moral code. And should we be able to specify the end or ideal aimed at by the State, we could compare the two ends or purposes. Should they be the same, then politics might be called a branch of ethics or vice versa. Ethics would lay down the general rules of conduct; it would tell us how to act as individuals. Politics would tell the State how to act; it would be a guide to the conduct of man in organized society.1

10. Ethics and Metaphysics. -A science, as we have seen, analyzes, classifies, and explains a particular set of phenomena. Strictly speaking, no fact is explained until we know all about it, until we understand its relation to the entire universe. Το

1 See Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Bk. I, chap. ii; Mackenzie, § 6; Muirhead, Elements of Ethics, pp. 34 ff.

know one thing well means to know everything, as we have already pointed out. An ideal science would therefore be able to account for every single fact within its domain and coördinate it with the rest of reality. As a matter of fact, however, this The different sciences do not

ideal is not realized. even aim at so high a goal. They do not go very far in their search for the causes of things, nor do they attempt to understand the world as a whole. When a science has referred an event to an antecedent, and this perhaps to another antecedent or group of antecedents, it is apt to regard its work as done. The physicist as such, for example, studies the properties of matter, the laws of motion. He does not concern himself with the question regarding the ultimate nature and origin of these data, nor does he seek to correlate them with other forms of reality, say with the phenomena of mind. Nay, the temptation is strong to regard his facts as the ultimate and most important facts, and to subordinate all others. to them. The biologist studies the different forms of living matter which occur upon our earth; he investigates the structure and function of organisms and compares them with each other. It is true that the tendency toward unification is stronger in biology than in many other sciences, and that attempts have been made to derive the more complex forms of life from simple beginnings; but in so far as this is the case, biology more nearly realizes the ideal 1 See § 7 of this chapter.

of science than the other sciences. Still, there are final problems which the biologist as such does not undertake to solve. The psychologist, again, analyzes and explains states of consciousness; he splits up the mind into its elements and refers them to their physical and psychical antecedents. But the questions, What is the ultimate nature and origin of consciousness or soul? How is such a thing as mind possible at all? Whence comes it and whither does it go? What is its relation to matter and motion? are left unanswered.1

Every science, then, confines itself to a particular group of phenomena and seeks to explain these in terms of each other.2 But certain ultimate questions suggest themselves, which, though hard to answer, cannot be brushed aside. These questions are handed over to philosophy or metaphysics for settlement. Philosophy simply means, as James puts it, "an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently." To philosophize means to go to the very bottom of things, to think a problem out to the bitter end, to account for everything, to understand everything. In strictness, every science should be philosophical, it should not stop until all questions have been answered. And as a matter of fact, there are philosophical scientists in every

1 It cannot be denied, of course, that every science makes certain metaphysical assumptions, that it practically starts out with the metaphysics of common sense.

2 In so far as it does this, we might call it empirical, as distinguished from rational or metaphysical.

sphere of science, men who like Wilhelm von Humboldt, Darwin, Huxley, and Helmholtz, cross the narrow confines of the particular fields in which they happen to be working, and look at the universe as a whole.

Now the remarks which apply to the other sciences likewise apply to ethics. Ethics investigates a particular branch of facts and has to explain them. An ideal science of ethics will not stop until it thoroughly understands the phenomena with which it deals, and this, as we have seen, is not possible without universal knowledge. To realize its ideal, ethics must become philosophical, must be philosophy. In this respect, however, we repeat, it in no wise differs from the other sciences.

We shall not, however, in this book, attempt to do more than the average science does with its subjectmatter. We shall be satisfied if we succeed in finding the general principles underlying morality. We must leave it to the philosophers to solve the ultimate problems of ethics and to insert the facts of morality into the universal system of things.1

11. The Methods of Ethics. sider the methods of ethics.

- Let us next con

The method to be

pursued by our science does not, generally speaking, differ from that followed by other sciences. We must examine moral phenomena with the same

1 For the relation of philosophy to the sciences, see Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 15 ff.; Külpe, Introduction to Philosophy; Münsterberg, Der Ursprung der Sittlichkeit, 1 ff.

can.

care practised in other fields of research. We must observe and collect moral facts wherever we We must investigate the modes of conduct of different races, nations, classes, individuals, and periods of time. We must watch the behavior of the civilized and uncivilized, adults and children, men and women; we must go as far back to the beginnings of history as we can; we must study the mythology, theology, philosophy, literature, and art of the different peoples, in order to discover what they considered right and wrong; we must look at their language, "the fossilized spiritual life of mankind," at their systems of law, at their political, social, and economic conditions, which are to a large extent an embodiment of their morality. What a wealth of moral facts we find in the works of Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek tragedians, in Shakespeare, Byron, and Goethe! What an insight we gain into the moral feelings of the Middle Ages from the contemplation of their great works of art; and how much the social conditions of our own times tell us of the moral ideals of the age!

Facts, then, must be gathered in our science, both external and internal facts. We must look outward and inward. But we must also study and seek to interpret these facts; we must reflect and speculate upon them. No science can live without speculation. You may gather facts by the thousands and be no better off than before; they are merely the raw material upon which you must work,