ing officer, or clerk; an executive officer, called sergeant-at-arms, and a door-keeper.

2. The Rules of Proceeding. These are made by each house, and are nearly the same for all deliberate bodies; but they are too numerous to be described. You will find them, with comments, in Jefferson's Manual, or Cushing's Manual. (a)

3. The Journal. (b) Each house is required to keep a journal of its proceedings, and publish it from time to time, in order that the constituents may know what their representatives have done, and to this end, in Ohio, all proceedings are required to be public, unless two-thirds shall otherwise determine.

4. The Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of Members. We have already seen that each house is made the exclusive judge of these matters; there being no good reason for requiring the concurrence of the other.

5. Punishment of Members. Each house may punish its members for "disorderly behavior:" otherwise its business might be utterly prevented; and there is no restriction as to cause or manner of punishment.

6. Punishment of Persons not Members. (c) Our State constitution expressly authorizes each house "to provide for its safety, and the undisturbed transaction of its business." The federal constitution is silent on this subject; but each house of Congress has been adjudged to possess this power as necessarily inherent; and it has been exercised repeatedly. As to what amounts to a contempt, each house judges for itself.

7. Expulsion of Members. (d) With the concurrence of twothirds, each house may expel a member. Our State constitution provides that a member shall not be twice expelled "for the same cause." In other words, if his constituents are satisfied to send him back, the house must be content to receive him. Perhaps this is right; but the houses of Congress are not thus restricted. The propriety of this power of expulsion will be felt the more strongly, if we reflect that the power of impeachment does not reach to members of the legislature. Expulsion is, therefore, the only means of removing an unworthy member.

(a) See the elaborate treatise on the Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies in the United States, by Luther S. Cushing. Little, Brown, & Co., 1856.

(b) See the original debate, Mad. Pap. 1293-4; also the debate on expunging the resolution censuring President Jackson.

(c)_See Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Howard v. Gossett, 10 Ad. & El. N. s. 359; Fenton v. Hampton, 11 Moore, Privy Council, R. 847; Keilly v. Carson, 4 id. 63; Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El., 1; 11 id. 273; 3 Perry & Dav. 349. See case of Robert Randall, 1 Benton, Abrid. 621; case of Charles Whitney, 1 id. 622; case of William Duane, 2 id. 407-26; case of John Anderson, 6 id. 90, 93. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, to enforce the attendance of witnesses on the summons of either house of Congress. See proceedings and documents of the United States senate in case of Thaddeus Hyatt, first session of the 36th Congress, on a charge against him for contempt, in refusing to appear as a witness before the Harper's Ferry Committee. In re Falvey. Massing, 7 Wisconsin, 630.

(d) There was no doubt in the convention as to the necessity of this power. The only question was, whether it should be exercised by a bare majority, or a greater number. Mad. Pap. 1291.

8. Adjournments. (a) Each house can of course adjourn from day to day, without consulting the other. But as the general business of legislation requires the concurrence of both, to prevent one house from defeating or interrupting this general business, it is provided that neither house of Congress, without consent of the other, can" adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting." It is the same with our assembly, except that the time is two days. Both constitutions further provide, that "in case of disagreement between the two houses with respect to the time of adjournment," the executive may adjourn them "to such time as he shall think proper." This must refer to the time of final adjournment at the end of the session. And our constitution adds, what is implied in the other, that the executive shall not adjourn them to a period beyond the annual time of meeting.

§ 36. Forms of Business. (b) I come now to the enactment of laws, commonly called acts or statutes, which forms the chief business of legislative bodies. The course of proceeding is nearly the same in all legislatures, and I shall give a brief outline of it. Every act in its incipient stage is denominated a bill. In general, all bills may originate indifferently in either house. But by the federal constitution, as we have seen, revenue bills must originate in the house of representatives, as the branch more immediately representing the people. This exception was borrowed from England, where the house of lords, representing the landed aristocracy, are allowed neither to originate nor amend revenue bills, but simply to pass or reject them. (c) The object is to secure the people at large against oppressive taxation, through the influence of the peers. It is evident that we have not the same reason for placing this check upon our republican senate; and accordingly our senate may amend but not originate revenue bills. (d) In Ohio, there is not even this restriction; nor has experience shown the want of it. Bills may be introduced by individual members, on leave of the house, or by the report of a committee. They are required to be read three times in each house; and this must be on three different days, unless, in a case of emergency, three-fourths of the house agree to dispense with the rule. (e) The first reading is for information only; and if there be any opposition, the question is upon the rejection of the bill. If not opposed or

(a) See the debate on this subject, Mad. Pap. 1294-6.

(b) See 1 Black. Com. 181; 1 Kent, Com. 238; 1 Story, Const. § 896; Jefferson's Manual.

(c) The power of the Lords to reject a money bill was seriously questioned in the Commons in 1860; but the Lords insisted on their privilege, and rejected a bill abolishing a certain tax. 6 Jurist, N. s. pt. 2, 236.

(d) This matter of revenue bills was very much debated in the convention, the large States insisting upon it as a part of the compromise between them and the small States. Mad. Pap. 856, 1016-24, 1045, 1260, 1305-16. The clause was finally adopted by a vote of 9 to 2. Id. 15:1.

(e) But this provision does not require every amendment to a bill to be read three times. Miller v. Gibson, 3 Ohio State, 475.

rejected, it passes of course to a second reading; and the question is then upon its commitment or engrossment. If committed, it is either to a standing or select committee consisting of a few, or to a general committee of the whole house. Bills of great importance are usually discussed in committee of the whole, because greater freedom of debate is there allowed than when the same persons are sitting as a house. After discussion in committee, the bill is reported back to the house, with or without amendment. If with amendments, these are acted upon in the house, and others may there be offered. When the bill has in this way become sufficiently matured, the question is upon its engrossment for a third reading; by which is meant the copying of it in a fair large hand. After engrossment, amendments are rarely offered. A clause is, however, sometimes added by way of ryder. This is the stage where opposition is usually made. After the third reading, the question is upon its final passage. If it pass, it is signed by the presiding officer, and transmitted to the other house, where it goes through a similar routine. If amendments be there made, it is sent back for concurrence; and in case of disagreement, committees of conference are appointed. When it has thus passed both houses, it is delivered to a joint committee for enrolment, who see that it is correctly copied. It is then signed by the presiding officers of the two houses. And in Ohio, the process ends here; for our governor has not, as in several of the States, a veto power. It only remains, therefore, to deposit the enrolled law, thus authenticated, among the State archives in the custody of the secretary. Out of abundant caution, however, our constitution provides that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; and that no law shall be revived or amended, unless the new act contains the entire act revived, or the section amended; and the original section is thereby repealed. (a) The signing is also required to be done publicly, while the house is in session. And it is further provided that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State, in order to prevent the great and growing evil of special legislation.

Veto Power. (b) But the acts of Congress must pass another

(a) Miller v. Gibson, 3 Ohio State, 475; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 id. 176. It is held in the last named case that this provision is directory only, and the supervision of its observance must be left to the general assembly. Under what circumstances a provision in an act that it shall take effect upon a popular vote, is constitutional, see Cincinnati, Wilmington, and Zanesville R. R. Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio State, 77; Morgan v. Monmouth Plank R. R. Co., 2 Dutcher, 99; Morgan v. Unger, 8 Clarke (Iowa), 82; Pierce on American Railroad Law, 116-20. A court cannot set aside an act of the legislature duly certified and enrolled on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation or improper motives in those voting for it. Jersey City, &c. R. R. C. v. Jersey City, &c. R. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 61. Contra in the case of an ordinance of a municipal corporation affecting private rights. State v. Cincinnati G. L. & C. Co., 20 Ohio State, 262.

(b) The first proposition in the convention was for a council of revision, to consist of the executive and judiciary, which was given up without a vote. Next, an absolute veto, which was unanimously negatived. Next, a power of suspending laws, which shared the same fate. The qualified veto, as it now stands, was then agreed upon by

ordeal before their consummation; and that is the scrutiny of the president. In England, the king has an absolute negative upon the acts of parliament; but the negative of the president is qualified. The bill is sent to him for approval. If he approves it, he signs it. If not, he sends it back to the house where it originated, with his objections, which are entered upon its journal. The bill is then reconsidered; and if it still pass by two-thirds of both houses, it becomes a law, notwithstanding the presidential veto. The time given to the president for consideration is ten days, within which he must return the bill, unless Congress prevent him by adjournment; otherwise it becomes a law without his signature. Unfortunately, the practice is to put off important bills until within ten days of the close of the session, and thus put it in the power of the president to give them an indirect veto by mere silence. The veto power thus qualified, extends "to every order, resolution, or vote," to which the concurrence of the two houses is necessary. And although the constitution does not indicate the proper occasion for its exercise, yet as one man thereby sets his individual opinion against a majority of both houses of Congress, it was manifestly intended only for cases of emergency. The better opinion is, that it can be properly exercised only on two occasions; first, when the bill, either from oversight in framing it, or from some contingency not known at the time of its passage through Congress, has become manifestly improper to be made a law, at the time of its presentation to the president; or, secondly, when such an exercise of power is necessary to shield the executive department against encroachment by the legislature. Being antirepublican in its character, it ought not to be exercised upon questions of mere policy, about which fair minds may differ; for this, as has been well remarked, would be converting the extreme medicine of the constitution into its daily bread. (a)

§ 37. Presentment and Trial of Impeachments. (b) This is a kind of judicial proceeding, and forms an exception to the general business of legislative bodies. Impeachment is the name given to that course of proceedings, by which "civil officers" are tried and punished for official misconduct. Civil officers include all public functionaries, except military and naval officers, and members of the legislature; the former of whom are punished by a court

a vote of 8 to 2. Mad. Pap. 783-91. A subsequent motion to associate the judiciary was lost by a vote of 3 to 8-id. 809-12. Still another motion to the same effect was debated and negatived, 3 to 4, and the present qualified veto agreed to unanimouslyid. 1161-71. On a subsequent day, the association of the judiciary was negatived, 3 to 8, and three-fourths, instead of two-thirds, required to pass a law notwithstanding the executive disapprobation-id. 1332-7. By a subsequent vote of 6 to 4, two-thirds was again reinstated-id. 1562-5.

(a) A history of the veto power may be found in the Democratic Review for January, 1849, by E. L. Pierce. See also, a history in appendix to the fourth volume of Elliot's Debates, p. 620.

(b) The convention at first resolved, that impeachments should be tried by the judiciary. Mad. Pap. 861, 1137. When the trial was given to the senate, it was proposed to except the case of the president-id. 1528.

martial, and the latter in the manner before described. The causes of impeachment, as stated in the federal constitution, are "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors ;" and, as stated in our State constitution, "any misdemeanor in office." The meaning is, probably, the same in both; and comprehends any violation of official duty, whether criminal or not. The mode of proceeding, which is borrowed from the British Parliament, is also the same under both constitutions. The impeachment or charge is presented by a majority of the house of representatives, who thus discharged a function similar to that of a grand jury. It is then tried by the senate sitting under oath; of whom two-thirds must concur to produce a conviction. In England, the judgment may include banishment, and even death. But here, it can extend only to removal from office, and future disqualification. If, however, the offence be criminal, the party may be afterwards tried and punished by due course of law. In case the president should be impeached, the chief justice of the United States is to preside. The reason will be obvious, if we remember that the vice-president, who usually presides, would become president if the impeachment should be sustained; and would not therefore be in a situation to preside impartially. This liability to impeachment is, in theory, one of our strong safeguards for official integrity. In practice, however, it has not yet resulted in the conviction of either a federal officer, or an officer of this State, though the experiment has been several times made. (a)

This terminates the view I proposed to take of the legislative department of the federal and State governments. The federal senate has indeed two other functions, but they can scarcely be called legislative. One is, to approve of treaties, which was described in a preceding lecture. The other is, to approve of the appointment of officers by the president, which will be described in the next lecture. I think you cannot have failed to be impressed with the striking similarity there is in the structure of the federal and State legislatures. The principal exceptions relate to the federal senate, whose organization is in many respects peculiar. But it is in consequence of these peculiarities, that it has been expressly denominated the "sheet anchor" of the constitution. In no other part of this wonderful instrument, do we find such convincing proof of the profound wisdom of its framers. They intended that the senate should be the balance of the federal system, and they have made it so. The house of representatives, being constructed to represent more directly the present feelings of the people, must necessarily represent their changing passions also. The president, whose very unity gives him strength, and who is intrusted with the vast powers to be described hereafter, with

(a) A judge, by the name of Elliot, has recently been removed by impeachment in Louisiana. 1 West. Law Jour. 380. The most remarkable instance of an impeachment trial is that of President Johnson, which also failed for want of the requisite majority.