minors living out of this State, by allowing their guardians to sell it under the same regulations as guardians appointed here. But with this exception, it follows that if the guardian change the domicile of his ward, as he may for good cause, he requires a new appointment or confirmation under the law of the new domicile; and the same is generally true, where the ward has property in different jurisdictions. The question who are minors, or otherwise subject to guardianship, depends upon the law of the place where they are when the question arises; and their capacities or incapacities depend upon the same law.

6. Master and Servant. Under this head we need notice only slaves and apprentices; for the relation of principal and agent is nearly the same everywhere. With respect to slaves, the general rule is, that slavery will not be recognized in any country whose laws prohibit slavery. And this is the doctrine held in the nonslaveholding States of this Union, except so far as affected by the federal compact respecting fugitive slaves, which has before been commented upon. With respect to apprentices, the general rule is, that foreign indentures of apprenticeship are of no binding force, unless the nature of the service, or the express provision of the indenture, contemplated a change of domicile.

7. Executors and Administrators. By our statute, authenticated copies of wills made and proved in any part of the world, according to the law of the place, are admitted to record here, and have the same effect as if made here. And if a person die intestate out of this State, leaving rights or credits here, administration may be granted here. So if an executor or administrator be duly appointed elsewhere within the United States, he may sue here, and may sell real estate here, in the same manner as if appointed here. But these latter provisions do not extend to foreign nations; and, therefore, no foreign executor or administrator can sue or be sued, or otherwise judicially recognized here, by reason of his foreign appointment. New letters of administration must be taken out here according to our laws, and a settlement must be made of the assets found here; and all debts or legacies due here must be paid out of such assets, before any thing is transmitted abroad, even though the estate were insolvent there. But the better opinion is, that he is not liable to be sued here for assets received abroad. The next question relates to descent and distribution. With respect to real property, the rule is that the rights of dower, curtesy, and descent, depend exclusively upon the law of the place where it is situated. But with respect to personal property, the rule is, that it is to be distributed according to the law of the intestate's domicile, at the time of his death, wherever such property be situated. With respect to a will of personalty, the rule is, that if made according to the law of the testator's actual domicile, it will pass personalty wherever it may be; but if not made according to the law of the domicile, it is not valid anywhere. With respect to a will of realty, its validity and effect must depend wholly upon the law of the place where the property is.

§ 256. As to the Law of Property. I shall consider this subject under three points of view; namely, as to real property, personal property, and contracts.

1. Real Property. We have seen that immobility is the distinguishing characteristic of realty. Its situs never changes; and therefore if the soil of a nation could be subject to foreign domination, the very foundation of national independence would be taken away. Hence the general rule is, that real property is governed exclusively by the law of the place where it is situated. This may be illustrated in several particulars. First, the capacity of persons to take or transfer real estate, depends, not as in other cases, upon the law of their domicile, but upon the law of the place of the real estate. To this there is no exception in England or in this country. Secondly, the forms and solemnities of passing the title are governed exclusively by the law of the place. We have seen, however, that the law of Ohio, in relation to deeds, expressly recognizes any foreign deed executed according to the law of the place where it is executed; and in relation to wills, expressly recognizes a will, made and proved in any part of the world, according to the law of the place where it is made and proved; and it would be a great convenience if all the States would make similar provisions. Thirdly, the law of the place governs with respect to descent, dower, and curtesy. Lastly, the law of the place governs with respect to what shall be considered real estate, and all restrictions upon alienation or incumbrance. In a word, therefore, real property is wholly governed by the domestic law.

2. Personal Property. The general rule is, that personal property has no situs, but follows the person of the owner; and consequently the law which governs it is the law of the owner's domicile, and not the law of the place where it happens to be. Accordingly, any transfer or disposition of personal property which is valid by the law of the owner's domicile, is valid everywhere, unless, perhaps, in the place where it was at the time, by reason of some prohibitory law of that place. The only kinds of personalty excepted, are such stocks or funds as are local in their nature, and require a particular mode of transfer by the local law; and perhaps some other things to which the same reason applies. But it does not follow, from the above rule, that a transfer not made according to the law of the domicile, but according to the law of the place where it is, would be invalid. For the benefit of commerce, such transfers will be sustained even in the courts of the domicile.

3. Contracts. Real contracts, or those which relate to real property, are exclusively governed by the law of the place where the property is situated, as we have already seen. Personal contracts include those which relate to persons only, or to personal property, or debts; and the general rule is, that the law of the place where a personal contract is made, everywhere governs the contract, as to the capacity of the parties to make it; as to its validity or

invalidity; as to the formalities, proofs, and authentications of it; and as to its nature, obligation, interpretation, and consequences. There is, however, this general exception, that no nation will give effect to foreign contracts which violate the law of nature or the law of God, or which contravene its own fundamental policy. And the rule itself presupposes that the parties have not stipulated for the law of a different place. For if the contract is either expressly or impliedly to be performed in a different place from that where it is made, the law of the place of performance will govern, as to the validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation of the contract. As between merchants residing in different countries and keeping accounts with each other, the rule in adjusting balances is, that each transaction is to be governed by the law of the place where it originated. As to interest, the rule is, that it is to be governed by the law of the place where the contract is made, unless the parties had in view a different place of payment; in which case the latter will govern. As to damages on protested bills, the place where each party contracts will govern the amount he is to pay. Where money is payable by contract in one place, and is sued for in another, the creditor is entitled to recover an amount sufficient to pay for its remittance to the place of payment; and exchange is to be added or deducted accordingly. Days of grace are governed by the law of the place of payment. Contracts which stipulate no particular place of performance, are performable everywhere. A defence to or discharge from a contract, which is good by the law of the place where the contract is made or is to be performed, is good everywhere else. But with respect to discharges under the insolvent laws of the different States, we have seen, that owing to the peculiar relations of the States, this rule is so far modified that such discharges are only valid with respect to contracts made between citizens of the same State authorizing the discharge. And the converse of the rule also prevails, that a discharge by the law of any other place than that where the contract was made, will not, on that account, be valid elsewhere.

§ 257. As to the Law of Crimes. The general rule is, to consider crimes as altogether local, that is, exclusively cognizable and punishable within the jurisdiction where they are committed. Accordingly, one country does not take cognizance of the penal laws of another, for any purpose whatsoever. This doctrine is carried out so strictly, that conviction of an infamous crime in one of the States of this Union does not render a witness incompetent in another State, unless by express provision, such as we have in this State; nor do the consequences of attainder in one nation attach to the attainted person in another. In short, no nation pays any respect whatever to foreign criminal laws, except in surrendering up fugitives from justice. This is sometimes stipulated for by treaty (a) and sometimes left to comity alone.

(a) For example, the Ashburton treaty.

In the absence of any positive compact, it is a subject of much controversy whether there is any binding obligation among nations to surrender a fugitive in any case whatever. In this country, the weight of authority is against the obligation. Such surrenders have been frequently made, and as frequently refused; and the result is, that unless the case is a very strong one, our tribunals would refuse to order the surrender, and such refusal is no just cause of offence to the nation making the demand. But in this respect, the States of this Union, as we have seen, have ceased to be foreign with reference to each other, under an express compact in the federal constitution; and Congress has provided the manner in which the demand and surrender shall be made. (a)

§ 258. As to the Law of Procedure. The general rule is, that the law governing the remedy is the law of the place where the remedy is sought. Even where the right is determined by recourse to foreign law, the redress must be obtained according to the domestic law, for the obvious reason that our courts cannot be presumed to be acquainted with foreign modes of procedure; and also because the adoption of them would introduce endless confusion and uncertainty into our practice. But I shall consider the subject under several aspects.

1. Jurisdiction. Upon the question of jurisdiction, the rule is, that it can only be rightfully exercised, when either the person or thing is within the territory; for as judicial process cannot go beyond the territory, the attempt to exercise an extra-territorial jurisdiction would be a nullity. But, on the other hand, the right of jurisdiction extends to all persons and things within the territory, except foreign ministers and their families and effects. In our tribunals, foreigners may sue and be sued, in like manner as citizens, with the single exception of alien enemies; and to give them every assurance of an impartial hearing, we allow them to select the federal tribunals. Where the person only, and not his property, is within the jurisdiction, the judgment or decree cannot of course operate directly upon such property; but where the property is within the jurisdiction, though the person is not, the judgment or decree will bind the property. In such case, however, our statute requires notice to be given by publication, and if

(a) The leading cases on the subject of surrendering fugitives are, the case of Washburn, 4 Johns. Ch. 106; Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515; Commonwealth 2. Deacon, 10 Serg. & Rawle, 123; and Rex v. Ball, 1 Amer. Jur. 297; 22 id. 330. See ante, § 64; see act of State of Ohio, March 24, 1860. In Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, the State of Kentucky applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for a mandamus to compel the Governor of Ohio to deliver up a person who had been indicted for some offence connected with the slave laws of Kentucky. The court held that the clause in the constitution gave a right to the executive of one State to demand and impose an obligation on the other to deliver up the fugitive, without any reference to the character of the crime charged, or to the policy or laws of the State to which the fugitive is fled, and that the governor cannot look behind or inquire into the certificates required by the statute. But they further held that the constitution provided no means of enforcing this duty, though merely ministerial, and on this ground alone refused the mandamus.

the person affected did not receive this notice, time is given him to open the judgment or decree and have a hearing.

2. Limitation of Actions. With respect to the limitation of actions, the universal rule is, that statutes of limitation belong to the remedy, and the law of the forum must govern. Courts, therefore, will not take notice of the statute of limitations of the foreign place where the cause of action accrued, but will be governed wholly by their own statute. We have seen, however, that Ohio has made an exception to this rule, in the case of foreign contracts, by providing, that if the right of action is barred by the law of the place where the contract is made, it shall be barred here.

3. Discharges by Bankruptcy or Insolvency. With respect to bankrupt or insolvent laws, the American rule differs from the English. The English rule is, that proceedings under the bankrupt law have a universal operation everywhere. We hold this doctrine only to a partial extent. Where no other rights intervene, the assignment under a foreign bankrupt or insolvent law passes the title of personalty to the assignees or commissioners; but such assignment is not good as against a subsequent attaching creditor here. And realty does not pass by such foreign assignment, unless the domestic law so provide. As to the discharge under a foreign bankrupt or insolvent law, the rule seems to be, that if the effect of the discharge be to extinguish the debt, by the law of the place of the contract, such discharge will be valid everywhere. But where the effect is only to take away some portion of the remedy, as the arrest of the debtor, such exemption from arrest is not elsewhere recognized. Such is the general principle of international law. But between the States of this Union, since no State can pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, it is held that State bankrupt and insolvent laws can only operate upon contracts. made between citizens of the State which enacts the law. (a)

4. Evidence. The general rule respecting evidence is, that its competency must depend upon the law of the forum. But in the case of deeds, wills, and other instruments of writing, it would seem to be almost a matter of necessity, that the evidence which would be sufficient to prove their execution in the place where made, should be held sufficient everywhere. With respect to foreign laws, their existence must be proved like any other facts, before the court will take notice of them. And the same is true of foreign judgments. The mode of proof varies according to the nature of the case. The great seal of a nation is sufficient to authenticate a foreign written law or judgment, but not the seal of a court, except it be a court of admiralty. So a copy sworn to be a true copy will be held sufficient. But the unwritten laws and usages of foreign nations are proved, either by the exhibition of printed reports, or by the oaths of persons having the means of knowing, or sometimes by the certificates of persons in high authority.

(a) See ante, § 55, n.