jurisdiction of the United States courts was raised, and this Court, after a review of several cases bearing on the subject, held that the suit was not one arising under the laws of the United States, and that the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the case, and reversed its decree, and remanded the cause, with directions to dismiss the bill. The argument against the jurisdiction in the case under the considera. tion is stronger than in the two cases above referred to. In each of these cases the object of the complainant in filing the bill was to go behind the agreement under which the defendant had contracted for the right to use the complainant's invention, and to obtain an injunction against the defendant as an infringer. In this case, the appellee admits the contract to be in force, and simply seeks to compel its performance. The following cases cited by this Court in Hartell v. Tilghman are in accord with the views we have expressed: Goodyear v. India Rubber Company (4 Blatchf., 63); Merserole v. Union Paper Collar Company, (6 Id., 356); Blanchard v. Sprague (1 Cliff., 288); Hill v. Whitcomb (1 Holmes, 317). From the conclusions reached by us, it follows that the decree of the circuit court, remanding the cause to the State court, must be affirmed. [United States Circuit Court-Western District of Pennsylvania.] WILDER . KENT ET AL. Decided February 2, 1882. 23 O. G., 831. SHERIFF'S SALE-PASSES RIGHT TO USE PATENTED MACHINE. The rule that a purchaser at a sheriff's sale succeeds to the beneficial rights of the defendant in the execution to the property sold applies to the case of patented machinery, and whatever right to use the patented machine a defendant in execution may have, passes with the machine when sold by the sheriff to his vendee. Messrs. Bakewell & Kerr and Mr. J. M. Stoner for the complainaut. Mr. George H. Christy and Mr. Manley Crosby for the defendants. BEFORE MCKENNAN, C. J., AND ACHESON, J. · ACHESON, J.: In Pennsylvania, as between vendor and vendee, heir and executor, and debtor and execution-creditor, machinery, whether fast or loose, of a manufactory which is a constituent part thereof for the purposes of the business there conducted, and without which the establishment would not be fully equipped, is a fixture, and passes as a part of the freehold. Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S., 116; Ege v. Kille, 84 Pa. St., 333; Morris' Appeal, 88 Id., 368. That the two graining-machines, the subject-matter of this suit, although loose and portable, were fixtures within the above-stated prin ciple we incline to think; but in our apprehension of the case it is not necessary to pass definitely upon that question. The sheriff's levy upon the real estate, after describing the factory lot, proceeds thus: And having erected thereon a large two-story brick building, known as the " "Corry Wooden Ware Works," with machinery for manufacturing tubs, pails, &c., large boilers and engine, pulleys, shafting, belting, &c. Now, the two graining-machines were then used in said works in the ordinary course of the manufacture of tubs and pails to paint or grain designs thereon, to finish the vessels, and make them marketable wares. Clearly they were within the scope of the levy. In Voorhis v. Freeman, supra, where the sheriff's vendee claimed duplicate detached rolls, the premises having been described as— A lot or piece of ground, with one iron rolling-mill establishment situate thereon, with the buildings, apparatus, steam-engine, boilers, bellows, &c., attached to the said establishment Chief Justice Gibson said: And were it necessary we would further hold that they might have passed, had they been chattels, by force of the word "apparatus,” in the description of the premises. So, in this instance, we decide without hesitation that under the sheriff's levy, sale, and deed, the title to the two graining-machines vested in his vendee, as part of the designated machinery. Each machine is a patented apparatus, constructed under letters patent granted by the United States to John R. and Alfred J. Cross. The plaintiff, David H. Wilder, having acquired the exclusive territorial right to the patent for the counties of Erie and Warren, Pennsylvania, set up said two machines (one of which he bought from one of the patentees, and the other of which he constructed himself) in the Corry Wooden Ware Works, in the said county of Erie. They were there operated under the patent for a number of years by Wilder & Howe and the Corry Manufacturing and Lumber Company (of both which concerns the plaintiff was a member), and by the plaintiff individually, he hav ing eventually become the sole owner of the works and machinery, including the machines in question. Afterward, upon an execution against Wilder, the sheriff levied upon the works and machinery, and sold the same to Adams Davis, one of the defendants. The sheriff's sale, as already shown, embraced the two graining-machines, and under the title thereby acquired the defendants are operating them at said works. This is the alleged infringement of which Wilder complains. We are, therefore, called upon to decide what rights a purchaser at sheriff's sale takes in a patented machine belonging to and sold as the property of the owner of the patent, the defendant in the execution. The learned counsel agree that the question has never been judicially determined; and upon diligent search no case has been found involving the precise point now presented for decision. In Sawin v. Guild (1 Gall., 485, 1 Robb., 47) the sheriff, upon an execution against the patentee, levied on and sold the "materials” of sev eral of the completed patented machines, and such sale was held to be no infringement of the patent right. "He sold," said Mr. Justice Story, "the materials as such, to be applied by the purchaser as he should by law have a right to apply them. The purchaser must therefore act at his own peril, but in no respect can the officer be responsible for his conduct." The specific ruling in Chambers v. Smith (5 Fisher, 12) was that a purchaser at a marshal's sale of a patented machine was an infringer in operating it outside of the district to which its use was limited by the license granted to the defendant in the execution. The position taken by the plaintiff's counsel is that when the owner of a patent, who does not manufacture for sale, makes a machine for his own use only, and such patented machine is sold at a forced sale by the sheriff, the right to use it does not pass with it, but only the ownership of the materials of which the machine is constructed. To sustain this proposition reliance is placed upon the cases of Stephens v. Cady (14 How., 528) and Stephens ♥. Gadding (17 Id., 447), in which it was held that the seizure and sale of the copper-plate of a copyrighted map, under an execution against the owner of the copyright and plate, did not carry with it the right to print and publish the map; but the reason assigned for this is that the copyright-the exclusive and intangible right to multiply copies of the original work-does not inhere in and has no necessary connection with the plate, which is the mere instrument for producing the copies. The copyright and the plate are wholly distinct and disconnected subjects of property, each capable of being owned and transferred independent of the other, ibid, and therefore a judicial sale of one does not carry any title to the other. But the lawful sale of a patented machine takes it out of the monopoly, either altogether or pro tanto, according to the nature of the contract. The purchaser of a machine from the patentee acquires no right in the patent itself, and needs none to enable him to enjoy his acquisition. By implication he is invested with a license to use that particular machine, and in the ab sence of express provision to the contrary such license passes with the machine to successive owners as an incident of proprietorship. That such is the law in case of a voluntary sale of a patented machine by the patentee is incontrovertible. But wherefore should the rights of the sheriff's vendee under an execution against the patentee be less than those of a purchaser directly from the patentee? The rule is that the purchaser at a sheriff's sale succeeds to the beneficial rights of the defendant in the execution to the property sold. (Chambers v. Smith, supra.) But why should an exception be made where the subject-matter of sale is a patented machine? To deny to the sheriff's vendee the right to use such machine would in effect prevent its sale upon an execution at law as an operative apparatus, and practically withdraw it from the reach of the owner's execution creditors. The mischievous consequences to such creditors to which the doctrine contended for would lead (now that patented machinery has come into almost universal use) can hardly be estimated. The plaintiff's position is untenable. It is very true that the patent right itself, being incorporeal and vesting exclusively upon statutory grant, cannot be levied on at law, and is available to creditors only by proceedings in a court of equity. Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S., 126. But a patented machine is susceptible of manual seizure, and the unrestricted sale thereof does not involve the transfer of any interest in the patent. The conclusion, therefore, is that whatever right to use the patented machine a defendant in an execution may have passes with the machine when sold by the sheriff to his vendee. Hence it follows that the plaintiff has no just cause of complaint against these defendants. The foregoing views being decisive of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions which the counsel have so ably discussed. MCKENNAN, C. J.: I concur fully in the foregoing opinion. PER CURIAM: Let a decree be drawn dismissing the plaintiff's bill, with costs. [Supreme Court of the United States.] HALL v. MACNEALE ET AL. Decided February 5, 1883. 23 O. G., 937. 1. LETTERS PATENT No. 67,046-INFRINGEMENT. Whether claim 3 of Letters Patent No. 67,046, granted to Joseph L. Hall, July 23, 1867, for an improvement in connecting doors and casings of safes-namely, "3. The conical or tapering arbors 1, in combination with two or more plates of metal, in the doors and casings of safes and other secure receptacles, the arbors being secured in place in the plates by keys 2, or in other substantial manner”—claims arbors which are tapped into two or more plates, or whether it excludes, as a part of it, screw-threads cut on the arbors, is immaterial in the present case, because under the former view the defendants are not shown to have used arbors with screw-threads on any part of the arbor that is within the plates, and under the latter view the claim is invalid. 2. SAME-PRIOR PATENT. The whole invention existed in letters patent granted to said Hall, September 25, 1860, for an improvement in locks. 3. SAME-SAME-INVENTION. A cored conical bolt with a screw-thread on it having been shown in the patent of 1860, and a solid conical bolt having existed, there was no invention in adding the screw-thread to the latter bolt. 4. PUBLIC USE-CONSENT AND ALLOWANCE-ACT OF 1836. Solid conical bolts without screw-threads having been used in two safes made and sold by the inventor more than two years before his patent was applied for, the invention covered by said claim 3 was in public use and on sale, with the consent and allowance of the inventor, so as to make such claim invalid under sections 7 and 15 of the act of July 4, 1833 (5 U. S. Stat. at Large, 117), and section 7 of the act of March 3, 1839 (Id., 353). Such use was not a use for experiment. APPEAL from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio. Mr. E. N. Dickerson and Mr. Thomas A. Logan for the appellant. Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court: This suit is brought on Letters Patent No. 67,046, granted to Joseph L. Hall, the appellant, July 23, 1867, for an improvement in connecting doors and casings of safes. The only claim alleged to have been infringed is claim 3, which is in these words: 3. The conical or tapering arbors 1, in combination with two or more plates of metal, in the doors and casings of safes and other secure receptacles, the arbors being secured in place in the plates by keys 2, or in other substantial manner. In regard to what is embraced in this claim, the specification says: The nature of this invention consists in securing a series of plates forming a casing or door of the safe by means of conical or tapering arbors, which, being tapped in from the outside of the door or casing and keyed upon the inside, present serious obstacles to the removal of successive plates forming the body of the safe. Fig. 1 represents a perspective view of a safe embodying my invention. Fig. 2 is a horizontal section of part of the same. Fig. 3 is a detail view, in cross-section of the door of the safe, showing the shape of, and manner of securing, an arbor. The most approved manner of securing together the numerous plates forming the casings and doors of safes is by means of screws tapped in from one series of pairs or triplets of plates from the inside, presenting no rivet-heads upon the outside surface of the safes. * In the doors of safes the outer plate D is secured to the plates EF by screws b, countersunk in the plate F. The fourth plate, I, has about the same area as the plate E. It is secured to the plate F by screws e, which pass through the inner plate K, in which they are countersunk. In order to still further secure together the plates forming the door of the safe, I use a conical arbor, 1, or a number, if necessary. They are introduced in openings through the series of plates, being tapped into the two innermost of all the plates and keyed in position. A smooth surface in the plane of the outer face of the door is presented, giving no means of removing the arbors 1, even should the key 2 be removed. Since the doors of safes are more exposed than any other part of them, it is necessary to embody in their construction such devices, which in themselves are the simplest, as shall effectually bar forcible entrance to the safes. The introduction of arbors for the purpose of more effectually binding in one compact mass the series of alternate iron and steel plates in the doors or bodies of safes will very much protract the labors of the burglar. Indeed, it will be necessary, in order to remove one sheet in succession, to cut out the arbors, which are made of the hardest steel. The arbors may be tapped through the entire series of plates, and the inner end rivet-headed instead of keyed, as shown in the drawings, or the inner plate, as well as other in the series of plates, may be put together in sections, and fitting into notches in the arbor or arbors secure them in position. In this latter construction the arbors need not be conical, but may have any cross-section tapering longitudinally. When the specification says that the conical arbors are "tapped in from the outside," it means that screw-threads are cut on them aud take into screw-threads in the body, and that the arbors are screwed in and have their smaller end toward the inside. The drawings, Fig. 3, show this, there being five plates, and the arbor being in position |