Exceptions to the recommendations of the Special Master have been filed by Louisiana and Texas. 423 U. S. 909 (1975).

At approximately 30° north latitude, the Sabine River enters into Sabine Lake through three channels. Louisiana excepts to that portion of the Special Master's report which marks the boundary line between the States through the passage more recently known as "middle pass," instead of in the geographic middle of the "west pass." Louisiana contends that the Special Master acted contrary to our rejection of the thalweg doctrine earlier in this case, 410 U. S., at 709, by considering navigation as the criterion to locate the boundary in the middle channel. We think it clear, however, that the Special Master makes reference to the volume of water flowing through these passes solely in an analytic context reflecting the history and geography of the region. We are persuaded that the Special Master made his determination consistent with our earlier holding.

Texas has filed exceptions to the Special Master's delimitation of the lateral seaward boundary in the Gulf of Mexico. Texas argues that the Special Master erred in concluding that Texas and Louisiana did not have a historic boundary in the Gulf; we think that misreads the findings of the Special Master. The Special Master does not reject Texas' contention that there was a historic "inchoate" boundary; what he concludes is that there has never been an established offshore boundary between the States. We find the Special Master correct in his conclusion and conclude that he properly considered how such a boundary should be now constructed.

All parties agree that the lateral seaward boundary is to be constructed by reference to the median line, or equidistant principle, recognized in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 U. S. T. (pt. 2) 1606, T. I. A. S. No.

5639.2 Texas, however, excepts to the Special Master's determination that the equidistant principle is to be applied to the coastlines of the States as affected by jetties at the mouth of the Sabine River. Texas urges that the relevant coastline is the coastline that existed in 1845 when it was admitted to the Union. Texas argues that this is a domestic dispute involving historical precedents and that the States' offshore boundary should be constructed as Congress would have done in 1845 had it considered the matter.

The short answer to Texas' argument is that no line was drawn by Congress and that the boundary is being described in this litigation for the first time. The Court

2 Article 12 of the Convention provides:

"1. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance with this provision.

"2. The line of delimitation between the territorial seas of two States lying opposite to each other or adjacent to each other shall be marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal States." [1964] 15 U. S. T. (pt. 2), at 1610, T. I. A. S. No. 5639.

3 There are two jetties—one originating from Texas and one from Louisiana-and each extending approximately 3.1 miles into the Gulf. The jetties were constructed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers in the 1880's to provide an adequate ship canal to the Sabine Pass for the benefit of such cities as Port Arthur, Beaumont, and others. They were completed to their present terminus in 1936. Article 8 of the Convention provides:

"For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of the coast." Id., at 1609, T. I. A. S. No. 5639.

should not be called upon to speculate as to what Congress might have done. We hold that the Special Master correctly applied the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone to this suit. As we previously have recognized, "the comprehensiveness of the Convention provides answers to many of the lesser problems related to coastlines which, absent the Convention, would be most troublesome." United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 165 (1965). When read together, Arts. 12 and 8 of the Convention clearly require that the median line be measured with reference to the jetties.*

Accordingly, the exceptions of Louisiana and Texas are overruled. The parties are directed within 90 days to submit a proposed decree which has the approval of the Special Master. If the States cannot agree, the Special Master is requested, after appropriate hearings, to prepare and submit a recommended decree.

The result is not inconsistent with our holding in United States v. Louisiana, 389 U. S. 155 (1967), that Texas' three-league grant under the Submerged Lands Act is measured from Texas' historic coastline, without reference to the jetties. We had earlier held that the coastal States had no claim to the submerged lands off their coastlines and that the United States had paramount rights in these lands. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947). This holding was applied to Louisiana and Texas in our first Louisiana decision. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699 (1950). In our 1967 Louisiana decision, supra, we were concerned only with interpretation of the statutory grant of the Submerged Lands Act. We concluded that "[n]o definitions are required by this Court and there is no need to resort to international law; Texas has simply been given that amount of submerged land it owned when it entered the Union." 389 U. S., at 160.

Per Curiam

BURRELL ET AL. v. MCCRAY ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-44. Argued April 27, 1976-Decided June 14, 1976

516 F. 2d 357, certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.

Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Henry R. Lord, Deputy Attorney General, and Clarence W. Sharp, Donald R. Stutman, and Glenn E. Bushel, Assistant Attorneys General.

Charles F. Morgan argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Barbara M. Milstein, Michael Millemann, and C. Christopher Brown.*

PER CURIAM.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissents. He would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.

Had I been a Member of the Court when the petition for certiorari was presented, I would have voted to deny because the opinion of the United States Court of Ap

*A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for their respective States by Jim Guy Tucker, Attorney General of Arkansas, and Robert A. Newcomb, Assistant Attorney General; Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General, and John T. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General; Carl R. Ajello, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Stephen J. O'Neill, Assistant Attorney General; Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, and G. Thomas Davis, Assistant Attorney General;

STEVENS, J., concurring

426 U.S.

peals for the Fourth Circuit correctly states the applicable law. For the same reason, I voted to affirm after oral argument. Although I did not vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, I do not dissent from that action for two reasons.

First, it is my understanding that at least one Member of the Court who voted to grant certiorari has now voted to dismiss the writ; accordingly, the action of the Court does not impair the integrity of the Rule of Four.

Second, just as the Court's broad control of its discretionary docket includes the power to dismiss the writ because circumstances disclosed by a careful study of the record were not fully apprehended at the time the writ was granted, The Monrosa v. Carbon Black, Inc., 359 U. S. 180, 183, so also, we should retain the power to take like action when our further study of the law discloses that there is no need for an opinion of this Court on the questions presented by the petition. Even though I agree with MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN that the questions in

John C. Danforth, Attorney General of Missouri, and William F. Arnet, Assistant Attorney General; Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Harold Mosher, Assistant Attorney General; William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Joseph T. Maloney, Deputy Attorney General; Toney Anaya, Attorney General of New Mexico, and Michael Francke and Robert William Piatt, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General; Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., Senior Deputy Attorney General; Larry Derryberry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Amy Hodgins, Assistant Attorney General; Robert P. Kane, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and J. Andrew Smyser, Deputy Attorney General; Daniel R. McLeon, Attorney General of South Carolina, and Emmet H. Clair, Assistant Attorney General; and John L. Hill, Attorney General of Texas, and Bert W. Pluymen, Assistant Attorney General.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Alvin Bronstein, Robert Plotkin, Burt Neuborne, and Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by Daniel L. Skoler for the Center for Correctional Justice.