I would like to point out that in achieving that strength we will have then cut our strength from what 2 years ago was about 900. The point has frequently been made that one of the objectives of these cuts is to lower the profile of the military in Latin America, and this deserves some clarification. I don't agree that our profile contributes to the U.S. profile, not when I am aware our U.S. population in these 17 countries where we have these people is about 130,000 Americans, and, if you add to that the tourists which I have been told amount to about 25,000 as of any 1 day, I don't see where these very small military groups-many in civilian clothes, well integrated in the communities contribute to a profile. Mr. FASCELL. I think, General, probably the profile that is being talked about-and everybody has their own opinion about this-derives from the fact that your people are on a day-to-day basis in contact with the military people at high level in those Governments. That brings about political repercussions. The fact that you are immediately identifiable by way of uniform or otherwise is one thing. The fact that you are immediately identifiable as a political factor is something else again. I think this is the profile that is being discussed. Rightly or wrongly, whether we take credit for it or they give us credit for it, the United States is a political factor as a result of our military presence. I think that is the problem. Whether or not cutting back will lessen the problem is debatable. It is the old story of how you integrate into a culture. OVERSEAS OPERATIONS OFFICERS My next question is, at one time there was a Joint Chiefs of Staff order I can't even remember the classification of it-but down in the list somewhere it gave the military command direct responsibility for the conduct of the cold war. Is that order, to your knowledge, still in effect? General MATHER. That is no part of my mission as I now have it from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sir. Mr. FASCELL. I raise that issue because it deals directly with the question of the political role that military command may have. Do you have assigned to your command any of the new group that were being trained in Fort Bragg? Do you have any of those people assigned to you, sir? General MATHER. I can check and submit that for the record. Mr. FASCELL. They are called, I believe, Overseas Operations Officers. General MATHER. The program is now called the Military Assistance Program Officer Program. We canvassed our military groups to find out how many positions we had that could utilize personnel trained in this way and it was a very small number. I think it was about 30. This I will correct in the record. And whether or not we have established requirements for those 30. Mr. FASCELL. I will appreciate your checking that out and supplying us with information essential to get the accurate view on the record. (The following information was subsequently furnished :) 47-893-70-7 MILITARY ASSISTANCE OFFICER PROGRAM POSITIONS Twenty-eight Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP) positions are authorized within United States Southern Command. Three officer participants in the Military Assistance Officer Program are presently assigned within the command. CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS Mr. FASCELL. Are there any instructions by way of directive or otherwise which bear on your responsibility toward civic action programs in Latin America? If so, what are they? General MATHER. Very definitely. This is a part of the mission that I have. I think we receive this through our military assistance guidance which requires us to encourage and to give impulse to civic action. Recognizing the benefits that the countries themselves derive from it, we have had, I think, a little more than modest success in pushing this program and we have seen some very constructive results in some cases. For instance, you are aware the Colombians have had considerable success in dealing with an extensive rural insurgency. We think it is largely the result of the civic action and the support that the military gained from the populace in these rural areas that gave them the information and the intelligence that enabled them to deal with these insurgents. Mr. FASCELL. In the context of that example, if I may, how do you define your responsibility and how specifically was it carried out in this example? General MATHER. It is a responsibility of our advisers who work with the host military and give them advice and counsel as to how best to do this. Mr. FASCELL. For example, is that a training program? Is it logistical support? General MATHER. Some of it is logistical support, but this has become very minimal in the last few years because our programs have fallen off so much. I think that in the last year about 5 percent of our grant aid program could be identified as materiel for civic action. Mr. FASCELL. I am trying to visualize accurately with respect to the example you gave in Colombia, in dealing with the insurgency problem there, which was rather substantial at one time, just how the U.S. role aided in that situation and exactly what we did. General MATHER. The Colombian units involved were engineer units and they had some materiel support from our Government Mr. FASCELL. You are talking about Colombian military engineering units? General MATHER. Right. They were trained and equipped to do modest construction work such as schoolhouse building, well-drilling, and, of course, they were augmented with medical support so they could give some medical help to these people out in these areas. The result was that they earned much goodwill and proved to the peasants that these were their friends rather than the insurgents. COUNTER-INSURGENCY SUPPORT Mr. FASCELL. What was the extent of our actual military role as differentiated from our civic action role in dealing with the insurgency problem in Colombia? General MATHER. I am sure that our advisers worked very carefully with the Colombian military in advising them as to how best to organize themselves, how to equip themselves, what kind of communication and control they needed in order to get in to deal with an identified insurgent group. Mr. FASCELL. Would special forces personnel assigned to that task be under your command? General MATHER. Yes, I have a special forces group who have a great capability for that type of training. Mr. FASCELL. Are they stationed in the zone? General MATHER. They are, and they are on the Atlantic side and are a very important part of the elements available to me for the security of the canal. However, they also are available for use as mobile training teams, and as requirements are established we send them out to these various countries. Mr. FASCELL. Other than military personnel assigned to this task in Colombia, what was made available in terms of actual military materiel? General MATHER. I will have to supply that for the record unless we can dig it out here. I don't think I would have that. Mr. FASCELL. I don't mean in total amounts like how many small arms and how many airplanes. I mean by type or category of assistance. General MATHER. It could be earthmoving equipment, it could be well-drilling equipment, it could be modest construction equipment, hand tools, things like that. Mr. FASCELL. That is on the civic action side, but how about on the military side? I am talking about troop transport, helicopters, airplanes, tanks, or whatever. You can supply that for the record. We will put it in the record at this point. (The information requested is classified and retained in the committee's files.) Mr. FASCELL. Let me get to the current theory of dealing with insurgency in these areas. At one time we were told, as I recall it, that it was necessary to build up helicopter support to run the insurgents down, a kind of seek and ́ destroy mission. Is that still our strategy for dealing with insurgency and is that the way we are dealing with it in Latin America? General MATHER. Yes, and that is an excellent way to react and get military force at a point where you can use it. The helicopter is the best way to get them there. We haven't funds to provide those from our program. I can't tell you at this moment the extent to which the Colombians have helicopters that can lift forces. They have some, I know, and it is a part of their plan and a part of their operation. Mr. FASCELL. I assume from what you have said that you personally consider that the Colombians have dealt successfully with their insurgency problems? General MATHER. They still have a continuing problem but they have dealt very successfully with it to date. Mr. FASCELL. May I also understand from that that the tactics, in a military sense, were successful, and one of those tactics was to identify the insurgent leaders and eliminate them. General MATHER. Right. Mr. FASCELL. And this the Colombians have done very effectively? General MATHER. Yes. Mr. FASCELL. In what other areas in either Central or South America is there this insurgency problem where there is some supporting role by U.S. military to the local government? General MATHER. Guatemala is a good example; but let me qualify, the supporting role is advisory only, Mr. Chairman. We are not involved in the operation. Mr. FASCELL. It is important to make that clear on the record. CUBAN TRAINED INSURGENTS General MATHER. None of my people are ever involved in operations. They are only there as advisers. In Guatemala they have a continuing insurgency problem. From our intelligence we know many of these people are Cuban-trained and [security deletion]. The way the Guatemalans deal with this, they have an intelligence system to locate these people and once they get a fix they mount up alert units to go to deal with them. This has given them quite a capability to keep these people on the run, with the result, we think, that the rural insurgency is on the downgrade there but, of course, it is being replaced by more urban terrorism. Mr. GROSS. Are these Guatemalans or Cubans? General MATHER. Cuban-trained Guatemalans. Mr. FASCELL. We have had other testimony before this subcommittee just recently that the tactics and the strategy of the Russians, as differentiated from the Castro elements, have placed less emphasis on terrorism, either urban or rural, and have tried to legitimatize their operations through the political apparatus. This is particularly evident, in the case of Chile where they now have their fingers crossed hoping to win an election. Does that square with your own view? General MATHER. Absolutely. The Russian is a very long-range, low key effort to penetrate the students, labor, and political parties. They support disorder and disarray when they can, but quite contrary to the Cuban thrust, it is as you have described it. It is long-range with the objective of eroding our position there and putting themselves in a position to take advantage of opportunities when propitious. Mr. FASCELL. We also have been advised that since the death of Che Guevarra in Bolivia, the Cuban effort, in support of the violent revolution, has diminished, although it is ongoing. Does that square with your view? General MATHER. He is not supporting subversion as far away or as openhandedly as he did in Bolivia. Mr. FASCELL. Is that in terms of personnel, training, or money? General MATHER. Yes. The effort in country. He is much more selective in those activities that he is supporting. You mentioned training. This, we feel, is going on as it always has and at the same rate. Training in Cuba. Mr. FASCELL. So the agitation for insurgency, agitation, and support, stems primarily out of Cuban-trained people who go back to these countries? General MATHER. That is right. Of course, I am sure you are aware of Castro's talk on Lenin's anniversary last April 22. If there are any doubts about his continued purpose, he sure went out of his way to make clear that he is still exporting revolution and that is what he is committed to. CURRENT CASTRO-COMMUNIST EFFORT Mr. FASCELL. What is your intelligence and your own evaluation of the present emphasis of the Castro agitation effort? Is it, for example, centered on the Caribbean area, among the small islands; is it aimed at Central America; or is it focused on some other targets? General MATHER. Primarily in the Caribbean Basin. [Security deletion.] Mr. GROSS. You say the Guatemalans [security deletion]. How do they accomplish this, by air? General MATHER. Yes, sir. [Security deletion.] Mr. FASCELL, I ask my question on the basis of prior testimony. [Security deletion.] General MATHER. I think that is very reasonable. MILITARY REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA Mr. FASCELL. What is your evaluation based on all of your intelligence and other efforts with respect to the trend in Latin America on military governments as against democratic institutions? General MATHER. I think we probably will see more, Mr. Chairman. rather than less. Mr. GROSS. How could there be more military dictatorships? Mr. FASCELL. What has been your experience with respect to the difference, if any, in dealing with military regimes and nonmilitary regimes, of the U.S. capability in dealing with them in your area? General MATHER. I was happy to see the President's policy as he announced it last October, that we shouldn't isolate ourselves from these authoritarian governments; we should maintain contact with them. I firmly believe-I am firmly convinced in our overall security interests that we have got to keep track of these people, keep in touch with them and have their good offices. The fact that they are authoritarian regimes, not in our image shouldn't poison our official relationship. Mr. FASCELL. You mean we should not automatically disassociate ourselves? General MATHER. That is right. I don't agree with many of the repressive measures that we read of in some of these regimes. On the other hand, I think it can be demonstrated that they do have a basis of support in many of the countries where they are in power; that economically they have brought these countries to a point where the previous regimes had not been able to get to. I think the main thing is, we must keep contact with them whether they are authoritarian or not. Mr. FASCELL. Whether they are really for us or against us? |