I would like to start with General Mather, if I may. You may proceed.

(A biographical sketch of General Mather follows:)

GENERAL GEORGE R. MATHER

Gen. George Robinson Mather was born in Watertown, South Dakota, in 1911. He was appointed to the United States Military Academy and commissioned a second lieutenant of Cavalry upon his graduation in 1932. The next five years of his military career included the normal posts and schooling of a Cavalry officer. He then spent a year at the University of Mexico, followed by service as instructor of Spanish from 1938 to 1942 at West Point. From 1942 to 1944 he was with the War Department General Staff's Operations Division, departing for Europe in 1944 where he served in combat, and was seriously wounded. Upon his return to the United States in 1945 he was again assigned to the War Department General Staff, and in 1946 joined the Headquarters, Caribbean Command, Panama Canal Zone. Later assignments in the United States included duty at the United Nations; command of a Tank Battalion at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and a year at Fort Knox, Ky. at the Army Field Forces Board. He departed for Europe in August 1952 to become Chief of Staff to the U.S. Commander in Berlin; from 1953 to 1954 be held a command with the 2nd Armored Division in Europe; then became Chief of Staff of the Division (1954). In 1955 General Mather became the first President of the newly activated Army Maintenance Board at Fort Knox, Kentucky; in 1956 he was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army. General Mather then went to Korea, serving as Assistant Division Commander, 7th Infantry (Bayonet) Division from August 1959 to October 1960. He assumed duties as Chief of Staff, Fourth U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in October 1960. In December 1961 he became Chairman, U.S. Delegation, Joint Brazil-U.S. Military Commission and Chief, MAAG, Brazil, stationed in Rio de Janeiro. Returning to the United States in 1964, General Mather assumed command of the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas. He then served as U.S. Representative, and later as Chairman (1965-66) of the Permanent Military Deputy Group, Central Treaty Organization, in Ankara, Turkey. From February 1966 to May 1967 he served as Commanding General of the V Corps, USAREUR, Frankfort, Germany. In June 1967 General Mather assumed command of the U.S. Army III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. Reassigned in April of 1968 to the Pentagon, he became Director for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations, Department of the Army, until February 1969 when he was appointed Commander in Chief, Southern Command. Among his citations and awards are the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, and the Bronze Star Medal (with V Device).

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE R. MATHER, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

General MATHER. Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege for me to appear before you and assist in your inquiries concerning defense matters in the Caribbean and Latin America. I have submitted my prepared statement for the record and would like to summarize its highlights.

My testimony does not deal with the presence of foreign naval units in the Caribbean nor with the status of our naval forces there. I will defer to Admiral Holmes on those topics.

As Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, my responsibilities in the Caribbean are limited to military assistance matters, specifically to the activities of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in the Dominican Republic.

This is not the extent of my command interest in the Caribbean, however, since the waters of the Caribbean wash the shores of 10 countries and the Panama Canal Zone within my area of responsi

bility. Corresponding to this association, my headquarters coordinates on many planning and operational matters with the U.S. Atlantic Command, and LANTCOM is tasked to provide certain forces when required to augment those in the Canal Zone.

PROTECTION OF THE PANAMA CANAL

The foremost mission of my command is the protection of the Panama Canal and its surrounding zone. It is an important and demanding mission. The continued operation of the canal is of great economic importance to the United States and to friendly countries throughout the world, as I am certain that Governor Leber will attest in his remarks. It also continues to be important to our national defense, even in this age of nuclear weapons, and our separate Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Large carriers cannot transmit the canal, but nuclear submarines do. The canal thus provides a capability for prompt redeployment of this element of our strategic capability. More important to our overall defense posture in these times when defense dollars must be so judiciously allocated are the same economic advantages that concern commercial shippers. The millions of tons of cargo that have passed through the canal each year during the Southeast Asia conflict would have added greatly to the financial burden of our operations had some alternate route been forced upon us.

The forces that are maintained in the Canal Zone are the minimum necessary for the task.

The main Army force is one infantry brigade. The Air Force contributes a C-123 squadron and an A-37 squadron, plus six C-130 transports on rotation. The Navy provides one LST on rotation.

In the unlikely event of an armed attack on the Canal Zone, or in the much more likely case of large-scale riots and incursions such as those experienced in 1964 and 1967, prompt augmentation of these limited forces is essential.

For this reason, the retention of key base areas within the zone is critical for its defense. The important facilities, population centers, and communications arteries must be protected. [Security deletion.] The Governor of the Canal Zone is responsible for security of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone except on military reservations. In the event a threat is beyond the capabilities of the Governor's security forces, he would request and receive assistance from my command. In the event of war, or when war is imminent, the President may direct that I assume exclusive authority over the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone.

Turning now to my responsibilities outside the zone, I think it important to discuss first the relationship of these other responsibilities to the essential Canal Zone task that I have been discussing.

The task of defending the Canal Zone and the security of the population there would be immensely complicated by the implantation of Communist regime in the countries bordering or neighboring the zone. [Security deletion.]

I would now like to comment briefly on the current communist strategy and tactics, and on how these have affected our mission of assisting Latin American countries to maintain internal security.

SHIFT IN COMMUNIST INTERVENTION AND SUBVERSION

Communists and other elements of the radical left, hard pressed in their efforts to establish bases in the countryside, have largely shifted their operations into the cities, where they are becoming increasingly adept at urban terrorism and the sponsorship of mass disorders. The recent wave of assassinations, kidnappings, riots, and other acts of violence represents a serious attack on the conditions of public order that are essential for economic and social progress in Latin America. Guatemala, Colombia, and Venezuela, among the countries bordering the Caribbean, have suffered especially from this new wave of terrorism. The potential for trouble exists to some degree in each Latin American country. The practical advantage of urban terrorism, from the standpoint of the terrorist, is that small groups and even individuals can cause enormous damage to the economy and social fabric of a country with little or no support and no real necessity to develop a sympathetic following.

We have carefully examined our military assistance and advisory efforts in the context of this shift of insurgent tactics. As a result, we have identified new areas of emphasis in our training programs and other forms of assistance. [Security deletion.] The increased urban threat has, in fact, emphasized the necessity for the coordination of all U.S. efforts to assist with Latin American internal security problems.

INTERNAL SECURITY MEASURES

The essential military roles in maintenance of internal security remain unaltered, although the distribution of emphasis on these roles has changed. In most countries, there can now be less attention paid to tactical operations in the field against armed groups. (This generalization does not hold for several countries, including Guatemala and Venezuela, where rebel forces have staged several successful ambushes against army and police elements during the last year.) The capability to conduct counter-guerrilla operations in the field must be maintained, however, for the communists are capable of switching tactics again if the opportunity is left open.

The essential role of the military in support of civil police during mass disturbances and riots has been accentuated by the new situation. The armed forces serve in this role in every Latin American country, just as they do in the United States. They do it, I think, generally quite capably. The performance of the armed forces in Colombia and Guatemala during the elections this year, and in Venezuela last year, was outstanding. We can take some credit for the training, materiel, and advisory assistance that we have contributed to this capability. Another facet of our assistance to Latin American security forces, and one of particular interest for this subcommittee, is the development of capabilities directly related to the threat of Cuban infiltration or attack against Central and South American countries of the Caribbean area.

MULTILATERAL COORDINATION

Within individual countries, we have encouraged and supported the establishment of joint operations centers to improve coordination

among military services and other public security elements. In the Caribbean area, such centers are operating in Columbia, Venezuela, and in Honduras. Progress has been made toward the creation of centers in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.

The fourth annual exercise HALCON VISTA was conducted in May of 1969. This exercise is sponsored by U.S. Southern Command, with CINCLANT support. This exercise is designed to test the surveillance and intercept capabilities of participating Latin American countries bordering the Caribbean basin. The next of these exercises is scheduled for August and September of this year, and I am pleased to report that for the first time the full responsibility for planning and directing this exercise has been accepted by the Latin American participants. This is the kind of capability and cooperation that we have been striving to develop.

Another important activity for developing a cooperative selfdefense capability among the Central American countries has been the Central American Defense Council (or "CONDECA"). Despite the setback resulting from the El Salvador/Honduras conflict, this organization has continued to grow in competence and scope.

MILITARY SCHOOL SYSTEM IN THE CANAL ZONE

Finally, in this brief survey, I must mention the essential contribution that the military school system in the Canal Zone is making to Latin American security capabilities and to cooperation among the nations of the area. I am extremely proud of the United States Army School of the Americas, of the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, and of the smaller but none the less important Small Craft Inspection and Training Team of our Navy component. Their excellent curriculums and the accessibility of their Spanish language instruction serves a genuine training need, especially suited to the smaller countries who lack the capability to conduct extensive training. More than that, the schools are communicating enthusiasms and a spirit of InterAmerican cooperation among their students. We endeavor also to ensure that the schools create an appreciation and understanding of our values. We do not look for this process to effect any sudden reversal of the deep-rooted cultural and social traditions of Latin American societies, but we think the schools have contributed something worthwhile to the quality of life in this hemisphere.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, General. An excellent summary and, I must say, a very carefully planned statement, especially the last part.

It is excellent.

You have a full statement which we will put in the record following your remarks, without objection.

(The prepared statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT BY USCINCSO FOR THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES INTERESTS

It is a privilege to appear before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, and to participate in your inquiries about United States security interests in the Caribbean and Latin America. I share with the members of this subcommit

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tee a deep interest in the nations of Central and South America. My different tours of duty in the region and extensive travel within the area reinforce my belief in the vital and continuing importance of our Latin American neighbors to our own country.

A stable, friendly group of nations on our southern flank enhances U.S. security; conversely, our security and national interests would be derogated if these countries, and especially those bordering the Caribbean, should be controlled by hostile power groups. It is, therefore, in our national interest to see that these nations are encouraged and permitted to grow and prosper in friendly association with us.

The United States has a long history and a heavy investment in the security and economic and social progress of the hemisphere. The Rio Treaty and the Alliance for Progress, and our constructive actions under these programs, testify to that concern. Our economic assistance has helped to stimulate social and economic development, while our military assistance has attempted to foster a climate of stability in which these developments could take place. A basic interest is orderly growth toward a better life for the people of Latin America, who in large measure lead a marginal existence-marginal with respect to the basic necessities of life-food, shelter and clothing. The approximate $12.5 billion in direct U.S. investment is also of concern, as are a favorable balance of payments and an uninterrupted flow of important raw materials.

Base and transit rights in various Latin American countries contribute to U.S. scientific, commercial and defense programs, and add to U.S. security. Establishment of hostile bases in the region, or loss of our present bases would impact upon our security, and U.S. prestige and influence would suffer. Loss or denial of Caribbean bases and the Panama Canal would cut our present lines of communication, significantly raise the cost of operations and weaken our anti-submarine capabilities. Specific effects from the loss or denial of the Panama Canal will be discussed later.

One of our broad national military policy objectives is to deny to an enemy the bases, either political or military, from which our national territory or our world strategic position can be threatened. In part, that policy is difficult of accomplishment unless it is undertaken as a subordinate element of the more important goal of a better life for the people of the Americas. Military security in the area is inextricably linked with economic betterment and social stability; it is not a separate issue. The factors impeding economic growth and social justice in Latin America imperil U.S. security interests, just as much as they threaten the security of the Latin American nations themselves.

The basic enduring problems of our southern neighbors influence U.S. security interests. They have been identified often and well, and it is widely recognized that they continue to hinder the orderly improvement in the standard of living. In fact, the problems may be outracing the remedies. For example, this subcommittee has reported that the encouraging economic growth rate since 1961 which earlier was averaging five per cent per year, has now been cut by accelerat ing population expansion to an annual per capita gain of only 1.5 per cent.

This subcommittee, in its 1969 report on "New Directions for the 1970s: Toward a Strategy of Inter-American Development," listed the forces that obstruct forward movement. Governor Rockefeller discussed them in his report to the President. They make a formidable and challenging recital to us in the military whose role in this area is so deeply involved with promotion of our overall national purposes. The population of Latin America grows at the fastest rate in the world. Demographers say it will reach 600 million by the year 2000. This surging, restless, upward striving population flows into urban areas at a rate beyond the government's capability to absorb, house, feed and employ. Frustration, tensions, and disturbances follow.

Fluctuating commodity prices have hurt one-crop economies; maldistribution of wealth and the revolution of rising expectations accentuate an awakening populace's awareness of its own acute poverty; the transistor radio has allowed millions of people, formerly isolated, to compare the discrepancy between their lot and the richer life available to others; and governmental and societal inertia handicap the application of remedies. All these invite political and social instability, with a parallel growth of political radicalism and increased temptation to turn to authoritarian or radical solutions to problems. They are conditions ripe for exploitation by radical elements of the left or the right.

The preceding general discussion of our interests and some of the problems affecting these interests sets the scene for discussion of the role of U.S. Southern Command in the Canal Zone, the Caribbean and Latin America.