I think if you only look at the Caribbean you only get one picture. If you look at the Caribbean and the Black Sea together, you get another kind of picture. Mr. FASCELL. You see, right now I am looking at the Caribbean and the Mediterranean. Í have seen how the Russians started slowly in the Mediterranean and wound up with a large fleet there without any overt confrontation. Mr. HURWITCH. These are developments. There is no question, I think. Let me be the first to say that I am not a Sovietologist and not an expert in Soviet matters. I think my colleagues in the Department of State would certainly agree that the Soviets have, in the last decade, made a significant and determined push to become a naval power. They have put a lot of their resources into building up their naval strength. What we see, as you rightfully point out in the Mediterranean, and what we see in their ability to detach, have enough ships, a large enough fleet to detach certain portions to sort of let us know, if you like, that perhaps some of our activities in the Black Sea are not quite what they wish. The Caribbean is not immune to a similar thing. Your wisdom in looking at this whole thing in its conglomerate is one which I share because I think one can exaggerate if one looks at it in too narrow a perspective. CUBAN "FISHING" FLEET Mr. FASCELL. One final enumeration. What is there in Cuba, in terms, of so-called fishing boats which are actually more than that? Some of them are 50-foot boats, carry highly sophisticated electronic equipment and are broadbeamed, able to go to sea for long periods of time. Is there an increase in the number of such craft in Cuba-in Castro's fishing fleet? Mr. HURWITCH. There has been a marked increase in the fishing fleet in its literal sense. They do catch more fish, if you like. Some of their larger fishing ships have an intelligence collection capability. They engage in that as well. Mr. FASCELL. There has been an increase in this type of vessel in recent months? Mr. HURWITCH. I do not have specific information on that subject which I can provide you today. Mr. FASCELL. Maybe we can develop that in our executive sessions with more precision. Mr. HURWITCH. I would be pleased to discuss that subject with the committee. Mr. FASCELL. I want to thank you gentlemen very much. We will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, July 9, 1970.) CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN THURSDAY, JULY 9, 1970 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs met at 10 a.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will please come to order. We meet this morning to continue our hearings on Cuba and the Caribbean. Yesterday, most of the testimony and questioning by members of the subcommittee centered on the broad outlines of U.S. policy toward Cuba; on the political, military, and economic conditions in that country; and on the part which Cuba, under the Castro regime, plays in the overall Soviet strategy in the Western Hemisphere. In the process we have established, I believe, that Soviet military incursions into the Caribbean cannot be considered as isolated incidents, but that they are, in all likelihood, an integral part of a long range Soviet plan to establish its diplomatic, economic, and military presence in the southern part of this hemisphere. Today we will begin with another subject--one which Mr. Palmatier introduced at yesterday's hearing: The subject of the Cuban refugee airlift. The accomplishments of that unique humanitarian undertaking are already part of the record. The movement of nearly half a million Cubans to the United States, their absorption into our communities, and their special contributions to our economic and cultural life, have been most impressive. The issue that confronts us now is where do we go from here? A couple of weeks ago, by a narrow margin of five votes, the House of Representatives rejected a proposal which would have abruptly terminated the Cuban airlift. That decision was somewhat tentative. The sentiment in the Congress may be moving in the direction of an early termination of the airlift. When the proposal to cut off funds for the airlift was before the House, I fought against it on the grounds that this entire question was under review at high levels in this administration and that the administration should be allowed an opportunity to investigate the various options which could lead to an orderly return to our national immigration policy as it affects the countries of the Western Hemisphere. I want to pursue that matter this morning, and to find out what kinds of options are available to the administration, the extent to which they have been studied, and the results which they may be expected to produce. We would like to discuss the policy questions and then some of the more detailed information that is necessary for us to have a better understanding of the airlift itself, where it stands, its objectives, goals, priorities, premises, and promises incorporated in the Memorandum of Understanding. Back with us today we have as our witnesses the Honorable Robert A. Hurwitch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Mr. Howard H. Palmatier, Director of the Cuban Refugee Program, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Mr. Robert L. Funseth, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State; and Mr. Glynn W. Baker, Finance Management Officer, Cuban Refugee Program, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. I shall begin by asking several questions of Mr. Palmatier. First, however, if there is no objection, I would like to put in the record a statement by our colleague, the Honorable Claude Pepper, of Florida, who regrets that he could not be here to engage in this discussion. (The document referred to follows:) Hon. DANTE FASCELL, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, DEAR DANTE: You will please accept my deep regrets that on account of being on an investigation trip of the reformatories of the Country with members and staff of the House Select Committee on Crime, I shall be out of Washington during your hearings on Cuban problems, particularly the Cuban airlift, and will not be able to attend. You know how deeply I share your deep concern about all aspects of the Cuban problem including the refugee and the airlift programs. A member of my staff will attend the hearings and keep me informed about them and I will look forward to receiving a copy of them when the hearings are concluded. I am sure that your hearings will be most helpful to you and me in determining what our course should be in the House of Representatives in respect to how we may best resolve any conflicts between proper concern and protection for our own people and Cuban refugees whom Castro's Communistic Government has forced out of their home. Believe me, Always sincerely, CLAUDE PEPPER, Mr. FASCELL. I would like to start with a question at the policy level. Mr. Secretary, what can you tell us this morning about the role assigned to the airlift in the overall review of U.S. policy toward Cuba, presently in process in the administration? STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. HURWITCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS REVIEW OF AIRLIFT PROGRAM Mr. HURWITCH. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here again this morning. Your observation that the question of the airlift for bring ing Cuban refugees to the United States is under review in the executive department is quite accurate. Our bureau in the Department of State and our colleagues in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare are engaged in reviewing this program. Since the program is still under review, there is very little that I am able to say in public session with regard to possible future action that one might contemplate taking with regard to this existing program. However, I would, of course, be pleased to share with you in executive session as much as I am able to with regard to the current state of our deliberations. I say that because, in the absence of any final decision, any contemplated actions or discussion of alternatives give rise to a great deal of speculation. Since this could affect the future of human beings, I think it would be only fair to them not to either give hopes or discourage people, as the case might be. The present policy, with regard to the Cuban airlift, is that which has been embodied in a Memorandum of Understanding with the Cuban Government. As I mentioned in my opening statement yesterday, we regard this as an international commitment and, obviously, from the standpoint of the Department of State, a commitment made by our Government and our country to another country is one that should be lived up to. I think that as the leader of the free world, the importance of our word, the importance of our signature to an international document is one that we should honor. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the motives underlying the Memorandum of Understanding reached with the Cuban Government were essentially humanitarian ones, with special emphasis on that aspect of the Cuban problem that struck us most forcibly. That was the separation of families and the desire, very human desire, to reunite such families. The chaotic situation that existed in 1965 is beyond my powers of description to try to conjure up once again, but I think that I would ask the understanding of the members of the commmittee to try to look back to that period and to recognize the pressures that existed at that time when a Communist dictator said to people living in this country, "If you want your friends and relatives to leave Cuba come and get them." The human impulse that that generated on the part of many people to go to Cuba under any circumstances to liberate from Communist domination members of their family was great. At the same time, a chaotic situation resulted. It was under those circumstances that the Department of State moved as rapidly as it did in order to arrive at some agreement which would bring order out of chaos and avoid the risk of many lives that could have been lost, as indeed some were as a result of the chaotic way in which this was handled before. This Memorandum of Understanding was designed essentially to reunite families in the United States. The exact workings of this memorandum of understanding, its implementation, I would like to leave to my colleague, Mr. Palmatier of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, who is one of the well-known experts in this field. I would say that this Memorandum of Understanding is consonant with the traditions of our country which has welcomed immigrants, people seeking freedom from all over the world. Any serious questioning of the underlying motives of this memorandum of understanding goes to the very heart of the values for which our country stands, which have made our country great. The review that is going on now within the Executive is a review to see whether or not there might be means whereby the spirit and the letter, if you like, of the Memorandum of Understanding could be lived up to and in a manner in which some savings could accrue to the American people for use in other fields. That is the essential purpose of the review that is going on now. Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We would appreciate a review of the state of deliberations in executive session and also a careful analysis of whatever options seem to be developing at this time. It would be of very great interest to us. In the broad general context there are obviously two alternatives with which we were confronted just recently in the legislative process and which we can certainly talk about. One was an action which would have denied funds to the State Department to carry out the transportation aspect of the airlift. I just wonder what your thinking is on that as compared to some kind of orderly, reasonably phased-out effort. Mr. HURWITCH. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I say, I think that we should live up to our international agreements. Therefore, I was quite frankly pleased that the action that was contemplated did not succeed. I am anxious and in a sense worried that the margin was so close. Mr. FASCELL. It does seem to be a clear signal at least by the House. We have had no action on this subject in the Senate as yet. Therefore, it would seem to me that a review by the administration, at the very highest levels, with regard to the continuance of the program is highly essential. How about the humanitarian aspects of this same alternative, Mr. Palmatier? STATEMENT OF HOWARD H. PALMATIER, DIRECTOR, CUBAN REFUGEE PROGRAM, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF AIRLIFT PROGRAM Mr. PALMATIER. To comment further on what Mr. Hurwitch said, as you know, Mr. Fascell, we really don't become involved in the foreign policy aspects of the airlift. We do have an opportunity to talk with the incominng refugees and we do know that all of the refugees coming in at the present time on the airlift have been waiting at least since 1966 to come in. We understand from them that, as soon as they did sign up to leave Cuba as a result of the Memorandum of Understanding, their property was confiscated. In many instances-in most instances, as a matter of fact-they were taken out of a regular job, no matter what that might have been, and put out to work in the cane fields. From that moment on they were officially referred to by the Cuban Government as "worms" and "non-people," so to speak. In talking to them one gets the impression from my point of view at least, |