CANAL ZONE AS A POLITICAL REFUGE An important angle in the Panama Canal situation is that the Canal Zone has served many times as a haven of refuge for Panamanian leaders seeking to escape assassination by their political enemies in a very unstable political entity, the Republic of Panama. The most recent example of the use of the Zone as an asylum was on June 8, 1970, when three colonels and a sergeant of the Panamanian National Guard escaped from prison in Panama City and found safety in the Zone. It is an island of security in a land of endemic revolution, endless political turmoil, technological incoherence, and which today, as is generally the case, is without a constitutional government. Another case of such use of the Zone territory was by Senora Torrijos, wife of Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, on December 15, 1969, when she fled to the Canal Zone during an abortive revolt against her husband, the caudillo of Panama. Never a dull minute down there. Mr. Chairman, I can't stress too strongly that were it not for the Canal Zone under U.S. sovereign control, some of the most brilliant leaders in Panama would have been assassinated. If the United States surrenders that Zone to Panama, as contemplated in the proposed new treaties, the Panama Canal would become a political pawn for the worst type of Panamanian politicians, and the Canal Zone the scene of guerrilla warfare and its inevitable cruelty and tragedy. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF PANAMA CANAL For many years, the Caribbean has been recognized as the Mediterranean of the Americas. As far back as 1960, in an address to the House, I described it as our fourth front and the Panama Canal as the key target for the Communist conquest of that strategic basin. Subsequent events since then have justified my worst fears. The surrender by the United States of the Canal Zone and Canal would inevitably result in a Communist takeover of Panama, as occurred in Cuba, which would include the Canal itself. With our country having given up its legal rights in the premises, it would be powerless to oppose. Moreover, within the last year Soviet missile-capable submarines and surface vessels stationed in Cuba have been sighted in our fourth front. For these and many other reasons, some of them related to the security of the Panama Canal, the Southern Command, with its headquarters in the Canal Zone, should be maintained as essential to hemispheric security and not reduced in importance. Fortunately for the United States, respected leaders in various parts of the Nation have studied the Canal problem and recently expressed their views in a "Memorial to the Congress." I would like consent to attach a copy of that memorial, which we have sent to your committee already, as part of an appendix to my statement. Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. FLOOD. For these and other reasons, some of them related to the security of the Canal, this command I consider of prime importance. It is the only independent command identified with this problem in the entire Western Hemisphere. Finally, I would summarize some of the principal lessons from my many years of study of this Panama Canal question: We have a fine canal now; it is approaching capacity saturation, but not obsolescence. We know how to maintain and operate it. We know how to increase its capacity and operational efficiency, as demonstrated by years of experience. We have a workable treaty with Panama, although partly abrogated through ill-advised surrenders. We have defended the lives of our citizens in the Canal Zone and the Canal itself by the use of our authority. We have now reached the point where, if we do not make known our determination to hold onto this priceless asset of the United States, we may lose it to Soviet power, as happened at the Suez Canal, and one of their great targets, from the early days of Communist writing, is the control of key maritime communications: the Kiel, Suez and Panama Canals; the Straits of Gibraltar and Malacca; and the Strategic Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas. They have got their hands on them all. Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I urge prompt action by this subcommittee on the pending Panama Canal sovereignty resolutions and the printing of the 1967 hearings along with the present hearings, or as an appendix to the present hearings. Such action should enable early adoption by the House of the resolutions and open the way for the long overdue major modernization of the Panama Canal, which we want done. Moreover, such action by the House would serve notice on the executive branch of the determination of the people of the United States to retain full control of both the Canal Zone and Panama Canal. If there can be any reasonable doubt, a scintilla of doubt in any mind, in a referendum, nationwide, the people of this country would vote uncountably to do what I suggest. With such resolutions adopted by the House, should the proposed treaties be sent to the Senate for ratification, some of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle have asked me to lead a march-there will be 200 of them, four abreast-from the House to Mr. Fulbright's committee, and ask to be heard. Thank you, sir. (The document referred to above, "Memorial to the Congress," follows:) MEMORIAL TO THE CONGRESS COMMITTEE FOR CONTINUED U.S. CONTROL OF THE PANAMA CANAL-1970 WASHINGTON, D.C. Honorable Members of the Congress of the United States, the undersigned, who have studied various aspects of interoceanic canal history and problems, wish to express our views: 1. The construction by the United States of the Panama Canal (1904-1914) was one of the greatest works of man. Undertaken as a long-range commitment by the United States in fulfillment of solemn treaty obligations (Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901) as a "mandate for civilization" in an area notorious as the pest hole of the world and as a land of endemic revolution, endless intrigue and governmental instability (Flood, "Panama : Land of Endemic Revolution . . ." Congressional Record, August 7, 1969, temp. pp. H7187-90), the task was accomplished in spite of physical and health conditions that seemed insuperable. Its subsequent management and operation on terms of "entire equality" with tolls that are "just and equitable" have won the praise of the world particularly countries that use the Canal. 2. Full sovereign rights, power and authority of the United States over the Canal Zone territory and Canal were acquired by treaty grant from Panama (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903), all privately owned land and property in the Zone were purchased from individual owners, and Colombia, the sovereign of the Isthmus before Panama's independence, has recognized the title to the Panama Canal and Railroad as vested "entirely and absolutely" in the United States (Thomson-Urrutia Treaty of 1914–22). 3. The gross total investment of our country in the Panama Canal enterprise, including its defense, from 1904 through June 30, 1968, was $6,368,009,000; recoveries during the same period were $1,359,931,421, making a total net investment by the taxpayers of the United States of more than $5,000,000,000. Except for the grant by Panama of full sovereign powers over the Zone territory, our Government would never have assumed the grave responsibilities involved in the construction of the Canal and its later operations, maintenance, sanitation, protection and defense. 4. In 1939, prior to the start of World War Two, the Congress authorized at a cost not to exceed $277,000,000, the construction of a third set of locks known as the Third Locks Project, then hailed as "the largest single current engineering work in the world." This Project was suspended in May 1942 because of more urgent war needs, and the total expenditures thereon were $76,357,405, mostly on lock site excavations at Gatun and Miraflores, which are still usable. Fortunately, an excavation was started at Pedro Miguel. The current program for the enlargement of Gaillard Cut is scheduled to be completed in 1970 at an estimated cost of $81,257,097. These two projects together represent an expenditure of more than $157,000,000 toward the major modernization of the existing Panama Canal. 5. As the result of canal operations during the crucial period of World War Two, there was developed in the Panama Canal organization the first comprehensive proposal for the major operational improvement and increase of capacity of the Canal as derived from actual marine experience, known as the Terminal Lake-Third Locks Plan. This conception includes provision for the (1) Elimination of the bottleneck Pedro Miguel Locks (3) Raising the Gatun Lake water level to its optimum height (about 92') (4) Construction of one set of larger locks (5) Creation at the Pacific end of the Canal of a summit-level terminal lake anchorage for use as a traffic reservoir to correspond with the layout at the Atlantic end, to permit uninterrupted operation of the Pacific locks during fog periods. 6. Competent, experienced engineers have officially reported that "all engineering considerations which are associated with the plan are favorable to it." Moreover, such solution: (1) Enables the maximum utilization of all work so far accomplished. (2) Avoids the danger of disastrous slides. (3) Provides the best operational canal practicable of achievement with the certainty of success. (4) Preserves and increases the existing economy of Panama. (5) Avoids inevitable demands for damages that would be involved in a Canal Zone sea level project. (6) Averts the danger of a potential biological catastrophe with international repercussions that would be caused by removing the fresh water barrier between the Oceans. (7) Can be constructed at "comparatively low cost" without the necessity for negotiating a new canal treaty with Panama. 7. All of these facts are paramount considerations from both U.S. national and international viewpoints and cannot be ignored, especially the diplomatic and treaty angles. In connection with the latter, it should be noted that the original Third Locks Project, being only a modification of the existing Canal, and wholly within the Canal Zone, did not require a new treaty with Panama. Nor, as previously stated, would the Terminal Lake-Third Locks Plan require a new treaty. 8. In contrast, the persistently advocated and strenuously propagandized Sea-Level Project at Panama, initially estimated in 1960 to cost $2,368,500,000, exclusive of indemnity to Panama, has long been a "hardy perennial," and according to former Governor of the Panama Canal, Jay J. Morrow, it seems that no matter how often the impossibility of realizing any such proposal within practicable limits of cost and time is demonstrated, there will always be someone to argue for it; and this, despite its engineering impracticability. Moreover, any sea-level project, whether in the U.S. Canal Zone territory or elsewhere, will require a new treaty or treaties with the countries involved in order to fix the specific conditions for its construction; and this would involve a huge indemnity and a greatly increased annuity that would have to be added to the cost of construction and reflected in tolls, or be wholly borne by the United States taxpayers. 9. Starting with the 1936-39 Treaty with Panama, there has been a sustained erosion of United States rights, powers and authority on the Isthmus, culminating in the completion in 1967 of negotiations for three proposed new canal treaties that would: (1) Surrender United States sovereignty over the Canal Zone to Panama; (2) Make that weak, technologically primitive and unstable country a partner in the management and defense of the Canal; (3) Ultimately give to Panama not only the existing Canal, but also any new one constructed in Panama to replace it, all without any compensation whatever and all in derogation of Article 17, Section 3, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. This provision vests the power to dispose of territory and other property of the United States in the entire Congress (Senate and House) and not in the treatymaking power of our Government (President and Senate). 10. It is clear from the conduct of our Panama Canal policy over many years that policymaking elements within the Department of State have been, and are yet engaged in efforts which will have the effect of diluting or even repudiating entirely the sovereign rights, power and authority of the United States with respect to the Canal end of dissipating the vast investment of the United States in the Canal Zone project. Such actions would eventually and inevitably permit the domination of this strategic waterway by a potentially hostile power that now indirectly controls the Suez Canal. That canal, under such domination, ceased to operate in 1967 with vast consequences of evil to world shipping. 11. Extensive debates in the Congress over the past decade have clarified and narrowed the key canal issues to the following: (1) Retention by the United States of its undiluted and indispensable sovereign rights, power and authority over the Canal Zone territory and Canal, and (2) The major modernization of the existing Panama Canal. Unfortunately, these efforts have been complicated by the agitation of Panamanian extremists, aided and abetted by irresponsible elements in the United States which aim at ceding to Panama complete sovereignty over the Canal Zone and, eventually, the ownership of the existing Canal and any future canal in the Zone or in Panama that might be built by the United States to replace it. 12. In the First Session of the 91st Congress identical bills were introduced in both House and Senate to provide for the major increase of capacity and operational improvement of the existing Panama Canal by modifying the authorized Third Lock Project to embody the principles of the previously mentioned Terminal Lake solution. 13. Starting on October 27, 1969 (Theodore Roosevelt's birthday), more than 100 Members of Congress have sponsored resolutions expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States should maintain and protect its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Panama Canal enterprise, including the Canal Zone, and not surrender any of its powers to any other nation or to any international organization. 14. The Panama Canal is a priceless asset of the United States, essential for interoceanic commerce and Hemispheric security. Clearly, the recent efforts to wrest its control from the United States trace back to the 1917 Communist Revolution and conform to long range Soviet policy of gaining domination over key water routes as in Cuba, which flanks the Atlantic approaches to the Panama Canal, and as was accomplished in the case of the Suez Canal. The real issue as regards the Canal Zone and Canal sovereignty is not United States control versus Panamanian, but United States control versus Communist control. This is the subject that should be debated in the Congress, especially in the Senate. 15. In view of all the foregoing, the undersigned urge prompt action as follows: (1) Adoption by the House of Representatives of pending Panama Canal sovereignty resolutions; also similar action by the Senate. (2) Enactment by the Congress of pending measures for the major modernization of the existing Panama Canal. To these ends, we respectfully urge that hearings be promptly held on the indicated measures and that Congressional policy thereon be determined for early prosecution of the vital work of modernizing the Panama Canal, now approaching capacity saturation. Dr. Karl Brandt, Palo Alto, Calif., Economist, Hoover Institute, Stanford, Calif., Formerly Chairman, President's Council of Economic Advisers. Dr. John C. Briggs, Tampa, Fla., Chairman, Department of Zoology, University of South Florida. William B. Collier, Santa Barbara, Calif., Business Executive with Background of Engineering and Naval Experience. Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, Alexandria, Va., Professor of Economics, Georgetown University. Dr. Donald M. Dozer, Santa Barbara, Calif., Historian, University of California, Authority on Latin America. Cmdr. Carl H. Holm, Miami Beach, Fla., Business Executive, Naval Architect and Engineer. Dr. Walter D. Jacobs, College Park, Md., Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland. Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane, McLean, Va., Engineer and Author. Dean Edwin J. B. Lewis, Washington, D.C., Professor of Accounting, George Washington University, President, Panama Canal Society, Washington, D.C. Dr. Leonard B. Loeb, Berkeley, Calif., Professor of Physics, University of California. Howard A. Meyerhoff, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Consulting Geologist, Formerly Head of Department of Geology, University of Pennsylvania. Richard B. O'Keeffe, Washington, D.C., Assistant Professor, George Mason College, Formerly Research Associate, The American Legion. William E. Russell, New York, N.Y., Lawyer, Publisher and Business Executive. Capt. C. H. Schildhauer, Owings Mills, Md., Aviation Executive. V. Ad. T. G. W. Settle, Washington, D.C., Formerly Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific. Harold L. Varney, New York, N.Y., Editor, Authority on Latin American Policy, Chairman, Committee on Pan American Policy. B. Gen. Herbert D. Vogel, Washington, D.C., Consulting Engineer, Formerly Deputy Governor, Panama Canal Zone. R. Ad. Charles J. Whiting, La Jolla, Calif., Attorney at Law. NOTE.-Institutions are listed for identification purposes only. Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Flood. We have a final vote pending on a bill on the House floor, and I guess we are all going to have to go and vote. I have some questions I would like to ask you, if you would care to come back as soon as we answer the rollcall. I suppose my colleagues would like to do that. So why don't we recess until we answer the rollcall, and come right back in a few minutes. Mr. FLOOD. Good idea. Thank you. (Whereupon, a short recess was taken from 3 p.m. to 3:20 p.m.) Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will please come to order. I want to thank our colleague, the Honorable Dan Flood of Pennsylvania, for giving us this very concise and candid statement, with respect to the Panama Canal. We appreciate that he has made himself available to answer some questions, so that we can add to the record. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE CARIBBEAN You raised the issue of Soviet or Communist designs on the Panama Canal. As I understand it, the point you are making is that as long as the United States retains sovereignty over the Canal Zone, those designs will not be implemented. Mr. FLOOD. Well, Mr. Chairman, when I say the Soviets have designs upon the Panama Canal, I mentioned before we adjourned, part |