children of Americans who may have a Cuban last name, or Spanish last name, but they are Americans, or wives of American citizens, including Americans that maybe can't speak English perfectly well, but they are Americans, and they have the right to be protected by their country.

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH CUBA

Mr. MORSE. Yes. Pursuing, briefly, the questions that Congressman Roybal put to you, I have the feeling unless you communicate with somebody, you can't influence him, and I think that is probably true. I wonder, in spite of the fact that you can argue that the economic sanctions, the lack of commercial relationships between the United States and Cuba, has been damaging to Castro, even though we do know that the Soviet Union has been supplying a significant economic base, and even though we do know that some countries in the Western Hemisphere and many in the Eastern Hemisphere have not respected the economic sanctions, it is usually asserted that the United States refusal to have commercial intercourse with the Cubans has been damaging to the Castro regime. But at the same time, we have denied ourselves the opportunity to have any influence on the events in Cuba, haven't we?

I wonder how these balances out; whether or not the advantage gained by virtue of U.S. refusal to have commercial activity with the Castro regime is greater than the disadvantage resulting from the denial of influence which we have imposed upon ourselves.

Now, I realize that it may be that Castro would not want to have commercial relations with the United States. I understand that, of course. But is it possible that we could have a greater influence, that would be more helpful to the people of Cuba, and advance our own interests if we did have commercial as well as diplomatic relations which would give us a presence in Cuba which might be influential? Mr. AGUIRRE. Well, Congressman, I will tell you my personal opinion, naturally. I would like to divide this answer into sections.

First, we have something that is a technical aspect, in accordance with international law. If any country, any member of the Organization of American States will establish diplomatic relations with Castro, for any reason, political reason, influence, whatever, it is, in my opinion, if we have to respect our structure from the legal point of view, we have to modify the Charter, and we have to eliminate first the incompatibility between our system and the Marxist-Leninist regime, because otherwise, we will destroy the image of our system, at least from the legal point of view.

The other thing is, the convenience of the influence. I don't have any doubt that the reestablishment of commercial relations between the United States and Cuba-and naturally the other countries will do the same thing-will help Castro a lot, but in my opinion, that does not mean that the other countries will develop important influence in Cuba, because of the type of regime there.

Castro will only receive the benefit, but he will not permit any other type of influence, because he has a hundred percent control of everything. We can't imagine, in our free world, how life developes in this type of country. He will get all the benefit, and I don't think we will get any benefit.

CHILE'S RELATIONS WITH CUBA

Mr. MORSE. It has been suggested that perhaps with the change in government in Chile in the months ahead, that that government may seek to change its relations with Cuba, perhaps going to commercial relations, and even to diplomatic relations. What will the effects be, if that were to come about?

Mr. AGUIRRE. Well, naturally, that could happen only in the case that the Communist Party wins the election, or the Christian Democratic Party wins, because if the other party assumes power, that is, Mr. Alessandri, that will not happen. If Chile alone, and despite the resolution of the American Republics, takes this decision, there is no question that it will create a great problem to the inter-American system.

First of all, we have to consider that-maybe that is not the proper word, but I have to use it because of my limitations-that would be a rebellion against the system, because that will be an attitude against the resolution adopted in accordance with the treaty.

As you know, the maximum sanctions it was possible to adopt against Castro, without the intervention of the United Nations, were in accordance with the Rio Treaty, the diplomatic sanctions and the economic sanctions, because the military sanctions have to be approved by the United Nations in accordance with the Article No. 51, I guess. But the other sanctions don't need the approval of the United Nations. And the treaty created an obligation for Chile, and Chile was in the same position of Mexico, during the conference, and they were trying not to break relations with Castro, but they respect the decision of the majority in accordance with the treaty.

There will be a crisis for the inter-American system, that could be only solved, legally speaking, through the International Court of Justice, if the rest of the countries present the case; we don't have an Inter-American Court to decide this type of thing. It has to go to the higher court-The Hague-and that will be a very embarrassing situation for our system, which in certain ways has many problems, and I would not like to see this possibility, because if the second country does the same thing, without any collective decision, it would be very bad for the system. This possibility only exists if Allende, or the former Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Tomic, assumes the Presidency of Chile.

Mr. MORSE. Yes.

Mr. AGUIRRE. Naturally it will be a great problem, not only for the system, but it will help Castro, to have more means to stay in power and carry on subversion in the rest of the hemisphere, including Chile. Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Dr. Aguirre, one of our distinguished colleagues who is not a member of this committee but who is very interested in issues relating to Cuba and the Caribbean, is with us this morning. He is Congressman de la Garza, of Texas. We are happy to welcome him and I just wondered if he had any comment or any questions.

Mr. DE LA GARZA. No, thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. The House bells have just rung, Dr. Aguirre; the House is in session, and a roll call is on, so we will have to end the meeting shortly.

CASTRO'S 26TH JULY ANNIVERSARY SPEECH

I wanted to ask a question about Castro's recent announcement, in which he made the surprising admission that things are so bad in Cuba that the people could have a change of government, if they wanted it. What is your opinion of this?

Mr. AGUIRRE. Well, Congressman, this is not the first time that he admitted that he has been defeated in the economic program of his government. If you remember, when they started, all of them, especially he, and Guevara, condemned the sugar industry; they thought it was possible to develop many other industries in Cuba, and to put the sugar industry in the second level.

Later on, he lived to change his mind and they started again with the sugar industry, after he said that it was a great mistake for the Cuban people to depend on this industry. Now he claims that he is proud of the famous 8 million tons of sugar produced in the last year, which is not true, because it is not in 1 year.

REDUCTION IN CUBAN SUGAR PRODUCTION

If you look at the history of this industry in Cuba, you know that in other years, the production was close to 8 million, but produced in 4 months', and now he needed a year and a half for the normal harvesting of the cane and producing the sugar. He has taken a year and a half to produce 8 million tons, and it was supposed to be produced in 4 months.

Thus they destroyed the cane, and for that reason he knows that in the next 5 years they will be in big trouble.

Naturally, he was very dramatic when he said, "Everything is bad; a tremendous mistake has been made," and so forth, but because of the type of control that he has in his country, he can say that; because no one, when he asked-and I was listening to the speech on the radio when he asked the people if they would like to change the leaders of this revolution-nobody said anything, except to shout, "Fidel! Fidel! Fidel! Fidel!" The people were trained to say that.

CHILEAN AND WORLD REACTION TO CASTRO'S SPEECH

In the rest of the world where there is freedom of expression, the impact of his speech has been extremely important. For instance, in Chile, as you know, it has been a matter of a political discussion. All the people against the Communist Party have been presenting this speech as testimony, as a proof that Allende would like for Chile the same thing that Castro has been doing in Cuba, and they say, "Well, after eleven and a half years, Castro has to admit this defeat, and that is what Allende wants for Chile."

In other words, outside of Cuba it has been, in my opinion, more important than inside, because the people in Cuba did not need for him to say that everything has been mistakes and misery, because there that is all they had, but outside it is very important, especially when the people like to discuss all the problems and like to see how bad is the system that Castro has imposed in Cuba.

It is extremely valuable, this speech, for this purpose. As I mentioned to you, it has been used in Chile and in other countries, because

the consequences, the disaster has to be immense when he needs to say, on a very historic occasion like the 26th of July, something like that, in 4 hours.

Mr. ROYBAL. For 4 hours?

Mr. AGUIRRE. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Dr. Aguirre, we want to thank you very much for cooperating with the committee and coming here to give us your views and your opinions. They are very substantial, and you have made an important contribution to our study.

Mr. AGUIRRE. And I repeat my gratitude for your words, and I consider it a civic and moral obligation to be here. I appreciate you and all the other members of the subcommittee asking me questions, and also, the presence of the Congressman from Texas, Mr. de la Garza. Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, very much.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., Monday, August 3, 1970.)

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