Admiral HOLMES. I think they could reach from Havana to Lima. Mr. FASCELL. But they can go direct from Havana to Lima? Mr. FASCELL. But they are stopping over in Colombia on the way in? Admiral HOLMES. They are stopping in Bogotá, Colombia. Mr. FASCELL. In other words, the Cuban stop is an essential stop. It is not strictly a ploy. Admiral HOLMES. No. I think it is necessary. Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, gentlemen. (Whereupon, at 12:15 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee adiourned subject to call.) CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN MONDAY, JULY 20, 1970 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs met at 10 a.m. in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will please come to order. We meet this morning to continue our hearings on Cuba and the Caribbean. In the early part of this series of hearings, the subcommittee focused attention on issues relating to the Cuban refugee airlift. We have not finished our discussion of that subject, and would like to resume it this morning. There are two major points which stand out from the testimony presented earlier by executive branch witnesses. First, it appears that the executive branch is not reviewing the basic principles underlying the airlift-principles which have very important foreign policy and domestic implications; and Second, the executive branch has given us all kinds of "guesstimates" relating to this undertaking. But testimony presented thus far does not really tell us where the airlift stands today in relation to the primary objectives it was intended to serve, nor where it is going. Nearly a year and a half ago, the Department of State advised me in writing that there were around 100,000 Cubans registered for the airlift still in Cuba and that "it would presumably take 2 years more to bring these people to the United States." That estimate was based on the belief that some 250,000 Cubans registered for the airlift through the spring of 1966, at which point Castro cut off any further registrations. Now, in his testimony the other day, Deputy Assistant Secretary Hurwitch raised that number to 300,000 and expressed his opinion that the airlift could continue for several years at the present rate before the various Cuban and United States lists are depleted. This has introduced a new and conflicting dimension to our discussion. I would therefore like to put into the record the letter which I received a year and a half ago from Mr. William Macomber, who was then the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, and start our discussion with that document. Without objection, the letter will be put into the record. Copies of it are before the subcommittee and our witnesses. (The letter follows:) Hon. DANTE B. FASCELL, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D.C., March 7, 1969. Chairman, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received your letter of February 20 in which you ask the Department's opinion on the issues raised in a recent newspaper editorial which urged the termination of the Cuban refugee airlift. The present movement of refugees by United States Government chartered aircraft from Varadero, Cuba, to Miami began on December 1, 1965, pursuant to the enclosed "Memorandum of Understanding" signed by the Cuban Government and the Swiss Embassy in Havana, representing United States interests in Cuba. This was an outgrowth of President Johnson's declaration included in his remarks at the Statue of Liberty on October 3, 1965 on the occasion of the signing of a new immigration bill. On that occasion President Johnson said that Cuban refugees would be welcomed in this country and that he had directed the Departments of State, of Justice and of Health, Education and Welfare to make all necessary arrangements. In this connection, I enclose a copy of the statement made on March 23, 1966 by Robert M. Sayre, then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The primary motive for the establishment of the refugee airlift was humanitarian and the operation of this program in the last three years has permitted many thousands of Cubans who were seeking to escape the oppressive conditions in Cuba to do so and to join their relatives in the U.S. The movement, in fact, has enabled many separated families to be reunited. By November 30, 1968, the end of the third year of operation, the airlift had brought approximately 132,000 persons to the United States. Through the domestic applications of the Cuban refugee program, operated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the assimilation of this large number of people and their integration into U.S. life has been very successfully carried out, in the Department's opinion. A large proportion of the persons brought here on the airlift have been resettled in areas outside Florida, although the largest concentration remains in the Miami area. Many Cuban refugees have made striking contributions in business, science and the arts. Considering the potentiality for strains involved in the movement of so large a number of people, we believe that this operation has been carried out generally with minimum difficulties. While the Department of State is responsible for the operation of the airlift itself and for dealings with the Cuban Government through the Swiss Embassy on operational details, the domestic aspects of the program and the much larger appropriation for resettlement and welfare activities is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and I would refer you to that Department for a complete evaluation of the domestic applications of the program. There is one additional factor which I would like to point out. When the refugee airlift was first announced, many thousands of Cubans immediately registered for inclusion in the airlift flights. Such persons have in almost all cases suffered penalties as a result of doing so, including a loss of jobs and other forms of discriminatory treatment. Many of them have had a very difficult time in the last few years while awaiting their turn to be called up for a flight. The Cuban Government appears to have stopped accepting registrations for the airlift in the spring of 1966. It has never announced how many people were accepted for registration before the cutoff date. We estimate that there were probably at least 250,000 people who registered and who presumably have been eligible to come out even if no further registrations are ever accepted. Allowing for the approximately 140,000 persons who have been airlifted through February 1969, it seems likely that there are around 100,000 remaining eligibles. At the present rate it would presumably take two years more to bring these people to the United States. Inasmuch as these individuals have already suffered heavy penalties as a result of having indicated their desire to leave Cuba, it could be held that a moral commitment to them was violated if we were to terminate the airlift now. I hope that this explanation will be helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to let me know if you desire any further information. Sincerely yours, WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, JR., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, I am puzzled by this numbers game. I cannot see how these discrepancies were allowed to develop unless you tell me that the number of refugees is totally unrelated to any fundamental U.S. policy objective. STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. HURWITCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS Mr. HURWITCH. I didn't hear what you just said. I was reading a copy of Mr. Macomber's letter which was just handed me. ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CUBANS AWAITING AIRLIFT Mr. FASCELL. According to Mr. Macomber's letter, at least 250,000 Cubans registered for the airlift to the United States. According to the Memorandum of Understanding with Cuba, the United States was supposed to see the list of registrants before they migrated to the United States. I believe that you testified the other day that the United States has never seen that list. Is that correct? Mr. HURWITCH. No, sir, we have never received a complete list from the Cuban Government. We have seen installments. Mr. FASCELL. The United States has never seen a complete list. Have we ever insisted on that? Mr. HURWITCH. Not to my knowledge. It is quite possible the Swiss Embassy has. But whether the Cubans have that complete list or are willing to make it available, we just don't know. Mr. FASCELL. How does the Swiss Embassy know how many people are going to come in? Mr. HURWITCH. Total? Mr. FASCELL. At any time. Mr. HURWITCH. They received these lists in installments, as I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman. These lists are forwarded to the United States where they are checked as to their veracity and to insure that the people on the list are eligible within the context of the Memorandum of Understanding and our immigration laws and so on. Those names that are approved are returned to the Swiss Embassy in Havana for delivery to the Cubans and then they make up the bulk of the passenger lists that come up. Mr. FASCELL. Obviously at the time Mr. Macomber wrote that letter in response to my inquiry, the Swiss Embassy must have estimated there were 250,000 on the list? Mr. HURWITCH. They estimated there were at least 250,000. Mr. HURWITCH. As I recall my testimony, Mr. Chairman, I said that the figure of 300,000, was a guesstimate. We had no accurate way of knowing. I see nothing inconsistent between an estimate of at least 250,000 and guesstimate of 300,000. Mr. FASCELL. I do. Why not say it is 150,000 or 500,000? Why not say it is going to be terminated the end of this year because there are no more people on the list? 47-893-70-10 Mr. HURWITCH. My point was that at "least 250,000" means as a minimum 250,000 and that there could be more. Therefore, I am saying that an estimate of 300,000 is not inconsistent, whereas, I would maintain 150,000 would be inconsistent with "at least 250,000." Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, if the United States has never seen the list and the Swiss Embassy has never seen the list and the lists are submitted by the Castro Government to the Swiss Embassy in installments of somewhere between 8,000 and 14,000 names each-that is the most we seem to have seen of any list anywhere-how can you make any kind of estimate? What value is such an estimate? I don't understand that. Mr. HURWITCH. It is admittedly an unsatisfactory situation, Mr. Chairman. However, as I recall, you asked me to provide such an estinate. The people on the spot are the best able to give us the information. They, in talking with the Cuban officials with whom they are in contact, immigration authorities and others of the Cuban Government, are the ones who have supplied us with the estimate of at least 250,000. In my own examination of the situation since I have taken on this responsibility last fall, I believed in order to be as forthcoming and cooperative as I would like to be with your committee, I gave you a ballpark estimate of 300,000. It was with no intention of misleading you in any way. Mr. FASCELL. I understand that. Mr. HURWITCH. Or to be in conflict with earlier testimony or anything written earlier. At least 250,000 could give you up to one million or two million or anything. At least 250,000 does not give you very much. I was trying to be more specific by saying that as of now it appeared that there may be perhaps 300,000 persons who registered during the December 1965-May 1966 period. I consider it to be a more specific figure than what you received earlier. Mr. FASCELL. You got pretty specific earlier when you said there were about 100,000 Cubans left on the registration lists. An airlift at the present rate could continue for 2 years. That is pretty definite. Mr. HURWITCH. Yes. Presumably take 2 years more to bring these individuals to the United States. As you recall, Mr. Palmatier had testified earlier that we had received a total of 247,000 names from the Cubans of persons on the Cuban master list. Therefore, it seemed to me to repeat the earlier estimate of at least 250,000 would have been a sort of self-evident statement. Therefore, based on what we have now seen, perhaps 300,000 would be a better figure. We simply are in no position to know in any scientific manner the number of Cubans who registered to leave Cuba 4 years ago. We have the guesstimate of the Swiss who are in contact with the Cubans. That is the extent of the sources of our information and of my attempts to respond to the committee's request for an idea as to how many Cubans were still awaiting airlift. U.S. POLICY REVIEW OF AIRLIFT PROGRAM Mr. FASCELL. If you are going to review policy, which is what the administration said it was going to do, it seems to me that the first thing you would determine is whether or not the principal objectives |