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RECENT DECISIONS RELATING TO PATENTS

JULIUS E. SCHINDLER

(National University Law School, '27) ABANDONMENT OF APPLICATION-FAILURE TO APPEAL WITHIN YEAR AFTER FINAL REJECTION-MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN APPLICANT AND ATTORNEY.

(Ex-Parte Stone and Frost, 32 0. G. 7) Where it clearly appears that the attorney well knew the status of the case and had no intention of appealing:

Held that the delay was not unavoidable, although there was a probable misunderstanding between the applicants and the principal attorney as to taking an appeal within the year after final rejection.

ESTOPPEL, DELAY OF MORE THAN TWO YEARS IN CLAIM

ING SUBJECT MATTER CLAIMED IN PATENT.

(Craig vs. Mayer, 349 0. G. 962)

Where “M” was estopped by reason of more than two years' delay after the grant of “C's" patent, to make a claim in the language of the Patent:

Held that he was also estopped to claim the subject matter of that claim unless he actually claimed it before the period of estoppel was reached.

RIGHT TO MAKE CLAIM-FEATURE INHERENT IN THE DISCLOSURE OF THE APPLICATION, BUT NOT

STATED THEREIN.

(Ellis vs. Shaw, 321 0. G. 223; 54 App. D. C. 185; 295 Fed. Rep. 1006)

Where "S” in his specification described lath boards composed of disintegrated fiber, which are, in fact, capable of expanding and contracting under a force less than that necessary to crack plaster:

Held that this function was inherent in the disclosure of his application, and he was entitled to make the claim accordingly, although he did not state the function in his specification or claims.

APPLICATION-PROSECUTION-STATUTORY PERIOD

EXPIRES ON SUNDAY

(Ex Parte Miller, 182 0. G. 976)

Where the year within which action could be taken expires on Sunday:

Held that in order to save the case from abandonment, amendment should be filed on the preceding day.

INTERFERENCE-DILIGENCE

(Andrews vs. Downs, 346 0. G. 785) On the question whether “A” was diligent, both the Court and the Patent Office attached much significance to the fact that the period of his delay came to an end only when he learned that “D” had given the invention to the public through the medium of various publications.

INTERFERENCE-REDUCTION TO PRACTICE, NOT
ESTABLISHED BY A DEVICE WHICH DOES
NOT SUPPORT THE COUNTS OF

THE ISSUE.

(Gulliford vs. Russ, 349 0. G. 470) It would involve a straining of language to describe a coating of abrasive material glued upon a wooden ring as a cutter mounted on a bead, or as a cutter projecting from one face of the bead, and, accordingly the device in question does not support the counts of the issues.

INTERFERENCE-NOLAN ACT OF MARCH 3, 1921. EFFEC

TIVE AGAINST APPLICATION FILED IN THIS

COUNTRY, BEFORE PASSAGE OF ACT.

(Geisler vs. Moulet, 349 0. G. 469)

Where “M," a French citizen, filed an application in France on June 4, 1917, and an application in this country for the same invention July 9, 1918, and “G” claimed conception and reduction to practice in June, 1918:

Held that “M” was entitled to the benefit of the “Nolan Act," and should be awarded priority, although “G’s” application for the invention was filed in this country July 16, 1920, before the passage of the act.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE.

(The Standard Parts Company vs. Peck, 325 0. G. 701; 264 U. S. 52)

Where “p” engaged by contract "to devote his time to the development of a process and machinery for the production of a front spring now used on the product of the Ford Motor Company," and received for his services a stated compensation: Held that the property in the invention belonged to his employer. CLAIMS, COPIED FROM A PATENT-INTERPRETATION OF.

(In re Levy, 331 O. G., 488; 55 App. D. C. 137; 2 (2nd) Fed. Rep. 939)

Where an applicant copied claims from a patent and the office did not give these claims the broad interpretation of which they were capable, and ruled that the application did not disclose the matter claimed:

Held that claims must be given the broadest interpretation which they reasonably will support.

INTERFERENCE, PRIORITY, EVIDENCE, TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES, TO WHOM DECEASED INVENTOR

DISCLOSED INVENTION.

(The Snead S. Co. Iron Works, Assignee of Harry P. MacDonald, Deceased, vs. Behn, 338 0. G. 481; 55 App. D. C. 275;

4 (2nd) Fed. Rep. 942)

When an inventor is dead and has left no documentary evidence of his date of disclosure, the testimony of his brother, who is also an officer of the corporation to which the invention was assigned, that the disclosure was made to him, is sufficient to carry the date of the invention back to the date testified to by the brother without further corroboration.

APPLICATION-ELECTION MAY BE MADE BY ORIGINAL

PRESENTATION OF CLAIMS.

(Ex Parte Mitchell, 196 0. G. 595)

Where an applicant presented claims for a street-sweeping device and also claims which the Examiner rejected as aggregations of a specific scraper and a specific sweeping device, and after such rejection presented specific claims to the scraper:

Held that if the Examiner was of the opinion that the scraper and sweeper constituted divisible inventions, he properly required the cancellation of the latter claims.

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL

Graduate Department

One-year course of study leading to the degrees of LL.M., S.J.D. and M.P.L., and two-year course of study leading to the degree of D.C.L.

Graduate courses include such subjects as Admiralty, International Law, Medical Jurisprudence, Patent Law, Roman Law, Federal Trade Commission, Evolution of Modern Civil Law, Canonical Law, International Claims, Government Contracts and Claims, Land and Irrigation Law, Federal Tax Laws, Trusts and Monopolies, and other subjects of vital importance to lawyers, but which as a rule cannot be included in undergraduate courses.

Catalogue giving full information as to entrance requirements, tuition fees, etc., may be had upon application to the Secretary, 816-820 Thirteenth Street N. W., Washington, D. C.

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