LETTER III.

REVEREND AND DEAR SIR,

My great object, hitherto, has been to show, that the real question at issue between us, in regard to a distinction in the Godhead and the divinity of the Saviour, cannot be decided independently of the Scriptures. There is no such absurdity or inconsistency in either of these doctrines, as will justify us in rejecting them without investigation. The question, whether they are true or not, belongs entirely and purely to revelation. If you admit this, then the simple question between us is, What does revelation teach? We are agreed that the Bible is the Word of God; that whatever "Christ taught, either during his personal ministry, or by his inspired Apostles, is of divine authority." We are agreed as to principles of interpretation, in most things that are of importance. We both concede, that the principles by which all books are to be interpreted, are those which apply to the interpretation of the Bible; for the very plain reason which you have given, that when God condescends to speak and write for men, it is according to the established rules of human language. What better than an enigma would the Scriptures be, if such were not the fact? An inspired interpreter would be as necessary to explain, as an inspired prophet or apostle was to compose, the books of Scripture.

From this great and fundamental principle of the Scriptural writings,-viz. that they are composed agreeably to the common laws of human language, it results, that the grammatical analysis of the words of any passage,-i. e. an investigation of their usual and general meaning, of their syntactical connexion, of their idiom, and of their relation to the context, must be the essential process, in determining the sense of any text or part of Scripture.

On this fundamental process, depends the interpretation of all the classics, and of all other books. In conformity to this process, rules of interpretation are prescribed, which cannot be violated without at once plunging into the dark and boundless field of conjectural exegesis. I may obtain aid from many sources, to throw light upon the meaning of words and sentences. From a knowledge of the geography of any country-of its climate, soil, productions, mountains, rivers, and other natural objects, as well as of the manners, customs, laws, history, &c., of its inhabitants-I may obtain assistance to explain its language, and must obtain it, if I mean to make out a satisfactory interpretation. But I can never dispense with the laws of grammatical analysis. These laws are vindicated by the simple fact, that every writer wishes and expects to be understood by his cotemporaries, and therefore may be expected to use language as they do. We presume this of the sacred writers; and therefore apply to their productions, as to those of classic authors, the common rules of grammatical interpretation.

Admitting these rules to be the best and surest guide to the meaning of language, we cannot supersede them by supposing, or conjecturing, peculiarities in a writer. It is only when these peculiarities are proved, or at least rendered probable, that they can be admitted to influence our interpretation of any passage. Without such proof, we cannot violate the obvious principles of grammatical interpretation, for the sake of vindicating from inconsistency, absurdity, or contradiction, any author, even a Scriptural one.

I must here explain myself, however, in order to prevent mistake in regard to my meaning. The Scriptures certainly stand on different ground from that on which any other book rests, on account of their claim to be received as a revelation from God. What other book can plead well-authenticated miracles for its support; or can produce declarations of a prophetic nature that have been fulfilled; or can glory in such an exhibition of the principles of piety and virtue-of love to God, and of benevolence and beneficence to men? Just in proportion, then, as these evidences influence my mind to believe that the

Bible is of divine origin, in the same proportion it becomes improbable to me that this Bible contains absurdities, errors, or contradictions. When any apparent error or contradiction attracts my attention, I hesitate to pronounce it such as it appears to be. My reason for doing so is the strength of the evidence in favour of its divine origin; which is such, that I must do violence to my convictions, if I admit that the book contains either what is erroneous or contradictory. I am, then, slow to attribute, in any case, such a sense to words in the Scriptures, as would make a passage speak either absurdity or contradiction. But if, after all the light which I could gain, it should appear still to be a plain case, that there is either absurdity or contradiction in the sacred text; then I must find a different reading-or give up the passage-or renounce the whole book. I may suspend an opinion, while I live, as to doubtful cases. My convictions respecting the nature and design of the Holy Scriptures, the imperfection of my knowledge, diffidence in myself, all demand that I should act in this manner. But, in any clear case, where the meaning of a sacred writer, or what he originally designed to say, can be definitely ascertained by the common laws of interpretation,-and it appears plainly that this meaning is erroneous, or contradicts some other passage,— I have no right to put a constructive sense upon the words, and do violence to the passage, in order to avoid the consequences that may follow. I cannot honestly do it. The same common sense and reason which prescribe the laws of exegesis, decide that the meaning of a writer must be that which those laws determine it to be. Of course, if I put a gloss upon any passage, which represents it as conveying a meaning different from that which the laws of interpretation would assign to it, I may deceive others, or I may serve the interests of party; but I violate the reason which God has given me by so doing, and act a part dishonest, and unworthy of an inquirer after truth.

If the fundamental maxims of exegesis lead to the belief that a writer of the New Testament has contradicted himself, or another sacred writer, then I must revert at once to the question, Is the book divine? Can it be so, if there is contradiction? This question I may settle (on my re

sponsibility to God) as I please. But I have no right to violate the fundamental rules of language, by forcing a meaning upon the writer to make him consistent; which it is obvious, on the universal principles of explaining language, he never designed to convey. In determining the question, whether the writers of the New Testament were inspired, I must always, in attending to the internal evidence of the books, consider whether they have contradicted each other. To determine this question, I cannot violate the simple rules of grammatical exegesis. I must read this book as I do all other books. Then, if there evidently be contradiction, I must reject its claims; if there be not,—and, I think, the evidence is sufficient that they are well-founded,-I must admit them. But, at any period subsequent to this, when I have admitted the book to be inspired, I am not at liberty to aver that the writers could never have taught some particular doctrine which I may dislike; and therefore to do violence to the rules of grammatical interpretation, in order to explain away a doctrine of this nature, which they seem to inculcate. My simple inquiry must be, what sentiment does the language of this or that passage convey, without violence or perversion of rule? When this question is settled philologically (not philosophically), then I either believe what is taught, or else reject the claim of divine authority. What can my own theories and reasonings, about the absurdity or reasonableness of any particular doctrine, avail in determining whether a writer of the New Testament has taught this doctrine or not? My investigation must be conducted independently of my philosophy, by my philology. And, when I have obtained his meaning by the simple and universal rules of expounding language, I choose the course I will take; 1 must believe his assertion, or reject his authority.

If these be not sound maxims of interpretation, I confess myself a stranger to the subject; nor can I help thinking that you will accord with me at once in the views just expressed.

Guided, then, by these principles, let us now come to the investigation of a few passages in the New Testament, which concern the divine nature of Christ. I take this

point, because you have dwelt most upon it; and because, very obviously, when this is admitted or rejected, no possible objection can be felt to admitting or rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity.

You will not require of me, however, to examine at length every text of the New Testament, which I may suppose to have any connexion with the subject in question. I must be permitted, in order to save time, to select only those texts, the language of which appears to be genuine, and above the condemnation of textual criticism; and such as appear to contain the best and most decisive proof of the point to be discussed. Believing the New Testament to be of divine origin and authority, you will permit me to add, that I cannot think the decision of this or any other question, depends on the number of times in which the terms of that decision are repeated.

I observe, then,

I. The New Testament gives to Christ the appellation of GOD, in such a manner as that, according to the fair rules of interpretation, only the SUPREME GOD can be meant.

A conspicuous passage in proof of this I should find in John, i. 1—3. :-" In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made." Verse 10. "And the world was made by him."

All known manuscripts agree in the text here. Griesbach has indeed recorded, that, foros (Theos, God), there is a conjectural reading Otov; and that for naι Oids 7་ ὁ λογος, there is a conjectural reading of Θεος ην και ὁ λογος. The first of these conjectures was made by Crellius. (Initium Evang. Johan. restauratum per. L. M. Artemonium, P. i. c. 2.) The reason of making such a conjecture Crellius has given.

"The greater Christ is," says he, "compared with other gods (the Father excepted), the less can he be expressly called God, lest he should be taken for the supreme God the Father." And again, "If he (Christ) had been expressly called God by the sacred writers, and had not always been distinguished from God, the sacred writers would have given an occasion to unskilful men to regard him as the supreme God."-init. Evang. Johan., p. 295.).