Mr. HUMPHREY. I recognize that the Senator has quoted the citation. I can give him quotations contrary to that one, without fear of contradiction. I am not a lawyer, but I have studied jurisprudence, constitutional law, and case law, and I know of no time when a court of competent jurisdiction has said that statements made by legislators relating to a law are without meaning or that they have no effect upon the interpretation of law or the application of law. To the contrary. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The Senator says he knows of no cases in which the courts have so held. However, I have just cited one case. I can cite the Senator another. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (254 U.S. 443) : "By repeated decisions of this court, it has come to be well established that the debates in Congress expressive of the views and motives of individual members are not a safe guide, and hence may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body." It was for this reason that I joined with others in attempting to send the bill to committee, in the first instance, so that the courts would have a reliable committee report upon which to gage and judge and ascertain the intent of the legislative body. Mr. HUMPHREY. I say most respectfully to the Senator that in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, if the Senator in charge of the bill, or the Senator who submits an amendment to a bill makes a statement relating to the bill, while it is not conclusive, it is considered to be relevant and considered to be interpretive of the statute. But there is an easy way to answer the Senator's question: Let the Senator put what he wants into an amendment. I do not see any reason for him to be on the fringes of this issue. All he has to do is to offer an amendment, if he has any doubts. The Senator has been discussing the amendment with me. There is no prob lem. I should be happy to join him in encouraging Senators to approve of his amendment. I should like to make one further reference to the Gary case. This case makes it quite clear that while the Constitution prohibits segregation, it does not require integration. The busing of children to achieve racial balance would be an act to effect the integration of schools. In fact, if the bill were to compel it, it would be a violation, because it would be handling the matter on the basis of race and we would be transporting children because of race. The bill does not attempt to integrate the schools, but it does attempt to eliminate segregation in the school systems. The natural factors such as density of population, and the distance that students would have to travel are considered legitimate means to determine the validity of a school district, if the school districts are not gerrymandered, and in effect deliberately segregated. The fact that there is a racial imbalance per se is not something which is unconstitutional. That is why we have attempted to clarify it with the language of section 4. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I concede that the statement by the Senator as floor manager of the bill would doubtlessly stand upon a more solid footing than would statements by certain other Senators when it comes to ascertaining the intent of this legislative body by the courts. I close by saying that the discussion we have had today points up, in my judgment, the fact that there is much about the substitute which needs further exploration, further explanation, and considerable amount of additional debate in order that the language might be made unambiguous and clear to all Senators who will vote on the bill. In my judgment, the language that we have been discussing is not at all clear. I appreciate the interpretations that have been placed upon it by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota and by the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS]. I think they have been helpful. But it is just such discussions as this which will be of assistance to us as we proceed to move in the direction of a vote on cloture, and, if cloture is invoked, a vote on the bill. But I insist that there is much language in the substitute, as there is much language in the bill, which is unclear to this Senator. And I would judge that it is unclear to other Senators. COMMENTS ON CERTAIN CRITICISMS MADE WITH RESPECT TO TITLE I OF THE PROPOSED "CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1966" 1. It has been suggested that jurors would have to be drawn from all over the district rather than from areas around the places where court is held. However, under section 1863 (a) of Title I the court is expressly authorized to establish a separate jury commission "for one or more divisions of the judicial district" and by virtue of the definition of "division" in section 1870 (c) a separate jury commission and master wheel can be established for each place where court is actually held-as under present law. It is true that in some districts, despite the fact that court is held in several places, the areas served by the various places of holding court are still relatively large. The present practice in some of these districts is to draw jurors exclusively from areas close to the court. Of course, the effect of this is to deprive many qualified citizens of the opportunity to serve on federal juries. contrary to the policy of Title I as declared in section 1861. Moreover, whatever burden travel in such areas may be thought to impose on jurors would be substantially ameliorated by the provisions doubling the present jury fees from $10 to $20 per day. 2. A number of judges urged that persons who are required to make a special trip to the clerk's office to fill out a juror qualification form should be compensated for their expenses. Section 1865 (a) was amended during the House debate to authorize payment to such persons of the same fees and travel allowances provided in 28 U.S.C. 1871 for actual jury service. And provision has been made by an amendment approved in committee to authorize mailing in of the forms if the chief judge determines that the personal appearance procedure would entail undue hardship or undue inconvenience. 3. Many judges expressed the view that the present compensation for appointed jury commissioners is inadequate, that the $16 daily rate of compensation proposed in the bill as introduced was also inadequate, and that appointed jury commissioners should be compensated for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses. Title I, as amended and passed by the House, reflects this view and provides that appointed jury commissioners shall be compensated at a rate to be fixed by the chief judge not to exceed $50 per day and that they shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses. 4. Several judges and clerks of court have expressed the view that the number of names required by subsection 1864 (b) of the bill as introduced to be included in the master jury wheel was unnecessarily large, and that this provision would impose an onerous administrative burden on the jury commission. In the bill as introduced, section 1864 (b) would have required the jury commission to place in the master wheel the names of one percent of the total number of persons on the voter registration rolls for the district or division, or 2,000 names, whichever was greater. The House responded to this objection by reducing from one to one-half percent the names required to be placed in the master wheel, and permitting the chief judge of the district and the judicial council to reduce the number further, with a floor of three times the number of persons actually called for jury service within the preceding year. While the basis of this objection, therefore, has been largely eliminated, it is useful to point out why the larger number was selected originally and why the 2 percent figure seems to be the lowest figure which should be permitted. A large number of names is required to be placed in the master wheel to assure that a broad cross-section of the community is actually represented in that wheel. It is obvious that the smaller the number of names placed in the master wheel, the greater are the chances that the names in the wheel will not reflect the population of the district or division in terms of race, religion, sex, national origin, and economic status-unless experts in sampling techniques are to supervise the random selection process, which is not contemplated by the Title. It is for this reason that that part of the House amendment permitting a reduction in the number of names below the one half of one percent standard seems doubtful. 65-506-66-pt. 2- -53 |