Supreme Court of Missouri, November 20, 1882.

1. In an action for negligently causing death by a railroad train, held, that aside from statutory or municipal regulation, no rate of speed is negligent per se. 2. Where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff shows that although the defendant was running its trains at a negligent rate of speed, still there was no connection between the rate of speed and the accident, but that the injury was caused by the forgetful and neglectful state of the deceased at the time, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant.

Appeal from Johnson Circuit Court.

Thomas J. Portis, for appellant; John F. Phillips, for respondent.

SHERWOOD, C. J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

The plaintiffs bring this action under the damage act, because of the death of their son, who was fatally injured by the defendant's cars. We rest our decision upon the evidence introduced by plaintiffs themselves in this cause, waiving all other questions whatsoever, as being altogether immaterial. That evidence, in substance and in brief, discloses that the son was a lad between fifteen and sixteen years of age, accustomed to go about the cars, to transact business there with the consent of his father, with whom he had been a great deal on the cars, shipping stock, and who had often warned him for three or four years before the occurrence of the accident, of the dangers attendant on proximity to the cars, but who nevertheless permitted him to go about the town of Holden, and the streets and depot, anywhere, regarding him as competent to take care of himself; that the son, in consequence of the facts aforesaid, was acquainted with the arrival and departure of the trains; that on the fatal evening he went down to the train to get newspapers from the express car of Metzler & Sinith, in whose employ he then was, by his father's permission; that a train of cars coming from the west, such as that by which the son was killed, could be seen approaching for a mile or more when the track was clear, and that the track had to be clear in order for the train from the west to come in on the main track, its customary one, and the one on which the accident occurred; that the east end of the switch was distant from the street crossing 200 yards or more; that the train in questien, No. 4, was heard to approach, the impression of one witness being that it gave the customary signal, or station whistle, which was heard before he saw the train reach the west end of the switch, about a quarter of a mile distant; that the boy was not seen by one witness, who was within a few feet of where the accident occurred, and watched the approaching train when he first looked; that he looked in

another direction for a very short space of time, standing in between the tracks, and then saw the boy whom he had not seen before in between the middle and main tracks,a space of nineor ten feet. just at the instant he was struck by No. 4; that. whether the boy was in motion couid not be told; that the boy was seen by another witness on the street crossing on the main track looking towards the South but a second before he was struck, having been left by his companion only a few moments before, standing in between the middle and main tracks, a place of perfect safety; that short,. sharp danger whistles were heard just before the train causing the injury came in at the street. crossing, and that the speed at which the train was running was variously estimated at from six to eight and ten miles per hour.

Upon these facts thus briefly recited the defendant asked an instruction to the effect that the plaintiffs could not recover.

We have no hesitation in saying that such an instruction should have been given. Much has been said about the rate of speed at which the train was run. Aside from statutory or municipal regulations no rate of speed is negligent per

se.

Maher v. Railroad, 64 Mo. 267; Bell v. Railroad, 72 Mo. 50; Wallace v. Railroad, 74 Mo. 594. But granting that the rate of speed was somewhat greater than customary, still there is nothing to show it to have been a reckless or wanton rate of speed, or granting so much as that, that there was any necessary connection between such a rate of speed and the injury inflicted. From all that can be gathered from the most liberal inferences from the facts in evidence, the son, in his forgetful and neglectful state, would as surely have been struck by a train moving at four miles an hour as at the one plaintiffs' witnesses claim it was moving. Making the broad concession, for argument's sake, that the testimony tended to show that the defendant was negligent, still there was nothing to show that this, of necessity,caused the injury. On the contrary thereof, the only inference that can be fairly drawn from the testimony, is that but for the boy's neglect to act in a. manner suitable to the situation in which he was placed, suitable to the dangerous machinery by which he was surrounded; that but for his heedlessness, not to say absolute rashness, in failing to look and listen for the train, of whose expected arrival he was fully aware, the accident would not have occurred. That he could have seen the train if he had looked; that ne could (have) heard it if he had listened is abundantly established, and this case in this, its most essential features, resembles Bell's case, supra, as well as that of Purl's. case, 72 Mo. 168, where views were taken of the evidence similar to those expressed in the present opinion. And it is the duty of the trial court, the facts being undisputed, facts which show that, conceding defendant's negligence, yet that notwithstanding this, the injury would not have occurred but for the contributory negligence of the party injured, directly tending to produce that.

injury, to direct the jury to find for the defendant. In a word, negligence, and injury as its legitimate consequence, must both concur, or else the detendant will not on any legal principles be liable, and so the jury in a proper case should be told.

And it is as much the duty and province of the trial court to direct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, where the undisputed facts show no legal liability to have been incurred, as it is in the province of the jury where there is conflicting evidence-evidence tending to establish the demand of the plaintiffs and the defense of the defendant, to return a verdict for either party. This is well settled law, both in this State and elsewhere. Harris v. Woody, 9 Mo. 113; Lee v. David, 11 Mo. 114; Alexander v. Harrison, 38 Mo. 258; Holman v. Railroad Co., 62 Mo. 562; Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131, and cases cited; Singleton v. Railroad Co., 41 Mo. 465; Bell's Case, supra; Maher v. Railroad, 64 Mo. 267; Harlan v. Railroad, Ib. 480; Fletcher v. Railroad, Ib. 480; Zimmerman v. Railroad, 61 Mo. 491; Railroad Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697; Proffatt on Jur. Tr., secs. 351, 352, 354, and cases there cited.

Such a direction to the jury does not usurp their province as triers of the facts; does not intermeddle with the facts, but simply pronounces the law on the uncontroverted evidence; simply asserts the province and prerogative of the court to declare the inference which the law itself draws from undisputed facts; simply asserts that in point of law the evidence introduced by a party is insufficient to warrant a verdict in his favor, and therefore directs a verdict for the opposite party. Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469.

In

In Callahan's Case, supra, an action for damages for negligence, it was said by Holmes, J.: "The cause of action is founded on the alleged negligence of the defendants, and the very gist of the action is that the negligence of the defendants caused the accident and produced the injury. The burden of proof is on the plaintiffs, and if there be no evidence sufficient in law to make out a prima facie case on this issue, plaintiff can not be entitled to recover." And it was then ruledthat as no prima facie case of liability against the defendants was made out by the plaintiffs' evidence, that the court should then have declared the law to the jury. Brown v. European Co., 58 Me. 389, Appleton, C. J., said: "It would be absurd to send a cause to a jury when a verdict, if rendered in favor of a plaintiff, would not be permitted to stand " In Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 122, the court thus states the rule respecting the point in hand: "If the court is satisfied that conceding all the inferences which the jury could justifiably draw from the testimony, the evidence is insufficient to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, the court should say so to the jury." In Wilds v. R. R., 24 N. Y. 433, it is declared that: "Cases of negligence form no extion to the rule. * * No court can be guilty of the absurdity of holding that it would not be competent for the judge who tried the

*

cause, either to non-suit the plaintiff, or direct a verdict in his favor, as the ease might have required. No legal principle compels him to allow a jury to render a merely idle verdict." In Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. 284, Mr. Justice Clifford, speaking for the court, said: "Judges are no longer required to submit a case to the jury, merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that it would warrant the jury to proceed in finding a verdict in favor of the party introducing such evidence. Decided cases may be found where it is held that, if there is a scintilla of evidence in support of a case, the judge is bound to leave it to the jury, but the modern decisions have established a more reasonable rule, to-wit: That before the evidence is left to the jury, there is, or may be in every case, a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the burden of proof is imposed."

So, also, in another case, where the trial court, by an instruction, had taken the case from the jury and directed a verdict for the defendant, Mr. Justice Swayne, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It was proper to give the instruction, if it were clear the plaintiff could not recover. It would have been idle to proceed further, when such would be the inevitable result. The practice is a wise one. It saves time and costs; it gives the certainty of applied science to the results of judicial investigation; it draws clearly the line which separates the provinces of the judge and jury, and fixes where it belongs, the responsibility which should be assumed by the courts." Merchant's Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 637.

Tested by the light of the authorities cited and quoted, as well as by that of obvious reason, the instruction commented on should have been given.

Therefore judgment reversed, but cause not remanded, because plaintiffs, on their own showing, had no standing in court. All concur, Norton, J., in the result.

ment between the covenantor and "S, and such other parties as he may associate with him under the name of S & Co.," signed and sealed by the covenantor, and signed "S & Co." by the hand of S, acting in behalf and by authority of the partnership-to pay to the said S & Co., parties of the second part," for work to be done by them, all those who are partners at the time of the signing of the agreement may join. Seymour v. Western R. Co., U. S. S. C., Nov. 13, 1882; 5 Morr. Trans., 96.

2. APPELLATE PRACTICE-WRIT OF Error. Where a judgment affects defendants jointly and not severally, and there has been no summons and severance or other equivalent proceeding, a writ of error by one alone will not lie. Feibelman v. Packard, U. S. S. C., Nov. 13, 1882; 5 Morr. Trans., 98.

3. BANKRUPTCY-FIDUCIARY DEBT-DISCHARGE. A debt due by a bankrupt as a fiduciary is not discharged by composition proceedings under the amended bankrupt act of 1874, section 5117 of the United States Revised Statutes not having been repealed thereby. Bayley v. Washington and Lee University, U. S. S. C., Nov. 6, 1882; 5 Morr. Trans., 90.

4. COMMON CARRIER-INJURY TO PASSENGER ON SLEEPING CAR.

1. A passenger, by train of a railroad company, traveling in the coach of a sleeping car company, may properly assume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that the whole train is under one management; and in such case, where he sustains injury by the negligence of one in the employ of the sleeping car company, he may maintain an action against the railroad company. What the effect of such notice would be is not determined. 2. On proof of injury sustained by a passenger on a railroad train, by the fall of a berth in a sleeping car, and that the passenger was without fault, a presumption arises, in the absence of other proof, that the railroad company is liable. Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Walrath, S. C. Ohio, Nov. 38, 1882; 3 Ohio L. J., 259.

5. COMMON CARRIERS-SLEEPING CAR COMPANIES NOT INN-KEEPERS-LIABILITY FOR PROPERTY STOLEN.

Action by appellee against appellant to recover the value of certain property stolen from his person while occupying a berth in one of appellant's sleeping cars. A sleeping car company is not liable as an inn-keeper or common carrier, but it impliedly agrees to keep watch over its patrons while asleep, and to take reasonable care to pie. vent the theft of his goods and money from his person. The case of an occupant of a berth in a sleeping car is similar to that of the occupant of a state room on a steamboat, and it has been held that a steamboat company is liable to such occupant, in the absence of negligence or fraud on his part, for the value of goods stolen from him during the night. It was found by the court that two sleeping cars in the train were under the charge of one conductor, and that he left the train in the. night, and for eighty-four miles there was no conductor in charge of the cars, and, therefore, one conductor ad charge of four cars. Each car had a porter, but he had duties which were inconsistent with his keeping watch over the occupants. These facts clearly showed negligence on the part of the company. Woodruff Sleeping Car Co, v. Diehl, S. C. Ind., Nov. 28, 1882.

6. CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONTRACT OF INDEMNITYLEX LOCI AND LEX Fori.

The defendant in error, also defendant below, executed and delivered, in New York, a bond of indemnity conditioned to hold harmless and fully indemnify the obligee against all loss or damage arising from the liability of the latter on an appeal bond, which he had entered into in Louisiana, as surety, for a certain railroad company, defendant in a judgment rendered against it in the courts of that State, and which, being affirmed, he was compelled to pay. 2. By the law of New York, any written instrument, although under seal, was subject to impeachment for want of consideration; and a pre-existing liability, entered into without request, which was the sole consideration of the bond of indemnity sued on, was insufficient. It was otherwise in Louisiana. 3. A suit on the bond having been brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, it is held, 1. That the question of the validity of the bond, as dependent upon the sufficiency of its consideration, is not a matter of procedure and remedy, to be governed by the ler fori, but belongs to the substance of the contract, and must be determined by the law of the seat of the obligation 2. In every forum a contract is governed by the law with a view to which it is made, beca se, by the consent of the parties, that law becomes a part of their agreement; and it is, therefore, to be presumed, in the absence of any express declaration or controlling circumstances to the contrary, that the parties had in contemplation a law according to which their contract would be upheld, rather than one by which it would be defeated. 3. The obligation of the bond of indemnity was either to place funds in the hands of the obligee wherewith to discharge his liability when it became fixed by judgment, or to refund to him his necessary advances in discharging it in the place where his liability was legally solvable; and as this obligation could only be fulfilled in Louisiana, it must be governed by the law of that State as the lex loci solutionis. Pritchard v. Norton. U. S. S. C., November 13, 1882; 5 Morr. Trans., 115.

-DEGREE

7. CRIMINAL LAW-FRAUDULENT BOND OF SIMILITUDE REQUIRED. A bond resembling a United States bond, but unexecuted, is not an obligation or other security" within the meaning of sec. 5480 R. S., and an indictment for having it in possession can not be sustained under that section. To constitute the offense, it is not necessary that the fraudulent bond purports to be an obligation of the United States, or that the similitude be such as to deceive experts or cautious men; it is sufficient that it be calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting man of ordinary observation and care, dealing with a man supposed to be honest. United States v. Willis, U. S. D. C., E. D. Wis.; 15 Chic. Leg. N., 107.

9. DEPOSITIONS-NOTARY PUBLIC-HABEAS CORPUS-REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO TESTIFY BEFORE NOTARY-RIGHT TO IMPRISON.

The petitioner applying to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, was imprisoned by the notary public in St. Louis for refusing to testify and give his deposition before said notary, upon the ground that he had previously testified in a case where the issues were the same, and that his evidence is preserved in a bill of exceptions in the same court where his depositions are wanted; that he is in good health, and lives in St. Louis, and will be able and is willing to be present and give testimony personally in court: Held, that the petitioner was bound to testify, and that the notary had authority to commit on his refusal. The court refuses to issue the writ, with the observation that the oppression and annoyance which witnesses and suitors who may be summoned to testify may be subjected, under the statute which confers on notaries and justices of the peace, is a matter for the consideration of the legislature; and we shall withhold an opinion until it shall have come before us. Ex parte Jonn G. Priest, S. C. Mo.

10. EASEMENT-PRESCRIPTION-NON-USER.

The right of passage-way through an alley-way, granted for the benefit of abutting lots, is prescribed and lost by non-user for ten years. Thompson v. Meyers, S. C. La., 15 Chic. Leg. N., 112.

11. EMINENT DOMAIN-PUBLIC USE-DIVERSION. Where a building erected on land, expropriated for the purpose of a railroad station, is used as such, but a private business is carried on in certain rooms by one who is an agent of the company, and receives his compensation in being allowed the use of the rooms, in which, however, freight is stored when necessary, it is not such a diversion by the company from the use for which the land was expropriated as to authorize an action for damages. Hoggart v. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., S. C. La., May, 1882, 14 Rep., 689.

12. EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION OF DEATH-ABSENCE FOR SEVEN YEARS.

A died intestate, leaving a number of heirs at law; his real estate was partitioned, and one of the heirs, B, took the estate at the appraised price, entering into a recognizance to pay the other heirs of A their distributive shares; C, another of A's heirs, became B's surety. D, the third son of A, had died about seven years before the death of A, leaving, however, three children surviving him. One of these children had been unheard of for more than seven years, and administration had been granted to her brother E upon her estate on the presumption of death. More than twenty years after the death of A, this presumed dead child of D turns up and proceeds against B and C, the recognizor and his surety in the partition proceeding. Held: Persons who undertake to act upon the presumption of death must bear the consequences of the failure of that presumption, as such a presumption may be successfully rebutted by proof that the person whose death it was thus sought to establish was in full life. Devlin v. Commonwealth, S, C. Pa., Nov. 20, 1882; 13 Pittsb. L. J., 143.

13. EVIDENCE-QUALITY OF GOODS FURNISHED. The quality of goods furnished at a given time by the plaintiff to the defendant being in question, it is competent for the plaintiff to show that the quality of like articles furnished at the same time

by him to another party was good, if such evidence be followed by evidence that the goods furnished by him at that time to such other party and the goods furnished by him at that time to the defendant were of the same kind and quality. Ames v. Quinby, U. S. S. C., Nov. 13, 1882; 5Morr. Trans., 99.

14. FEDERAL COURTS-FOLLOW STATE PRACTICENEW TRIALS.

1. Section 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Colorado grants as of right, without cause shown, one new trial to each party, as it may in turn have a verdict or judgment rendered against it in an action of ejectment. 2. The law of the State in that respect is binding on the Circuit Court of the United States in cases tried in that State. Equator Min., etc. Co. v. Hall, U. S. S. C., Nov. 13, 1882; 5 Morr. Trans., 92.

15. FEDERAL COURTS-PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT -CERTIFIED QUESTIONS.

In order to give this court jurisdiction on a certificate of division of opinion, the questions certified must be of law and not of fact, and only single points must be certified up, and not the whole case. Weeth v. New England Mortgage Sec'y, U. S. S. C., Nov. 6, 1882; 5 Morr. Trans., 89.

16. FEDERAL COURTS-REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF TERRITORIAL COURTS.

Where the court of last resort of a territory setsaside the findings of an inferior territorial court as contrary to the evidence, its decision so doing is reviewable here only when a statement of the facts in the nature of a special verdict is filed, and not when the evidence at large is set out. Gray v Howe, U. S. S. C., November 13, 1882; 5 Morr.. Trans., 107.

17. HUSBAND AND WIFE-VENDOR'S LIEN-LIABILITY OF LAND PURCHASED BY MARRIED WOMAN. 1. Where a married woman, with the consent of her husband, buys land and gives her promissory notes for part of the purchase-money, and a lien is reserved in the deed of conveyance for the payment of the notes, such lien may be enforced against the land, though the notes be void as against the woman personally. [The husband and wife went into possession, made permanent improvements, and made payments on the notes.] 2. In such case the grantee is not entitled, by reason of her coverture, to have the sale set aside and the purchase-money already paid refunded,. though consenting to account for rents and profits, nor will she, or her husband, be allowed for permanent improvements erected by them. 3. In such case also, in a State where, by contract, interest above the ordinary legal rate may be stipulated for, such interest may be recovered under the vendor's lien, if agreed to be given in the notes for purchase money. Bedford v. Burton, U. S. S. C., November 13, 1882; 5 Morr. Trans., 134.

18. MORTGAGE-ASSIGNMENT OF NOTE. In regard to the assigument of mortgage liens the law of Georgia does not differ from the general rules of law and equity, and therefore, in that State, a transfer by delivery of a promissory note payable to bearer and secured by mortgage, car. ries with it the mortgage lien, so that the holder of the note may foreclose the mortgage by suit in equity in his own name, and without making the mortgagee a party. Winstead v. Bingham, U. S.

C. C., N. D. Ga., August, 1882; 14 Fed. Rep., 1

OF EXCHANGE-REIMBURSEMENT.

1. If the drawee of a bill of exchange is without funds of the drawer and pays the bill, he is entitled to be reimbursed by the drawer; and if there are several drawers, part of whom are securities for the others, all are alike liable to reimburse the drawee in the absence of any understanding to the contrary. 2. Where a bill of exchange is made payable to S, and at the time of its execution, C signs his name on the back, he becomes a party to the request upon the drawee to pay the bill; and in an action by the drawee to recover the amount paid in taking up the bill, C is to be regarded as a drawer. Church v. Swope, S. C. Ohio, Nov. 28, 1882; 3 Ohio L. J., 261.

20. PARTNERSHIP-COMPENSATION AS BETWEEN

PARTNERS-IMPLICATION OF LAW. Unless there be an agreement to that effect, no compensation will be allowed one partner for his services about the partnership business; but the law will sometimes imply an agreement, and where one partner devotes his time and attention to the business, while the other does not, there will be an implied agreement to compensate him for such services. Sheridan v. Healy, N.Y. Supreme Ct., 15 Chic. Leg. N., 104.

21. PRACTICE-SUNDAY LAW-WRITS RETURNABLE ON SUNDAY.

Certain writs were made returnable on Sunday, the term of court beginning the following Monday. Held, that the writs were voidable, and not void, and that in such cases an amendment will be granted, where it appears that no person will be prejudiced thereby. Norton v. Dover, U. s. C C., D. N. H., October 31, 1882; 14 Rep. 641.

22. RAILROAD MORTGAGE - FORECLOSURE- RIGHT TO APPEAL.

Where a decree had been made in a foreclosure suit brought by a trustee for creditors against a railroad that the property be sold, that various labor and supply claimants be allowed their claims, and that the purchasers at the sale should assume the payment of the labor and supply claims, it was held, 1. That the trustee and those it represented were not interested in the result of an appeal against the allowance of the labor and supply claims, and could not therefore sustain an appeal from the decree allowing them. 2. That the purchasers could not maintain an appeal from the allowance of less than $5,000 to any of the respective claimants, and that as the interests of the claimants were several and not joint, they could not, by being added together, give such purchasers the right of appeal. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Waterman, U. S. S. C., Nov. 13, 1882; 5 Morr. Trans., 139.

28. SALE CONDITION PRECEDENT-DELIVERY. Appellee agreed with one Hart to sell and deliver to him at Miller's station, one car load of wheat, payment to be made on delivery. The wheat was loaded in a car furnished by Hart, who nailed up the car ready for shipment. Hart then said he did not have the money for the wheat with him, but would obtain it the next day; whereupon appellee told him he could not have the wheat until it was paid for, to which Hart assented. Without the knowledge of the appellee, Hart then procured a bill of lading from the railroad company and sold the wheat to appellant Start, who had no notice of appellee's claim. Held, appellee's sale to Hart was upon the condition precedent that Hart should pay for the wheat on delivery. The

attempted sale of wheat by Hart did not preclude appellee from recovering his property by replevin. Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Erwin, 8. C. Ind., Nov. 27, 1882.

24. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS. A party contracting to sell and exchange his house for the house of another, after fulfilling the contract on his part, and being let into possesion by the other party, can enforce the entire specifie performance of the contract, whether the memorandum of sale was a sufficient writing under the statute or not. Bigelow v. Armes, U. S. S. C., November 6, 1882; 5 Morr. Trans., 79.

25. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-CONTRACT FOR INTEREST IN LAND.

Where a vendee of land under articles of agreement contracts with a third party that the title shall be conveyed to such third party upon consideration that the vendee shall share in the profits of a resale, this is not a contract for an interest in land within the meaning of the statute of frauds. Benjamin v. Zell, S. C.Pa., October 2, 1882; 12 W. N. C., 248.

RECENT LEGAL LITERATURE.

BUMP ON FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES. A Treatise upon Conveyances made by Debtors to Defraud Creditors, containing references to all the cases, both English and American. By Orlando F. Bump. Third Edition. Baltimore, Md.. 1882: Cushings & Bailey.

This work is too well known to require more at our hands than the formal announcement of the issue of the third edition. It is a thorough and masterly treatise by a specialist who has made an extended study of the law of Insolvency in all its phases, one of which is exhaustively treated in the volume before us. The value of such a work can hardly be exaggerated.

LAW OF BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS. The Law of Building Associations, being a Treatise upon the Principles of Law Applicable to Mutual and Cooperative Building. Homestead, Saving, Accumulating, Loan and Fund Associations, Benefit Building Societies, etc., in the United States. By G. A. Endlich. Jersey City, N. J., 1882: F. D. Linn & Co.

Mr. Endlich's purpose, as indicated in his preface, was "to secure a statement of the entire law applicable to Building Associations." This he has certainly accomplished with complete success. While thus covering a large field, his arrangement and treatment of the subject is of the simplest and clearest character. There is no trace of confusion or obscurity in any part of the work; and, with the aid of an excellent index, the practitioner is enabled to turn at once to the law on any question which confronts him.

The mass of the litigation of building associations is peculiar in this, that it is against their own members, seldom, if ever, against an outsider;