called as a witness on the trial, who deposes that he took the boots off the prisoner upon his arrest, that he compared them with the footmarks near the place of the alleged crime, and that they corresponded in every particular. "You compared them, I suppose,' usually asks the judge, "by placing the boots in the impressions, and found that they corresponded?" "Yes, my lord." The answer is fatal to that branch of evidence, for the placing the boot in the impression found very possibly caused the similarity relied upon; the prudent officer places the prisoner's boot beside the footprint, presses it into the earth, and then removes it, compares the impression made with the one discovered.-Leisure Hour. NOTES. -The celebrated reply of Lord Thurlow to the Duke of Grafton, who reproached him with his plebian extraction, and his recent elevation to the peerage, is thus described. He rose from the wool-sack, and advanced slowly to the place from which the chancellor generally addressed the house; then turning towards the duke, he said: "I am amazed at the attack the noble duke has made upon me. Yes, my lords," considerably raising his voice, "I am amazed at his grace's speech. The noble duke can not look before him, behind him, or on either side of him, without seeing some noble peer, who owes his seat in this house to his successful exertions in the profession to which I belong. Does he not feel it as honorable to owe it to these as to being the result of accident? To all these noble lords the language of his grace is as applicable and as insulting as it is to myself. But I don't fear to meet it single and alone. No one venerates the peerage more than I do; but, my lords, I must say that the peerage solicited me-not I the peerage. Nay more-I can say and will say, that as a peer of Parliament, as speaker of this right honorable house, as Keeper of the Great Seal, as keeper of his majesty's conscience, as Lord Chancellor of England-nay, even in that character alone in which the noble duke would think it an affront to be considered-but which character none can deny me-as a man, I am at this moment as respectable-I beg leave to add-I am at this moment as much respected-as the proudest peer I now look down upon. The effect of this speech, both within the walls of Parliament and out of them was prodigious. It gave Lord Thurlow an ascendancy of the house which no chancellor had ever possessed, and it invested him in public opinion with a character of independence and honor. -A characteristic story is told of the Borderers' exploits, and the dangers which judges encountered. The Earl of Traquair, when engaged in a lawsuit, dreaded the Lord President Durie's opposition. The earl's servant, Will Armstrong, as the judge was riding in the suburbs one afternoon, threw a trooper's cloak over him, and did not slacken his steed till Durie was safely lodged in the tower of the Graemes in Annandale. Will boasted he stole "an auld lurdane aff the bench." It was a bold trick, a bit of Border fair play in a lawsuit, and the Border-side rang with laughter against the kidnapped judge. In good time Will set down the judge at the council doors in Edinburgh And there full loudly shouted he: -A Toronto lawyer, who was one of a party out hunting lately in the Muskoka district, had a narrow escape from the rather dangerous embraces of a bear. The incident is an amusing one. It appears that the members of the party had arranged that they should take turns at the cooking. The gentleman in question did not take kindly to this work, and when the remainder of the party returned from the chase he was invariably asleep, not having prepared a meal. His companions became tired of this conduct, and on this occasion ordered him out to bring in some game. This he proceeded very gladly to do. In a few minutes, however, he was seen returning at the top of his speed, with an immense bear in hot pursuit. He dashed into the shanty, the heavy doors of which were at once barred against the would-be intruder, the gallant hunter exclaiming, "Boys, here's your fresh meat, all alive." After some dozen shots had been fired into the bear's body from the roof of the shanty, where the gallant hunters had managed to crawl through one of the numerous smoke-holes, they descended, and after some slight delay in removing the skin, were soon enjoying a hearty dinner of bear steaks. It appears that when the bear was first seen by the hunter, he had his back turned toward that gentleman, who, taking aim rather nervously, managed, if not to seriously wound the brute, at least to irritate him, the brute turning upon the hunter. -In one of the English law courts the then well-known counsel, Mr. Phillimore, was pleading against Sergt. Something, socially his bosom friend, forensically his deadly enemy. It was the case of the theft of some donkeys, and there was a dispute as to the number and sex of the animals. The judge got bothered and testily asked: "How many asses were there in the plaintiff's stable on the night of the robbery?" Three, my lord," answered the sergeant; "two mares and a colt." "Nay, my lud, four," put in the opposing advocate; "four donkeys in all." "Ah, yes, true! I beg your ludship's and my learned brother's pardon. He reminds me that there were four donkeys present-two mares, one colt, and one filly more," -London Society, The Central Law JournKİ, ST. LOUIS, NOVEMBER 17, 1882. CURRENT TOPICS. There is a statute in Pennsylvania, designed for the protection of the traveling public, and, incidentally, of the railroads, making the sale of railroad tickets by an unauthorized person, or, as it is known in railway slang, "ticket scalping," a misdemeanor, and subjecting the scalper to fine and imprisonment. Act May 6, 1863, P. L. 582. Nothing in the language of the act forbids the purchase of such a ticket. But at least one of the roads, as appears from the facts contained in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sleeper v. Pennsylvania R. Co., attributed to this act the effect of nullifying and rendering void such a ticket in the hands of any purchaser for value. The plaintiff purchased a ticket from a scalper in New York, over the defendant's road to Philadelphia, and on its presentation was ejected from the cars at Elizabethtown. On an action for damages, it was urged that the ticket was bought from one who sold in violation of the Pennsylvania statute. It was not said that the vendor in New York was actually guilty of the statutory offense, but that the defendant being a corporation in Pensylvania, and the stipulated right of passage being partly in Pennsylvania, her courts would not enforce a contract resting upon acts which the legislature has declared criminal. The court ruled otherwise. Says Trunkey, J.: "Such tickets are evidence of the holder's title to travel on the railroad. Prior to the statute in Pennsylvania it was lawful for holders to sell them. The property in them passes by delivery. The act of 1863 confers no right upon a railroad company to question passengers as to where or how they procured tickets, or to eject them from the cars upon suspicion that the tickets were sold to them by a person who was not an agent for the company. At common law, which is deemed in force in absence of evidence to the contrary, the contract made by the plaintiff in New York was valid. It was executed. No part remained to be performed. It vested in him the evidence of title to a passage over Vol. 15-No. 20. the railroad. His act had no savor of illegality or immorality. It was a mere purchase of the obligation of a common carrier to carry the holder according to its terms. The defendant issued the obligation, received the consideration, and became liable for performance at the date of issue. As transferee, the plaintiff claimed performance. This is the contract which is the basis of the cause of action. It is purposely made so as to entitle the bona fide holder to performance, and for breach, to an action in his own name. Let it be assumed that the defendant made the contract in Pennsylvania, it is quite as reasonable to assume that tickets for passengers coming from New York into Pennsylvania were sold in New York. But wherever the contract was made, it is true, as claimed by the defendant, 'this action is to enforce, not the contract between the ticket scalper and the plaintiff in error, but between the defendant in error and the plaintiff in er ror.'"' An interesting discussion recently arose in a Wisconsin case on the subject of the duties of firemen with reference to the rescue of persons from burning buildings. The circumstances were these: During a conflagration which destroyed the principal hotel of Oshkosh, the Beckwith House, two several attempts were made by firemen to rescue a Mrs. Paige, who was in rooms on the fourth story. Both of these failed. Mrs. Paige's husband, the defendant, who was in the crowd below, then made in substance the following offer: "I will give $5,000 to any person who will bring the body of my wife out of that building, dead or alive." The plaintiff, Reif, who was an assistant engineer of the fire department, ascended the ladder, entered the room and brought out the body of Mrs. Paige, who had been burned to death. Upon the refusal of Mr. Paige to pay the reward, he brought suit. In the trial court, the plaintiff was nonsuited, principally upon the ground that inasmuch as he was an officer and paid member of the fire department, the rescue of Mrs. Paige's body, although accomplished at the imminent peril of his life, was within the scope of his official duty, for the performance of which he could not claim any bounty or reward. It was upon this point, too, that the decision of the court above turned. It was conceded on the part of the plaintiff, that if the rescue of the remains of Mrs. Paige, at the peril of his life, was within the scope of his duty as fireman, he can not recover. Counsel for the defendant, while not contending that it was the duty of the plaintiff as fireman, to imperil his life by going into the building for Mrs. Paige, or that the act was not a very perilous one, maintains that it was in the nature of extra or extra hazardous services in the line or scope of his duty, and being so, the law will not permit him to contract for a reward for doing the act. Says LYONS, J., in delivering the opinion of the court: "It is difficult to perceive how it can properly be said that it was within the scope or line of the plaintiff's duty to do the act, when it was not his duty to do it. It is conceded for the purposes of the case that it was his duty as a fireman to rescue Mrs. Paige from the flames if he could do so without hazarding his own life. It was not his duty to do so at the hazard of his life. Can it properly be said that it was in the line or scope of his duty to rescue her at the imminent peril of losing his life, when his duty did not require him to do so. We confess our inability to perceive any satisfactory grounds upon which this question may be answered affirmatively. In the law of agency we find that principals are often held responsible for the unauthorized acts of their agents, because such acts are within the scope of the authority of such agents; although not within their actual authority. The principal is held in such a case because he has clothed his agent with apparent authority to do the act, and a person to whom the agent is accredited may Ideal with him on the faith that he has the authority to bind his principal which he appears to have, and may hold the principal as effectually as though the agent had actual authority in the premises. Hence when it is said that a given act of an agent, although unauthorized, is within the scope of his authority, and therefore binds his principal, it only signifies that the principal has apparently given his agent authority to do the act, and as against a person dealing with the agent in good faith, he shall not be heard to deny the agent's authority. But where the question is one of duty, there seems to be no room for the application of any such principle. If it is not the duty of a person to render a specified service, we fail to comprehend how it can correctly be said that the service is within the line or scope of his duty-that is to say, that although it is not actually his duty to render the service-yet, because it is his apparent duty to do so, he shall be held to the same consequences as though it were his actual duty. It seems to us that the mere statement of the proposition is sufficient to show that it is untenable." THE FORECLOSURE OF PLEDGES. A pledge is something put in pawn or deposited with another as security for a debt or for the performance of some agreement; and the contract is confined to personal property.1 Notes, bonds, stocks, and in general all kinds of personal chattels, may be given or delivered in pledge, and the mere delivery of a chattel or chose in action is sufficient.2 A familiar distinction made in the books between a pledge and a mortgage is, that in the case of a pledge, the title remains in the pledgor; while in the case of a mortgage, the title passes to the mortgagee, subject to be divested. This time-honored discrimination has lost much of its force in those States where, as in Michigan, the true theory of the chattel mortgage is held to be analagous to that of real estate mortgages, and to constitute a mere lien upon property, the title to which still remains in the mortgagor; while the almost universal statutory provisions requiring either an actual change of possession of the mortgaged property, or the filing or recording of the mortgage, remove another of the ancient distinctions between a mortgage and a pledge. A pledge differs from a mere lien. The distinction is said to be that a mere lien can not be enforced by sale by the act of the party, but that a pledge is a lien with a power of 1 Edwards on Bailment, sec. 176; Jones on Bailm.. 118; Story on Bailm., sec. 286; Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Den. 227; Markham v. Jandon, 41 N. Y. 235. 2 Edwards on Bailm., sec. 176; McLean v. Walker, 10 Johns. 472; Campbell v. Parker, 9 Bosw. 322. * Brown v. Bement, 8 Johns. 98; Wood v. Dudley, 8 Vt. 435; Bonsey v. Ames, 8 Pick. 236; 2 Story Eq. Jur., sec. 1030; Jones on Chat. Mortgages, secs. 4-7. 4 Kohl v. Lynn, 34 Mich. 360; Cary v. Hewitt, 26 Mich. 228; Lucking v. Wesson, 25 Mich. 443. sale superadded.5 Bnt it is not the purpose of this article to deal with the nature of pledges in general, but simply with the question: How may a pledge be foreclosed? The solution of this problem depends quite largely upon the circumstances and conditions under which the pledge is given. In some cases, no agreement is made as to the conduct of the pledgee upon default, but the parties are left to to the rules of the common law; while in other cases, definite and specific provisions are declared in accordance with which the rights of the parties shall be adjusted. I. It is proposed to consider first, the mode of foreclosure under the ordinary contract of pledge, where no particular provisions are made for that purpose by the parties. Keeping in mind, then, the definition of a pledge as a bailment of personal property as security for some debt or engagement, it may be stated first, in general terms, that nonpayment of the debt at the stipulated time, did not work a forfeiture of the pledge either by the civil or at the common law. It simply clothed the pledgee with authority to sell the pledge and reimburse himself for his debt, interest and expenses, and the residue of the proceeds of the sale then belonged to the pledgor. The old rule, existing in the time of Glanvil, required a judicial sentence to warrant a sale, unless there was a special agreement to the contrary. But as the law now is, the pledgee may sell without judicial process, upon giving reasonable notice to the pledgor to redeem and of the intended sale; or he may file his bill in chancery for a foreclosure and proceed to a judicial sale. 6 The pledgee's right to sell the pledge and apply the proceeds to the payment of his demand, is an implied authority arising from the nature of the transaction. The debtor intends that the security shall be made available and the proceeds applied, if necessary, to the satisfaction of the debt; and the law 5 Walter v. Smith, 2 Barn & Ald. 439; McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325; s. C., 7 Am. Rep. 341. 6 Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Den. 227; Cortleyon v. Lansing, 2 Caines Cas. 204; 7 Am. Dec. 296; 2 Kent's Com. 581. 582; Tucker v. Wilson, 1 P. Wms. 261; Lockwood v. Ewer, 2 Atk. 303; Johnson v. Varnon, 1 Bailey's S. C. Rep. 527; Perry v. Craig, 3 Mo. 516; Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. 40; Story's Eq. Jur., sec. 1008; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 100; Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61; Garlick v. James, 12 Johns. 64; 7 Am. Dec. 294; Edwards on Bailm., sec. 279. sanctions a sale by the pledgee under proper restrictions, as a safe and convenient mode of applying the pledge in payment of the debt.7 Under the ordinary contract of pledge, the pledgee's right to sell, at common law, does not accrue until after a default is made in the payment of the debt secured, or in fulfilling the engagement. It is a breach of trust to sell the pledge before the debt becomes due, or before the principal obligation matures. His right to sell arises, like that of the mortgagee of chattels, upon default; until that occurs, he holds the property merely as a security. The right to foreclose, or to sell the pledge, is a remedy given to the creditor to enforce the principal obligation; the pledgee can not therefore resort to either of these remedies until his right accrues to enforce that principal obligation. 8 Supposing, then, that default has occurred in the conditions of the pledge made under the ordinary contract, without any express stipulation between the parties as to the mode of procedure, in what way may the pledgee avail himself of the benefit of the security? 1. The pledgee may, after the debt becomes due, sell the pledge without resorting to judicial process; but before he can proceed to such a sale under the usual contract of pledge, he must demand payment of the debt; he must call upon the pledgor to redeem, and must give him a reasonable opportunity to do so. The right to sell is conditioned upon a prior demand, and is to be exercised in a reasonable manner, after giving the pledgor a reasonable time to redeem the pledge. Hence a waiver of notice of sale, embodied in the contract or pledge, does not dispense with the necessity for such prior demand, and the rule is the same where the principal debt is already due. The law requires a demand so that the pledgor may redeem, and thus save himself from a sacrifice of his property on a forced sale. It also requires that the pledgee shall give the pled gor 7 Pigot v. Cubley, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 701; Cortleyon v. Lansing, 2 Caines Cas. 200; 7 Am. Dec. 297; Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray (Mass.), 382; Garlick v. James, 12 Johns. 146; 7 Am. Dec. 294; Robinson v. Hanley, 11 Iowa, 410; Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 62; Nelson v. Edwards, 40 Barb. 279. 8 Dykers v. Allen, 7 Hill, 497; Johnson v. Stear, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 330; Spaulding v. Barnes, 4 Gray (Mass.), 330. notice of the time and place of the proposed sale, so that he may be present, if he see fit, and prevent the sale by a redemption.9 There does not appear to be any reason to prevent the demand of payment being made at the time the notice of sale is given. As steps prerequisite to a sale, they are not to be confounded; the object of the demand is to prevent a sale by rendering it unnecessary, and the object of a notice of sale is to enable the debtor to take proper measures to insure a fair sale, and both must be reasonable in point of time. 10 To authorize a sale by the pledgee, the notice given to the pledgor must be a personal one. As to what shall be deemed a reasonable notice, there appears to be no established rule, but this must be determined largely by the nature of the goods pledged. The cases agree that a sale may be had on a reasonable previous demand and notice of the time and place of sale, and that the object of this notice is to give the pledgor an opportunity to redeem, or to attend the sale for the purpose of seeing that the property is not sacrificed.11 This being the object, it is evident that what would be a reasonable notice in one case, might be entirely inadequate in another. Thus stocks might be sold upon the Stock Exchange with entire safety upon a much shorter notice than merchandise pledged could be sold in a remote inland district. 12 It has been thought that a notice similar to that required on execution sales of similar property would be sufficient, upon the presumption that what the law would consider adequate notice to protect the rights of an 9 Wilson v. Little, 2 N. Y. 443; Genet v. Howland, 45 Barb. 560; Hanks v. Drake, 49 Barb. 186; Markham v. Jandon, 41 N. Y. 235; Stevens v. Hurlbut, 31 Conn. 146; Davis v. Funk, 39 Pa. St. 243; Milliken v. Dehon, 27 N. Y. 334; Merwin v. Hamilton, 6 Duer, 244; Lawrence v. Maxwell, 53 N. Y. 19; Stanton v. Jerome, 54 N. Y. 480; Ogden v. Lathrop, 65 N. Y. 158; Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. 40; Mowry v. Wood, 12 Wis. 413; Gay v. Moss, 24 Cal. 725; Washburn v. Pond, 2 Allen, 473; Bryan v. Baldwin, 52 N. Y. 233. 10 Howe v. Bemis, 2 Gray (Mass.), 203; Genet v. Howland, 45 Barb. 560; Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. 40; Washburn v. Pond, 2 Allen (Mass.), 474. 11 Lewis v. Graham, 4 Abbott's Pr. 106; Wheeler v. Newhold, 5 Duer, 29; 16 N. Y. 392; Brass v Worth, 40 Barb. 462; Strong v. Nat. Bank Asssociation, 45 N. Y. 718, Markham v. Jandon, 41 N. Y. 235; Brown v. Ward, 3 Duer, 660, and cases cited above. 12 Willoughby v. Comstock, 3 Hill, 389; Bryan v. Baldwin, 7 Lans. 174; Baltimore F. Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 242; Vose v. Florida Ry. Co., 50 N. Y. 369. execution debtor, ought to be sufficient to protect a pledgor. The sale, taking place under these circumstances, must be open and public. It must be made at public auction, at a place open to the general public, and under circumstances fitted to insure a sale for an adequate price. 13 The property to be sold should be present, subject to inspection and examination, and should be sold in bulk or in parcels, as will best realize the largest sum therefor, and no more should be sold than is necessary to satisfy the debt.14 The pledgee should not buy the pledge himself, and he should take all proper and customary precautions, in the time and manner of sale, of notice or advertisement, and the like, to protect effectually the pledgor's interest and property. 15 A party holding a pledge as security for a debt owing to himself, is under no obligation to proceed and sell within any given time, nor is he bound in the first instance to resort to the property for the payment of the debt. 16 He may also, if he see fit, collect his debt by levying upon and selling the property pledged.17 Until an actual foreclosure, the pledgor has always the right to redeem the pledge by paying the amount due. If no time is fixed for the redemption of the pledge, the pledgor may redeem at any time, and the right of redemption survives on his death to his legal representatives, against the pledgee and his representatives. 18 representatives. 18 A pledgee has, however, no right under the above rules, to sell notes or ordinary choses in action. The law infers that the true intent of the transaction in cases of this kind is, that the pledgee shall receive the moneys on the securities as they fall due, or collect them by suit, and, out of the proceeds thus arising, to satisfy his claim.19 13 Brown v. Ward, 3 Duer. 660; Schepeler v. Eisner, 3 Daly, 11. 14 Cresson v. Stout, 17 Johns. 116; Bruce v. Westervelt, 2 E. D. Smith, 440; Sheldon v. Soper, 14 Johns. 252; Howard v. Ames, 3 Met. (Mass.) 311; Fitzgerald v. Blocker, 32 Ark. 742; 29 Am. Rep. 3. 151 Story's Eq., secs. 308-323; 2 Parson's on Cont., 120. 16 Granite Bank v. Richardson, 7 Met. 407; Case V. Boughton, 11 Wend. 106; Elder v. Rouse, 15 Wend. 218; Butterworth v. Kennedy, 5 Bosw. 143; Rozett v. McCellan, 48 Ill. 345; Townsend v. Newell, 14 Pick. 332. 17 Buck v. Ingersoll, 11 Met. 226; Arendale v. Mor. gan, 5 Sneed. 704. 18 Perry v. Craig, 3 Mo. 516; Cortelyon v. Lansing, upra. 19 Joliet Iron Co. v. Scioto Fire Brick Co., 82 Ill. |