injunction should not have been removed, but should have been continued to the final hearing.” Further, that if, upon the hearing, the jury should be of opinion that this stable with its inmates and attendants is not a nuisance of itself, but that it may be kept in such manner as to make it unobjectionable, they will no doubt require that it shall be kept in this manner, or provide adequate protection to the complainant." This same subject of building a livery stable again came before this court on the granting of an injunction to restrain its erection, and is reported in 20 Ga. 537. It was there held that to enjoin nuisances in the course of erection, the evil sought to be remedied must not be "merely probable, but certain;" and Lumpkin, C. J., in the opinion adds "inevitable." And further, that if "the establishment were properly kept, that instead of being certain that the stable would be a nuisance, the probability is that it would not be." This brings the rule where we think the law puts it, that livery stables may be so located as to become nuisances; and so may any private stable be located with reference to the dwellings, or places of business of others, and be so improperly kept and conducted as to become an actionable nuisance. But the mere probability that it will become so, is insufficient to deprive the owner of a lot, of the right to erect a stable for his own use, although it may be on the line of his lot, and quite near the dwelling of an adjacent owner. It is true that he who thus builds must, at his peril, guard against such construction as that its ordinary use would disturb adjacent owners by the noises produced, or manage it in such a way as not to permit offensive stenches to emanate therefrom and float over his neighbor's premises to his serious annoyance and discomfort. Although there are variations in the different courts in the manner of stating the law, we think that this is the proper legal rule on the subject, as well as that it is the most general one adopted. Wood on Nuis., secs. 526-7-8-9.

It was ruled by the Supreme Court of Texas, in Burdett v. Swanson, 17 Tex. 489: "It would seem that a livery stable in a town is not necessarily or prima facie a nuisance, but that it depends on whether from the manner in which it is either built, kept or used it destroys the comfort of persons owning adjoining premises, or impairs the value of their property." In Iredell, 244, it was held that a stable in a town is not like a slaughter pen or a hog stye, necessarily or prima facie a nuisance, though in itself it be a convenient and lawful erection." In 11 Humph. 407, the court say, that "a livery stable in a town is not necessarily a nuisance in itself, and therefore a court of equity has no jurisdiction to restrain by injunction, either the completion of a building because intended for that purpose, nor its appropriation to the use intended." In the case of Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 Mylne & Keene, cited 2 Story's Eq., sec. 924, note 1,Lord Brougham says, that "no instance can be produced of the interposition of

courts of equity by injunction in the case of an eventual or contingent nuisance." If, then, this be the law in reference to livery stables, the right to build a private one should not be denied, and especially so upon the apprehension that it will become a nuisance. In this case all the allegations, except the mere location, are speculative and contingent; the bill was therefore without equity, and should have been dismissed. Whilst the building of this stable may not be a kindly or neighborly act, yet with this the courts have nothing to do; they are simply to decide whether in itself it is an unlawful one, and therefore to be suppressed. To hold that there is equity in this bill is to hold, that the building of a private stable on one's own lot is per se a nuisance, and that an adjacent owner may dictate its location upon some other part of the lot, because he has seen fit to build his own house within nine feet of the line. To send it to the jury would be for them to pass on that which does not yet, and may never, exist; that is, whether the manner in which it is to be used, or the manner in which it is to be kept will make it a nuisance.

provided by statute, without waiting for a suit to be begun against him or his vessel for the loss out of which the liability arises. Ex parte Slayton, U. S. S. C., Md. Law Rec., July 1, 1882.

3, ATTORNEY AND (LIENT-EXTENT OF AUTHORITY -COMPROMISE OF ACTION.

An attorney at law can not, by virtue of his genera[ retainer and authority, accept in satisfaction of a judgment he has obtained for a client, a less sum than is really due, binding the client. Robinson v. Murphy, S. C. Ala.

4. BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE

DISEASE.

VENEREAL

Where defendant failed to perform such contract upon the ground that he was afflicted with a disease which rendered him unfit for the married state, it was held that he would be answerable in damages if the disease was contracted subsequently to the time of making the promise, or if before, and he knew his infirmity was incurable; but if it was contracted prior to the promise and he had reason to believe it to be temporary only, he is excusable for a breach resulting from a knowledge afterwards acquired that it was of long duration. Allen v. Baker, S. C. N. C., 1 Am. Law Mag., 191. 5. CHATTEL MORTGAGE SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITIONS.

A mortgage of furniture then in a dwelling house, and of that afterwards to be purchased, conveys a valid title to that only of which the mortgagor was then the owner. The mortgage being void as to after-acquired property a mere delivery of the same by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, the former retaining the possession and control, does not transfer a valid title as against attaching creditors. In such a case the mortgagee can not hold the subsequently purchased property as against attaching creditors, because the mortgage when recorded did not embrace it. He can not hold it as a pledge because he did not retain the possession. Griffith v. Douglas, S. C. Me., May 31, 1882, Reporter's Advance Sheets.

6. COMMON CARRIER-RIGHTS OF COLORED PASSENGER HOLDING A FIRST-CLASS TICKET.

A colored lady who had purchased and held a firstclass ticket was entitled to admission into the ladies' car, if there was room for her therein; and if she was refused admission and the railroad company declined to carry her except in the smoking car, containing only men, some of whom were smoking, she had a right to decline such accommodations, and it is liable to her in damages. Gray v. Cincinnati Southern R. Co., U. S. C. C., S. D. Ohio, April 18, 1882, 11 Fed. Rep., 683. 7. CONTRACTS-FUTURES"-WAGERS. Whatever may be the form of the contract, if from the nature of the transaction and the circumstances surrounding it, it is apparent that the purpose is not to buy or sell the goods, and that no delivery of them is intended, but that at the time appointed for delivery the transaction should be closed upon the basis of the then market price of the goods, the losing party paying the difference, even though there be no statute denouncing it, such contract is void. Hawley v. Bibb, S. C. Ala. 8. CONTRACT- UNDUE INFLUENCE ASSIGNMENT BY PERSON OF FEEBLE MIND.

Where a person feeble in mind and body and incapable of exercising control over his property, or of managing it in a prudent, careful manner, or of making any contract in reference thereto, was unduly influenced to purchase an interest in a

CONTRACT "CONTROL" OF A

-

patent right of doubtful utility, and in consideration therefor to assign notes and a mortgage on real property to the defendant, held, that such assignment is void, and transfers no title to the assignee. Colburn v. Van Velzer, U. S. C. C., D. Minn., May, 1882, 11 Fed. Rep., 795. 9. CORPORATION CORPORATION. Where a railroad company made a contract concerning all roads which it then did or might thereafter control, by ownership, lease or otherwise, and thereafter acquired more than a majority of the stock of B, another railway company, and by voting such stock elected B's board of directors; and where certain persons were members of the board of directors of both A and B, and the same persons were respectively presidents and vice-presidents of both companies, held, that A had not acquired "control" of B, within the meaning of the terms of the contract, and that the word "control," as used in said contract, meant an immediate or executive control exercised by the officers and agents chosen by and acting under the direction of A's board of directors. Pullman Palace Car Co v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., U.S.C. C., E.D.Mo., April 25, 1882, 11 Fed. Rep., 634.

10. CORPORATION-POWER OF STOCKHOLDER TO ENFORCE CORPORATE RIGHT.

Where the legislature of a State has repealed the charter of a street railroad company, and transferred its franchises and track to another, and the corporation refuses to seek a remedy in the courts, a stockholder of the company will have a standing in a court of equity, who asks an injunction on the ground that the repealing statute impairs the obligation of a contract. Greenwoodv. Union Freight Ry. Co., U. S. S. C., January 9, 1882, 6 Va. L. J., 410. 11. CRIMINAL LAW

OATH.

PERJURY EXTRA-JUDICIAL

Perjury can not be assigned upon an extra-judicial oath. So, where the law does not require a proceeding to be sworn to, an indictment for perjury will not lie, even if the affidavit on which it is predicated is false. Linn v. Commonwealth, S. C. Pa., 14 Ch. Leg. N. 332.

12. CRIMINAL LAW-PRESENCE OF DEFENDANT. Where the record fails to show affirmatively that the

defendant was personally present in court when a day was fixed for trial and an order was made for summoning a special venire, this court will not presume that he was so present, and will reverse the judgment of the lower court. The failure of the prisoner to make the objection in the lower court does not waive the irregularity. Sylvester v. State, S. C. Ala., 1 Aia. L. J., 184.

13. CRIMINAL LAW-UNITED STATES MAIL-INDECENT MATTER.

The term "indecent" in section 3893 of the Revised Statutes, in connection with the offense defined in said section of mailing any book, letter, envelope, postal card, etc., containing any indecent, etc., delineations, epithets, ete., either written or printed, taken with the history of the legislation upon the subject, means immodest, impure; and language which is coarse or unbecoming, or even profane, is not within the inhibition of the act. United States v. Smith, U. S. C. C. D. Ky., 11 Fed. Rep., 663.

14. DAMAGES-MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL EXCLUSION FROM CARS.

In an action against a railroad company to recover

damages for wrongful exclusion from its cars, in which it appeared that the plaintiff, a colored lady, purchased and held a first-class ticket at the time she applied for admission to the ladies' car; that she was lady-like in appearance and conduct, and was at the time carrying a sick child in her arms; and that the company refused to carry her'except in the smoking car, in which were men only, some of whom were smoking; whereupon she left the cars: Held, that she was entitled to such damages as would make her whole, and the jury should consider the loss of time and inconvenience she had been put to, and the proper amount of expenses incurred in the vindication of her rights. Gray v. Cincinnati Southern R. Co., U. S. C. C., S. D. Ohio, April 18, 1882, 11 Fed. Rep., 683. 15. EQUITY-ASSIGNMENT OF A PART OF A CHOSE IN

16. EQUITY BOND AND MORTGAGE INNOCENT HOLDER FOR VALUE.

Parker and wife were indebted to Lamb. Lamb bad in his hands money belonging to Etheridge, which he, Lamb, wanted to get the use of. He thereupon informed Etheridge that he could lend this money out at large interest, well secured, which Etheridge authorized him to do. Lamb then obtained from Parker and wife their bond, payable to him at twelve months, and a deed of trust on Mrs. P.'s separate estate to secure it; but in order to do this he had to give Mrs. P. his own non-negotiable note, payable at twelve months, for the same amount. Both Parker and his wife knew this arrangement was for Lamb to raise money, and Lamb assigned to Etheridge for full value the note of Parker and wife, secured as aforesaid, without any knowledge on the part of Etheridge of the note given Mrs. P. by Lamb. Held, under the circumstances, Etheridge is not affected by any equities which might be supposed to exist between Lamb and Parker and wife, and is entitled to have his debt enforced against Mrs. P's separate estate. Etheridge v. Parker, S. C. App. Va., March Term, 1882, 6 Va. L. J., 428.

17. ESTOPPEL IN PAIS-REPRESENTATIONS. A party is not estopped from asserting a right belonging to him against another party unless he has made a representation or concealment in a matter of fact important to the interest of the other party upon which the other party was authorized to rely, and in fact did actually rely, to his prejudice. A mere expression of opinion, upon facts equally known or open to both, is not a representation upon which a party has a right to rely within the meaning of the doctrine of estoppel. Hurt v. Rifle, U. S. C. C., D. Ind., May, 1882, 11 Fed. Rep., 790.

18. EVIDENCE-BREACH OF PROMISE-MEASURE OF

DAMAGES.

Contracts of promise to marry differ from ordinary, contracts, and upon a trial for breach of same it was held: 1. All the circumstances of the case and the surroundings of the parties should be submitted to the jury. 2. Evidence of the value of the defendant's estate, and of the mortification and pain of mind the plaintiff suffered from his refus

al to fulfill the promise, is competent to be considered by the jury as a standard by which to measure the plaintiff's disappointment and the extent of her loss. Allen v. Baker, S. C. N. C., 1 Am. Law Mag., 191.

19. EVIDENCE-DECLARATIONS OF DECEASED PER

SONS-DATES.

Matters of public or general interest may be proved by the declarations of deceased persons; but not dates or particular facts which are not in themselves matters of general knowledge, though connected with those that are. Southwest School District v. William, S. C. Errors Conn., 14 Ch. Leg. News, 322.

20. EVIDENCE-IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESS-REPU

TATION.

1. In an attempt to impeach a witness, evidence of what his reputation was just before the suit was commenced is admissible to determine his present character. 2. If the reports as to his reputation arose out of the pending controversy, this fact would materially lessen the weight of the testimony. Amidon v. Hasley, S. C. Vt., February Term,.1882, Reporter's Advance Sheets.

21. EXEMPTION-WHEN DOES THE RIGHT ACCRUE—

IMMIGRANT.

A, the head of a family, removed to Nebraska with his family, intending to reside there. Shortly after, and before he occupied a dwelling, his personal property was attached on the ground that he was a non-resident. Held, that he was entitled to the benefit of the exemption law. Held, further, that exempt property may be claimed at any time before it is sold. Chesney v. Francisco, S. C. Neb., 14 Ch. Leg. N. 316.

22. INFANCY-RESCISSION OF MINORS' CONTRACTS-RETURN OF CHATTELS.

The rescission of a minor's contract in this manner, by the return of chattels bought, through the intervention of an agent employed by him for that purpose, is not manifestly nor necessarily prejudicial to the minor, and is therefore not to be classed nor regarded as void; and his appointment of an agent for such purpose is at the worst only voidable; and the opposite party, when thus notified of the rescission, if he refuses to accept the consideration returned,and restore the property, can no longer shield himself under the contract. Even if the failure of the infant to present himself personally to make the rescission were to be regarded as a valid objection-still, if the other party, without questioning the authority of the agent to act in the premises at the time of the tender and demand, simply refuses to restore the property and accept the tender, he may be regarded as waiving the objection. The disability of infancy is a personal privilege which the infant and his legal representatives only are entitled to assert. Towle v. Dresser, S. C. Me., March 9, 1882, Reporter's Advance Sheets.

23. INSOLVENCY-COMPOSITION INDUCED BY FRAUD. A compromise voluntarily made without any fraud or imposition will not be set aside, however disadvantageous it may be; but if a debtor fraudulently conceals his property, and by a false and fraudulent representation of his inability to pay induces his creditors to compound his debt, the creditor will not be bound by the composition. Ackerman v. Ackerman, S. C. N. J., Feb. Term, 1882, 5 N. J. L. J., 179.

24. JURISDICTION-RECOGNIZANCE.

No recovery can be had upon a recognizance taken

in a suit or proceeding when the court to which it is returnable has no jurisdiction of the subject matter. Pike v. Neal, S. C. Me., May 31, 1882, Reporter's Advance Sheets.

25. JUDGMENT-UNASSIGNED-PRIORITY.

A father gave a deed of trust on his real and personal property to secure two debts to his son and one to the trustee of his wife. The deed was substantially in the form prescribed by the Code, and no priority was given any of the debts secured. One of the debts due the son, however, arose out of a judgment which had been obtained against the father, prior to the deed, by another creditor, which debt had been paid off by the son, but no assignment of the judgment taken to himself, although it is referred to in the deed as an execution against the father, which had been settled by the son. Upon the question whether, in the distribu tion of the trust fund, this debt is entitled to priority. Held, it is not, and all three of the debts are to be paid off pari passu. Clark v. Moore, S. C. App. Va., March Term, 1882, 6 Va. L. J., 434. 26. MANDAMUS-ISSUE OF CORPORATE STOCK.

The weight of authority inclines against the right to employ mandamus to compel eertificates of stock to be issued by a corporation, upon the ground that the petitioner for mandamus can receive full indemnity by purchasing other shares in the market and recovering the price thereof against the corporation in an action of law. Mandamus does not lie, unless the petitioner's right to the possession of the shares is clear. If the right claimed is a doubtful one, involving the necessity of litigation to settle it, the remedy by mandamus must be denied. Townes v. Nichols, S. C. Me., May 31, 1882, Reporter's Advance Sheets.

27. NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE

-SUICIDE.

A railroad company is not liable for the death of a person who commits suicide by reason of insanity brought on by an injury inflicted by the company's negligence. Scheffer v. Washington City, etc. R. Co., U. S. S. C., 5 N. J. L. J., 169.

28. NEGLIGENCE REASONABLE CARE AND PRUDENCE-SEX.

In questions of contributory negligence, the rule as to reasonable care and prudence is not affected by the sex of the plaintiff; the same care and caution is required in the case of a woman as of a man. Michigan Central R. Co. v. Hasseneyer, S. C. Mich., April, 1882, 6 Va. L. J., 439.

29. PLEADING EQUITY-ALLEGATION OF FRAUD. A general allegation of fraud is not sufficient in a bill in equity praying for relief, the acts constituting the fraud must be set out. Where the bill alleges that the defendant made fraudulent representations, which are relied upon as constituting the fraud, it should also allege, that the representations were false and made with the knowledge of their want of truth, or made by the party as of his own knowledge when he had no knowledge. Stevens v. Moore, S. C. Me., June 1, 1882, Reporter's Advance Sheets.

30. SUBROGATION-VOLUNTARY PAYMENT. The principle of subrogation, in the absence of special agreement, applies only where the payment is made by one, who is surety for the debt, or is compelled to pay it, in order to protect his own interest, and not where the payment is made voluntarily and without any assignment of the lien. Clark v. Moore, S. C. App. Va., March Term, 1882, Va. L. J., 434

81. WILL-PAROL EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH DEVISE. A party seeking to maintain a devise must show it by the will itself, and no defects in the language used in the instrument can be supplied by parol proof. The true inquiry is, not what the testator meant to express, but what the words used do express. Evidence is however always admissible of the condition of the testator's family and his surroundings to throw light upon his intentions in cases of difficulty. If, however, there be found a subject which satisfies the condition of the property as contained in the will, parol evidence can not be admitted to show that a different subject is meant. The only exception to the rule excluding parol testimony of the intention of the testator, in cases of latent ambiguity, which does not exist in this case. Burk v. Lee, S. C. App. Va., March Term, 1882, 6 Va. L. J. 420.

LEGAL EXTRACTS.

OLD INNS OF COURT CUSTOMS. The history of the Inns of Court in days gone by, apart from its legal interests, affords us a good insight into the festive and social life of our forefathers. Indeed, the merry doings associated with these old institutions are proverbial, and many a graphic picture has been bequeathed to us illustrative of the joviality which once formed a prominent characteristic on all seasons of rejoicing. Thus, it may be remembered, that in the hall of the Middle Temple was performed Shakespeare's "Twelfth Night," a fact recorded in the table-book of John Manningham, a student of the Middle Temple: "Feb. 2, 1601-2. At our feast we had a play called "Twelfth Night, or What You Will."" As Charles Knight remarks in his "Pictorial Shakespeare," "it is yet pleasant to know that there is one locality remaining where a play of Shakespeare was listened to by his contemporaries, and that play Twelfth Night.'" We read, too, how, in the reign of Charles I., the students of the Middle Temple were accustomed at All Hallow-tide, which they considered the beginning of Christmas, to prepare for the festive season, an account of which we find in Whitelock's "Memoirs of Bulstrode Whitelock." Evelyn alludes to the Middle Temple feasts, and describes that of 1688 as "very extravagant and great, as the like had not been seen at any time." Equally famous were the entertainments at the Inner Temple-Christmas, Candlemas, Ascension Day and Halloween having been observed with great splendor. In 1561, the Christmas revels were kept on a very splendid scale. At breakfast, brawn, mustard and malmsey were served; and at the dinner in the hall several imposing ceremonies were gone through. Thus it is related how, between the two courses, first came the master of the game, then the ranger of the forests, who, having blown three blasts of the hunting-horn, paced three times around the fire, then in the middle of the hall. Nine or ten couple of hounds were then bro ight in, with a fox and a cat, which

were set upon by the dogs, amidst the blowing of horns. At the close of the second course the oldest of the masters of the revels sang a song. Finally, after supper, the Lord of Misrule addressed himself to the banquet, which, amongst other diversities, generally concluded with minstrelsy and dancing.

Many of the dinner customs of the Inns of Court are curious. Thus a banquet at the Inner Temple is a grand affair. At six, the barristers and students in their gowns follow the benchers in procession to the dais; the steward strikes the table three times, grace is said by the treasurer or senior bencher present, and dinner commences. The waiters are called "panniers," from the "panarii" who attended the Knight Templars; and in former years it was the custom to blow a horn in every court to announce the meal. The loving cups used on important occasions are huge silver bowls, which are passed down the table filled with time-honored "sack," which consists of "sweetened and exquisitely-flavored white wine;" each student being restricted to a "sip." On the 29th of May a gold cup of this fragrant beverage is handed to each member, who drinks to the happy restoration of Charles II.

Referring to the customs once observed at the Middle Temple banquets, many of these have died out. "The loving cup." Mr. Thornbury remarks in "Old and New London" (I. 179), "once fragrant with sweetened sack, is now used to hold the almost superfluous toothpicks. Oysters are no longer brought in, in Term, every Friday before dinner; nor when one bencher dines does he, on leaving the hall, invite the senior bar-man to come and take wine with him in the Parliament Chamber the accommodation-room of Oxford Colleges)." Dugdale informs us that "until the second year of Queen Elizabeth's reign, this society did use to drink in cups of aspenwood; but then those were laid aside, and green earthenware pots introduced, which have ever since been continued." Amongst the old customs associated with the Middle Temple may be mentioned the calves'-head breakfast which was given by the chief cook of the society to the whole fraternity, for which every member paid at least one shilling. In the eleventh year of James I., however, this breakfast was turned into a dinner, and appointed to be held on the first and second Monday in every Easter Term. The price per head was regularly fixed, and to be paid by the whole society, as well absent as present, and the sum thus collected was divided amongst all the domestics of the house.

The merry doings at Lincoln's-Inn were,in days gone by, kept up with much enthusiasm; and frequent notices of the "Revels" are given by our old writers. Charles Knight, too, in his "Cyclopædia of London," tells us that on such occasions dancing and singing were insisted on, and, by an order of Feb. 6. in the 7th James I., it appears that "the under-barristers were by decimation put out of commons for example's. sake, because the whole Bar were offended by their not dancing

on the Candlemas Day preceding, according to the ancient order of the society, when the judges were present." Of the social customs formerly observed, we read that at each mess it was a rule that there should be a "moot daily;"-the junior member of each mess having to propound to the rest at his table some knotty question of law,which was discussed by each in turn during the dinner. Not many years ago, too, it was the custom for one of the servants, attired in his robes, to go to the threshold of the outer door about twelve or one o'clock, and call out three times, "Venez manger." To quote a further old custom, in the first year of Elizabeth, it was ordered "that no Fellow of the House should wear a beard of above a fortnight's growth, under a penalty of loss of commons, and, in case of obstinancy, of final expulsion."

Gray's-Inn, again, formerly had its masques and revels, when the presentation of plays seems to have been one of the chief features. A comedy, acted at Christmas, 1527, written by John Roos, a student of the inn, so offended Wolsey that its author was actually imprisoned. Amongst the many customs relating to the dining-hall, we are told that in 1581 an agreement was made regarding Easter, in accordance with which the members who came to breakfast after service and communion were to have "eggs and green sauce," at the expense of the House, and that "no calves' heads were to be provided by the cook." In the year 1600 the members were instructed not to come into the hall with their hats, boots or spurs; but with their caps, decently and orderly, "according to ancient orders." Gray's-Inn has also been noted for its exercises known as "bolting," which is thus defined in Cowell's Law Dictionary Bolting is a term of art used in Gray's-Inn, and applied to the bolting or arguing of moot cases."

Lastly, a very curious dinner custom has in years gone by been kept up at Clifford's-Inn. The society consists of two distinct bodies-"the Principal and Rules," and the junior members, or

Kentish Mess." Each body has its own table. At the conclusion of the dinner the chairman of the Kentish Mess, first bowing to the Principal of the Inn, takes from the hand of the servitor some small rolls or loaves of bread, and, without saying a word, he dashes them three several times on the table; he then discharges them to the other end of the table, from whence the bread is removed by a servant in attendance. Solemn silence-broken only by three impressive thumps upon the table-prevails during this ceremony.-Illustrated London News.